I came across this today from 
Yesterday I wrote a post about creating a Flagging whale but didn't want to commit to any narrow view as it would kill the discussion. Since I mostly got spam comments, I am going to commit more today by rewording it and combining some of
I said yesterday that this was hypothetical fun but, I don't think it should be, I think something needs to be done and done decisively. So, lets trim the idea down a little and remove some of the 'for consideration' parts since it may have been to much to consider and contemplate.
If there was an account that was draining the reward pool. Perhaps they were posting much too often and getting massive support from one or two potentially 'bad actors' with a lot of voting power. The problem is that no one can really act against it because if they do, they will be targeted and attacked and have their reputation and earning potential severely reduced.
A flag comes at a cost in several ways that some of the newer members don't consider. Flagging costs the same amount of voting power as upvoting but, it does not get any reward at all meaning there is no curation. The flagging amount does go back into the pool to be distributed to other accounts in upvotes, this means that a good flag against a bad actor is good for the rest of the community but, comes with no thanks and is often met with hostility by the flagged account and their often narrow-viewed supporters.
The other cost is to all the accounts that would be otherwise upvoted by the flagging account, value lost to people who may deserve the value and the community good that comes from the spread of Steem and support of the content invested.
If there was an account that just didn't care about any of this and didn't care about reputation and never needed to make any value itself, it would be very valuable. All it has is a purpose to put value back into the pool for more equal distribution from accounts that are undeserving of such high rewards or can really afford a slight reduction.
Firstly, How could Helsing be made? A few ways potentially which don't change for this purpose. There may even be others but these I think are the most likely.
It could be backed by Steemit as an independent arbitrator under the assumption that Steemit Inc wants what is best for Steem and the community. This would obviously support 
It could be created by a group of whales who think that distribution is important, either through delegation or, building it up over time through the reward pool itself by upvoting it. This opens some whales to abuse or policing responsibilities that cost them significant amounts to create something worthy plus, it opens it up to being hijacked by the group for less than community spirited actions.
The top 200 accounts could all delegate 1 percent of their current value to the bot which would make it very powerful indeed. This is my preferred method as it shows an act of faith by these accounts AND creates a monster that can hunt any of them if they stray too far from the guidelines. It also doesn't stop anyone else from delegating either.
How to use this powerful killer is of course contentious but there will be ways to ensure some objectivity, some sensitivity and some insensitivity if used in conjunction with
To flag, highly voted spammers. No account here at this time should really be able to post 10 times a day and get all of them voted past 400 dollars by another account. It screams of scam and is terrible for the impression of the community. The Helsing account could null 50% of the posts each day in the last 12 hour window. Does anyone really deserve 22,000 SBD a week? Isn't 11,000 still very, very high for one person? Is there no limit to greed and lack of community thinking? Perhaps this would work like a salary cap on paramaters such as posting frequency or spread of voting value.
If an account is found to be without a shadow of doubt raping the pool, Helsing could of course null all rewards until it either adjusts behaviour or, leaves the community. Perhaps for highly self-voted nothing comments as have been even more prevalent lately. This would be guided by algorithms for discovery and wielded by the Manuals as they come across the poor behaviour of members.
It could 'tax' Trending where insensitively it negated some percentage of the top 100-400 posts for the week 10 - 20% percent (arbitrary numbers here of course) or, scale taxed depending on how often one account appeared in the trending section. No one here of course likes the idea of tax but how many posts are really worth the equivalent of 5-10,000 dollars US? 20 percent would still leave it at 8000. And, how many accounts should be in their as often as they are?
It could also automatically drop the payout on the top 1000 paid comments also in the last window as even the comments that are not spam and scam upvoted probably don't deserve some of the values they actually get. Again, this could go on how many an account has highly voted. Sure, 1 odd $100+ comment may happen but how many can one account really get in a week or month?
It could be used by the 1000 Manuals to reduce the voting percentages by Apps where at times, massive rewards are going for very little value (read 
There are of course many other ways Helsing could be used and it could also have a board of trustees (The 1000 manual curators and the 200 whale delegators together) who decide upon its behaviours as long as that board is actually trustworthy, which is always a problem as power tends to get abused by many who obtain it, no matter the level.
Helsing would be for the good of the community, is not invested in any particular angle other than sharing rewards more usefully. And it does this without any one account to blame.
It would be taking percentages off already highly rewarded accounts or voiding the actions of 'bad actor' accounts and returning value back into the pool. For the bad actors of course, this would hurt them but for the highly rewarded, in the long-run as Steem spreads and decentralises wider and deeper into the community, their overall value will increase significantly whilst still not limiting their ability to be the highest earners on the platform, nor eat into their time in Trending as the flag will come in the final 12 hours.
The most highly invested in this community are also the ones who have the most to gain from wider distribution of Steem and SBD and even though many of them would take a short term reduction in reward, they will get long-term growth potential that will far outstrip it.
The numbers, percentages and limits would have to be looked into (Something I can't do) but, having a roving Vampire killer might actually be quite a useful tool for the community. Of course, there are many caveats to this that must be considered, but I find the idea very interesting especially if supported by the largest and most invested accounts at Steemit as they are the ones who will also wear some of the cuts of Helsing. It would definitely be a show of faith in the future of Steem and an act of good faith for the Steem community who may see some of them as inactive.
I think things like the 'No whale' voting experiment last year brought a lot of feedback value to the community in many ways as will another of 
Helsing would be an account that could be supported by all whales and used as a tool to conduct experiments in the community to find ways to improve it in numerous ways. Because it would be supported widely, its actions would be accepted by the whales even if they are sometimes wounded by it.
Yesterday, I said that this was discussion only but, I would like to see an experiment run on this. It is through delegation to a rule based account so does not require a hardfork and is not difficult to setup, adjust or dissolve if needs be. It would be definitely interesting if the top accounts had an obligation to support such experiments with a 1% delegation in order to benefit the platform that in turn supports them and all of us.
What do you think about it?
Taraz
[ a Steemit original ]
I suggest everyone read the posts I have linked here by
