Nemesis: The Jouvenelian Versus the Liberal Model of Human Orders is a book about Bertrand de Jouvenel's model of political power and its further development by C.A. Bond. The book endeavors to show how political ideologies come (or fail to come) to the forefront, as well as explain how mainstream political science is a failure. The preface outlines what led Bond to write the book and gives broad credit to other intellectuals who inspired it, including Jouvenel, Mencius Moldbug, and Alasdair MacIntyre.
The first chapter introduces Jouvenel's model of human orders, as explained in his 1949 work On Power: Its Nature and the History of Its Growth. Here, the reader is introduced to terminology that will be present throughout the book, such as the majuscule Power that denotes the central governing authority within a territory. The trichotomization of society into center, subsidiaries, and periphery is not unique to Jouvenel or Bond, but some of the understanding of the potential relationships between them is. Bond notes that “Defining the institutions and actors that occupy these various categories according to some set criteria is not particularly fruitful” because “Humans repeatedly invent new forms of organisation,”[1] which is important to remember so as to avoid errors of eisegesis in historical analysis. That the central Power always exists, and should be treated as a complex phenomenon, is a realization that separates Jouvenel (and libertarian reaction[2]) from mainstream libertarianism and allows for greater understanding of social order. Bond goes on to describe the dynamic known to reactionaries as “high-low versus middle” or “Mutt and Jeff,” and to radical leftists as “top down, bottom up, inside out.”
The supposed liberation of the masses as an excuse for the central Power to expand itself at the expense of subsidiaries is a dominant theme throughout the book, as it is the most common dynamic among the three elements in the modern world. In analyzing the role of the periphery, Bond is largely accurate, except in saying that the periphery is “basically irrelevant” and that without support from either the center or the subsidiaries, its actions will be “sporadic and ineffective.”[3] This is usually the case, but there are notable exceptions, such as major domestic terrorist attacks which alter government policy.[4] After describing the subsidiaries in terms of traditional aristocracy, Bond moves on to historical examples. Following Jouvenel, he notes the difference in the level of centralization in European monarchies in the 13th century versus the 18th century. It may be tempting to ascribe this development entirely to the Jouvenelian dynamic, but as Bond is careful to remind the reader, “The ability of these monarchies to centralise control ebbed and flowed with the availability of tools at the monarch's disposal. Such tools included taxation, coinage, military reform, and law.”[5] In more recent times, electronic surveillance mechanisms must be included in this list. In analyzing the role of coinage in allowing for government centralization, Bond details the historical role of the state in implementing monetary systems, which is not sufficiently acknowledged and dealt with by most free-market economists. The mechanisms by which standing armies use the periphery to grow the central Power at the expense of the subsidiaries is discussed next, followed by the overtaking of common law by legislation. A question arises as to whether the organization of the periphery into institutions which help Power to centralize ought to be described as subsidiaries, albeit of another sort vis-à-vis the aforementioned subsidiaries. Bond concludes the chapter by noting that Jouvenel kept some liberal assumptions which are inconsistent with his own model which must be dealt with in the chapters ahead.
In Chapter 2, we see Bond expand upon Jouvenel's work and depart from it somewhat. This is because Jouvenel also held that atomized individuals produce society through spontaneous order, and that parts of society can develop independently of Power. Bond disagrees with this, arguing that this modern model has only arisen to prominence by the means described in the Jouvenelian model. He then discusses the types of liberty described by Jouvenel: liberty from one's own might, liberty under authority, liberty resulting from competition among powers. These are important to differentiate, and too few libertarians have done so adequately. Jouvenel's differentiation between political and economic liberty also manifests today in the form of the Nolan chart, which is common in mainstream libertarian propaganda. Bond considers Jouvenel's analysis of the differences between England and France in terms of expansion of aristocratic liberty versus liberty under Power, finding that Jouvenel erred in equating the individual of antiquity with the individual of modernity. In explaining this finding, Bond examines Jouvenel's account of societal formation, which bears resemblance to the Hobbesian account, but with collective human struggle against a hostile world driving cooperation rather than mutual fear of other humans. (An account recognizing both of these threats would be more accurate, though Bond does not say this.) But by imposing modern individualism upon ancient peoples, Jouvenel commits eisegesis.
In an effort to remedy this fault, Bond resorts to what has become an unusual procedure: to start in the middle of a theory and attempt to work backwards to its first principles. It must be noted that this methodology can be dubious, in that it can produce a logically rigorous theory that does not fit with empirical observation. In other words, it may be internally consistent but externally falsified. The remainder of the chapter briefly explains the anthropological works of René Girard and Eric Gans, which offer possible alternatives to modern liberal anthropology. Bond notes that “The reader may raise issues with hypothetically entertaining such anthropological accounts,”[6] and here I must. Both Girard and Gans offer accounts which are not only highly speculative, but are subject to infinite regress, in that they do not explain how desires and actions originate; only how they propagate. Perhaps they may be provisionally accepted for superior function relative to modern individualism, but that is all. In fact, the origination of human action which is then subject to the selection mechanisms of Power and subsidiaries suggests the kind of spontaneous order that Bond rejects, at least with respect to origins.
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