Recent developments around US democracy program aimed at Cuba

Each year, the U.S. Congress funds a federal program that was born in 1995, first under the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, and later also anchored to the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, aimed at promoting a change of political regime in Cuba. I have already introduced here its history and the uniqueness of this effort, particularly the quasi-secret or classified nature with which it operates, and I suggest reading that first installment on the subject as a starting point to understand this one, in which I review how the program has been operating in fiscal years 2022 and so far in 2023.

The State Dept CBJs (FY 2022-2023)

Let's remember that the referred Cuba program is implemented by three U.S. agencies: the State Department —which silently since FY 2015 administers more than two-thirds the annual fund approved by Congress—, USAID, and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Although the latter technically presents itself as an NGO, you have to go back in history to understand that scam. In any case, it is receiving one-third of the funding for the Cuba democracy program through the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL). These agencies then issue calls for U.S. and foreign NGOs to apply for these funds and develop specific projects under their supervision.

The budget request for the program is made from Foggy Bottom, and for fiscal years 2022 and 2023 amounted to US$ 20 million each, the value that as a rule is allocated about 15 years ago. In total, since 1996, about US$ 445 million has been approved by Capitol Hill based on compliance with the provisions of the legislation cited above. Even when the State Dept has decreased the value of the request —Donald Trump himself in Rex Tillerson's time brought it to zero— Congress has kept sending the same amount, being faithful to a recommendation subscribed by a commission instituted by George W. Bush.

The objective described in the 2023 justification in particular states that projects valued at around US$ 11 million would support independent groups and civil society organizations —a concept that is quite popular but with important scientific and ideological connotations and biases— that promote democratic values, human rights, and fundamental freedoms. Another front (to be financed with around US$ 3,5 million) focuses on humanitarian aid to activists, political prisoners, and their families —a vicious circle since the majority of beneficiaries of these resources have fallen into disgrace precisely for being part of the U.S. regime change policy—. Finally, the spotlight of the program is very much focused on projects deployed on the Internet, promoting the "free flow of information" directed to, from, and within Cuba (this is information war, plain and simple, and would have an economic support of over US$ 5,5 million). The budget proposal for FY 2024 is a carbon copy of what I have just described in every way.

Well, to reinforce the strategic and sensitive nature with which both the Administration and Congress plan this program, the Legislature did not include any mention of its funding in any of the explanatory statements of the FYs 2022 and 2023 appropriations acts. It is intuited that the figure of US$ 20 million is maintained, which is then corroborated as the State Department makes new budget requests and sets forth the actual value for each fiscal year.

Asking for new ideas

The last two calls for applications to run programs with this federal funding have been posted on Grants.gov by the State Department's DRL Bureau, which administers most of the balance. The most recent is dated as recently as May 11, places US$ 750,000, and is open to «organizations interested in submitting applications for a program to strengthen independent Cuban civil society on-island through improved collaboration with recently exiled human rights defenders, including artists, journalists, and activists».

Last February the same DRL office introduced another solicitation (with US$ 1,5 million available), initially soliciting proposals and ideas in a 5-page document on how the applicant envisions strengthening independent civil society in Cuba to advance labor rights and empower entrepreneurs. This is explicitly aimed at subverting or at least critically exposing the current trade union system in the country, regardless of the assessment made of how it operates and its correspondence with international law. Based on the merit that the agency finds in the proposals, at a second stage of the process it will invite certain applicant organizations to submit full proposals, with a total of two to be funded.

The last USAID solicitation dates back to July of last year (with US$ 6,25 million available), and had two areas of interest. The first was for projects to «alleviate the hardships of people who have lost some or all of their ability to support themselves and their families because of their political or religious beliefs or efforts to promote and push for democratic freedoms in Cuba». The second focused on «building and supporting a democratic culture in Cuba through greater access to independent, legitimate and uncensored information about the experiences faced by Cuba's citizens» (activities that could be funded under this umbrella included support for independent journalists and activists dedicated to «creating and disseminating information not readily available through the Cuban regime's tightly-controlled press and heavily surveilled and restricted internet»). In the same vein, among the indicators that would serve to illustrate the effectiveness of the project implemented are the number of non-state media that receive U.S. government support in this way, and the number of journalists trained or supported, who regularly specialize in data journalism (working with big data) or investigative journalism.

