The Thesis is that now that a summer victory is gone with even more aid they'll win, this autumn, best case scenario:

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4201955-a-fall-victory-for-ukraine-can-avert-another-winter-of-targeted-brutality/

Unfortunately for them, they're gonna be fighting a war of attrition, to the last retard:

After more than 18 months of grinding, attritional war, it should be obvious that there are no miracle weapons and that there are no alternatives to slowly and methodically reducing Russian forces in Ukraine.

It is time to bury the game-changing weapons narrative and embrace a more realistic understanding of what individual weapon systems can and cannot accomplish—while making sure that Ukraine gets what it needs to continue the fight.

There are numerous reasons why the idea of game-changing weapons is flawed and dangerous. For one, it risks undermining long-term military support by Western governments as their expectations for the effect of specific weapons are not fulfilled. Just think of the ongoing counteroffensive: The fact that Ukrainian soldiers quickly gained proficiency in handling the Leopard 2s and other fresh Western equipment led some commentators and policymakers to believe that this would automatically translate into battlefield success. They did not bother to ask whether just a few months of training on a limited number of vehicles would suffice to pull off a complex combined arms offensive across well-prepared Russian fortifications.

Disappointment can quickly create discord. Accusations fill the air, arguing that the weapons were not supplied fast enough or in sufficient numbers. If this criticism is voiced by Ukrainians, some Western policymakers feel that Kyiv is “ungrateful.”

Even larger quantities—whether of the Taurus alone or in combination with ATACMS—would not guarantee a game-changing impact. As Michael Kofman and Rob Lee pointed out, conducting a successful deep battle campaign is much harder than most commentators seem to think. It is very difficult to interdict supply lines, conduct dynamic targeting, or establish fire control in the deep rear without air superiority. To conduct a more systematic deep battle campaign, Ukraine would need persistent intelligence, as well as better surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities (such as satellites and uncrewed aerial vehicles) to identify and track Russian targets.

Given effective Russian countermeasures—such as electromagnetic jamming of drones, and Ukraine’s lack of high-end reconnaissance platforms and lack of control of the skies—persistent coverage of the Russian rear is a difficult proposition.

The hope that Taurus and ATACMS will be game-changers also seems to ignore systematic Russian adaptation ever since the introduction of HIMARS multiple rocket launchers in the summer of 2022. Russian forces have hardened command and control posts, diversified their supply network, and no longer rely on large, vulnerable ammunition depots close to the front line. Even if Ukraine were able to more systematically employ long-range missiles in larger quantities, it is unclear how effective such a strike campaign would be against a well-entrenched adversary with sophisticated air and missile defense and strong electronic warfare capabilities.

Russian forces are still able to mount counterattacks, conduct counterbattery fire, and keep up relatively steady artillery barrages in the face of Ukrainian attacks.

In short, given missile availability and Russian adaptations, the expectations in what can be accomplished with long-range missiles in the Russians’ deep rear are far beyond what seems to be possible. We should not expect a sudden, disruptive impact on the war effort from additional precision-strike missiles, even if they are armed with a more powerful warhead and have an even longer range, such as ATACMS. Rather, these systems will be an additional asset to help Ukraine slowly attrit Russia’s capacity to wage this war.

In Clown Central Network:

Don't Give Up!

Basic Math, they've "changed tactics" since mid June, so 3 months, let's say 90 days. Lets say they advanced the minimum .7km*90/5= 12.6km, so it's hard to see how that adds up:
3 months:

3 months:

This is over 4 months of "progress":

Even by the lowest estimate it hardly translates to reality, they continue making fools of themselves:

Just Believe!

Believe the studies!

Don't Fold, Strength To The Empire!

Team Challenged:

Same Bunch:

Lessons, in how to decimate your population for no gains.

Why is Ukraine building the largest military cemetery on the face of the Earth?
https://life.pravda.com.ua/society/2023/08/21/256056/

Why does Ukraine have ten times as many amputees as the US did in Vietnam?
https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-ukraine-a-surge-in-amputations-reveals-the-human-cost-of-russias-war-d0bca320

Why does the average Ukrainian personally know 3 people killed in the war?
https://archive.is/Jj9r8

Why did a Ukrainian major general say multiple times that they have hundreds of thousands of dead?

Why is the Ukrainian Rada legalizing the conscription of those with episodic and motor disorders, central nervous system disorders, mild mental retardation, HIV, tuberculosis, and blood disorders?
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/z1467-23#Text

Why does Ukraine have thousands of women in front line non-support roles?
https://it.usembassy.gov/ukrainian-women-fight-for-their-countrys-future/

Why did the Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister say they had 1300 IFVs 400 tanks and 700 artillery systems destroyed in June 2022 when oryx claimed only 132, 200, and 70 destroyed or damaged? Why the 600% difference?
http://nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/6/15/ukraine-to-us-defense-industry-we-need-long-range-precision-weapons
https://archive.ph/pwFMP

Why?

What do they mean "Struggles"!

They are Victorious!

Win!

For context, they haven't captured one village around Bakhmut despite more than 4 months of trying, pre war population of less than 100, image losing thousands of troops, maybe even tens of thousands, to almost capture a village you lost in less than 8 days (1-2 days in and around the village) 10 months earlier.

Now Imagine you thought you'll get paid 400k by Queef:

But they said they're working slow and methodical to preserve manpower! And they also said 400k for benefits.. And that they liberated Andriyfka.. and that they'll be at Sea of Azov in one to three weeks..

Bakhmut City was an Impenetrable Fortress at the crossroads of many important train rail and roadways, it was Fortress Bakhmut and Bakhmut Holds before it quickly became a Grinding Operation to atrit the Russians in an insignificant town. The "one to three weeks" to sea of Azov "spring" counteroffensive now identifies as another such.. grinding operation, where it's not about how much territory they liberate, but how many Russians they destroy:

Imagine if they learn the Russians are only expanding:

Russians on February 24, 2022

Now here's the Russians after

The great Kivv and Kherson Counteroffensive,
The Greatest Summer Counteroffensive Kherson,
The Mighty Kharkov Rout,
The Soledar Encirclement,
The Bakhmut Grinder,
and now The Greatest Attrition Offensive ever:

https://kyivindependent.com/military-intelligence-more-than-420-000-russian-soldiers-deployed-across-occupied-territories/
At this rate the Russians will reach 960k in Ukraine by the time the Ukrainians are done ”Attriting" them in preparation for the Greatest Counteroffensive Spring 2024, just in time for some sapling to form into a shrub:

From Dangerous Shrubs To Danger Behind Every Shrub:

To become shrubs, cringe warning:

Source
Be Vegetables, even The Onion would think this was a joke, but Reality is much more ridiq.

Breakdown indeed

Savor the Seethe:

Bring the Whambulance!

Sthap it Ruzzia!

No, says hateful Russia:

Generations of Attempted Domination!

(Lol, 200k)

Defence in depth is deeply entrenched, who would have thought?! They concluded that right now fighting takes precedence, and when it pauses it'll be rearmament, not peace that follows, until rearmament is no more.