In its call for proposals, USAID referred to something important, which denotes the comprehensiveness with which the U.S. Government in general plans the execution of the program, and also the direct inclusion of the NED in this effort. According to the agency, they ensure that they don't duplicate efforts by communicating regularly with the State Department's Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) —which administers a smaller but also strategic percentage of the funding, playing a rather coordinating role— and also with their DRL office, as well as with other donors such as the NED. This tells us that each organization that collaborates with Foggy Bottom in the execution of some project is intended to cover specific areas of the Cuban socio-political apparatus that it seeks to subvert.

The WHA issued its last solicitation in correspondence with the funds it administers from the program in June 2022 (just over US$ 543,000 in this case), and aimed to award a grant to an organization that would support emerging Cuban leaders «by training and elevating [their] skillsets [...] to coordinate among themselves on the island, to advocate for democratic principles, and to convey the needs of the Cuban people to a broader audience». Applicants were to be "U.S. non-profit/nongovernmental organizations subject to section 501 (c) (3) of the U.S. tax code and U.S. institutions of higher education".

In particular, the intention was to strengthen the professional capacity of 15 to 20 Cubans between the ages of 25 and 45, to advance community-based causes related to democracy and human rights, with training sessions in a third country other than the United States and on the island itself (virtual or face-to-face). Participants had to be Cuban citizens interested in communications, technology, and leadership roles, and among the skills to be developed were the ability to effectively communicate ideas about democracy and human rights to strategic audiences, and to start or grow community organizations related to democracy-building.

In the case of NED, it awards more than 2,000 grants each year in support of NGO projects that advance its concept of democracy in line with strategic U.S. foreign policy interests. The process for applying for a NED grant and the list of documents and forms that must accompany the proposal is described here. Final decisions to fund applications are made quarterly. In the Cuban case, to be up to date, for FY 2024 the NED plans that, "with sufficient grant funding" —and I emphasize that fact that I take from here—, the country will be a priority (outside the Cuba topic briefly, I found interesting the mention of México and Brazil as "threatened" democracies there). The areas of interest are the same as I have described above when referring to State Department and USAID planning.

Obligations incurred by federal agencies for FY 2022/2023

Here we reach a point in the process where information starts to become scarce. For example, the Government does not report on USASpending.gov or ForeignAssistance.gov the organizations receiving grants through the State Department (when apparently by mistake some of that information was available on ForeignAssistance.gov, I inquired directly with the State Department, and the result of my application, which was the withdrawal of the information, is detailed here).

In the case of USAID grants, you only have the name of the project and a little description, and sometimes the name of the implementing organization. In some cases, if we are talking about media such as Cubanet or ADN Cuba, it is easy to determine the approach, but if we are talking about the projects executed by the International Republican Institute or its peer the National Democratic Institute —both attached to the NED—, then we are in a more obscure terrain because we don't know the organizations they subcontract and the specific actions that are developed as part of the implementation of the program. The same happens with NED grants.

Below I present a table with information obtained through USASpending.gov, where I present the identifiers of 18 grants associated with the Cuba democracy program that have received funding or have had continuity during FY2022 and FY2023 (still in development), the total funds they have received, the start and end dates, the sponsoring government office, the implementing organization, and a summary description of the project/activity.

My opinion

The U.S. government, through the sponsorship of the initiatives outlined above, sustains its strategy towards Cuba centered on two fronts. One is the economic sanctions regime, aimed at hindering the economic deployment of the Cuban model. And the second, the one I have portrayed in its most recent implementation here, focuses on developing in a patient and aggregate manner an environment that pressures and discusses the Cuban political system.

The most important flag of this program is in the appeal to technologies and digital journalism, training, and allocating resources for projects that have had some impact in the Cuban digital sphere. Although, as I commented here recently, it is now a group of influencers with a presumably conservative spirit, apparently disconnected from these financing channels, and defenders of the "hard-line" towards Cuba, who, from Florida, are influencing with greater force the political thinking of the population here.

I consider this gamble by the White House as a major disrespect to international law, to the extent that it compromises national sovereignty no matter the assessment made from Pennsylvania Avenue or anywhere else of the Cuban political regime. At the same time, at the very least, it constitutes a plausible argument to sustain a group of restrictions on the exercise of rights and freedoms in Cuba. How can one promote, for example, a more open and relaxed media scene here when resources are allocated to projects that the Cuban government doesn't even always know what they are?

I particularly think that any organization or individual that participates in the implementation of this strategy is no longer a valid actor to discuss the destiny of the country. The problems that Cuba has, or the problem that anyone has with the Cuban political system, must be solved without being vitiated from the outside —with economic obstacles and information wars— that particular or collective struggle for the country that everyone wants to build. Hopefully, in any case, we can always settle those differences peacefully.