FEDERALIST No. 10 The Same Subject Continued (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection)
From the Daily Advertiser. Thursday, November 22, 1787. MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed 통일체Union(연맹), none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the 폭력violence(폐단) of 분파faction(당파). The 친구friend(옹호자) of 쪽수많은 정부통치들popular governments(민중정부) never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the 공적인 공의회들public councils(공공의회), have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which 쪽수많은 정부통치들popular governments(민중정부) have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the 쪽수많은 모델들popular models(민중모델), both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected. Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of 공적인 그리고 인격적인 리버티public and personal liberty(공공과 개인적 자유), that our governments are too unstable, that the 공적인 선public good(대중의 이익) is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that 척도들measures(정책) are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the 우월한 강제력superior force(횡포) of an interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for 사적인 라이트들private rights(개인적인 권리), which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a 분파적 영성factious spirit(파벌정신) has tainted our public administrations.
By a 분파faction(파벌), I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the 전일체whole(전체), who are 통일된united(단결된) and actuated by some common impulse of 정념passion(열정), or of 이득관계interest(관심), adversed to the 라이트들rights(권리) of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate 이득관계interests(이익) of the 공동체community(지역사회).
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of 분파faction(파벌): the one, by removing its causes; the other, by 통제하기controlling(조정하는) its effects.
There are again two methods of removing the causes of 분파faction(파벌): the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same 정념들passions(열정), and the same 이득관계들interests(관심사).
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to 분파faction(파벌) what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes 분파faction(파벌), than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.
● “자유가 파벌을 양육하기 때문에 정치적 생명에 필수적인 자유를 없애는 일은, 공기가 불을 향해 그것의 파괴적 행위자를 나누어주기 때문에 동물적 생명에 필수적인 공기를 소멸시키려는 것과 똑같이 어리석은 짓이다”라는 글토막은 아주 중요합니다.
자유는 인간의 본성자연적인 라이트이기 때문에, 그것이 또는 그것의 사용법이 본성자연적 라이트 자체를 파괴하지 않는한, 결코 어떠한 경우에도 누구에 의해서도 제한되거나 폐지되거나 소멸될 수 없는 신성불가침한, 불가-양도적인 라이트이기 때문입니다. 반-연방주의자들 또는 어떤 정치적 분파도 마찬가지입니다.
그들이 <인종차별이나 혐오>와 같은 사악함과 죄악으로써 본성자연적 라이트(자연권)과 본성자연적인 법률(자연법)을 폭력하지 않는 한, 그들의 자유는 결코 무엇에 의해서도 누구에 의해서도 제한되거나 폐지되거나 소멸될수 없습니다.
The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his 자기-사랑self-love(자기애), his opinions and his 정념들passions(열정) will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the 라이트들rights(권리) of 프로퍼티property(재산권) originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a 획일됨uniformity(동일한) of 이득관계들interests(관심사). The protection of these faculties is the first 대상object(목적) of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring 프로퍼티property(재산권), the possession of different degrees and kinds of 프로퍼티property(재산권) immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective 프로퍼티가진이들proprietors(재산소유자), ensues a division of the society into different 이득관계들interests(이해관계) and 정당들parties(당파들).
The latent causes of 분파faction(파벌) are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for 앞서-탁월함pre-eminence(우월성) and power; or to 인격들persons(사람들) of other descriptions whose fortunes have been 이득관계화해온nteresting(살 수 있었던) to the human 정념들passions(관심), have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly 정념들passions(열정) and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of 분파faction(파벌)s has been the various and unequal distribution of 프로퍼티property(재산권). Those who hold and those who are without 프로퍼티property(재산권) have ever formed distinct 이득관계들interests(이익) in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed 이득관계interests(이권), a manufacturing 이득관계interests(이권), a mercantile 이득관계interests(이권), a moneyed 이득관계interests(이권), with many lesser 이득관계들interests(이권), grow up of necessity in 시민화된 국민들civilized nations(문명국가), and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering 이득관계들interests(이권) forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the 영성spirit(정신) of party and 분파faction(파벌) in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.
● ‘사람들 사이의 의견, 정념, 이득관계의 획일됨이 어째서 불가능한가’를 매디슨은, 이성과 정념 사이의 영향력, 프로퍼티의 기원이 되는 패컬티의 다양함, 프로퍼티의 다른 정도들과 종류들이 다른 이득관계들과 정당들을 만들어 내므로, 불가능함을 논증하네요.
특히 <분파의 무엇보다도 치명적인 원천은 프로퍼티 분배의 불평등함>이라고 매디슨은 봅니다. 이러한 <다양한 그리고 상호간섭하는 이득관계들의 규제는, 근대적 입법의 원리적인 과제이며, 그리고 정부통치의 필연적인 그리고 질서명령있는 작동들 안에 정당 및 분파의 영성을 말려들게한다>고 합니다. 대단한 통찰이라서 뽑아추립니다.
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his 이득관계interests(이익) would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a 사람들의 몸체body of men(집단) are unfit to be both judges and 당사자들parties(정당) at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many 재판의judicial(사법적) determinations, not indeed concerning the 라이트들rights(권리) of 혼자인 인격들single persons(개인), but concerning the 라이트들rights(권리) of 시민들의 큰 몸체들large bodies of citizens(많은 수의 시민들)? And what are the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning 사적인private(개인적인) debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful 분파faction(파벌) must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and the 공적인 선public good(공익). The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of 프로퍼티property(재산) is an act which seems to require the most exact 불편부당함impartiality(공평성); yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a 앞서-주도적인 정당predominant party(지배당) to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they overburden the 열등한 숫자inferior number(가난한 사람), is a shilling saved to their own pockets.
It is in vain to say that 깨어있는 정치가들enlightened statesmen(견식있는 정치가들) will be able to adjust these clashing 이득관계들interests(이익), and render them all subservient to the 공적인 선public good(공익). Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate 이득관계interests(이익) which one party may find in disregarding the 라이트들rights(권리) of another or the good of the 전일체whole(전체).
The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of 분파faction(파벌) cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS.
If a 분파faction(파벌) consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its 악의찬sinister(유해한) views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a 분파faction(파벌), the form of 쪽수많은 정부통치popular government(민중정부), on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling 정념passion(열정) or 이득관계interests(이익) both the 공적인 선public good(대중의 이익) and the 라이트들rights(권리) of other citizens. To secure the 공적인 선public good(대중의 이익) and 사적인private(개인의) 라이트들rights(권리) against the danger of such a 분파faction(파벌), and at the same time to preserve the 영성spirit(정신) and the form of 쪽수많은 정부통치popular government(민중정부), is then the great 대상object(목적) to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.
By what means is this 대상object(목적) attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same 정념passion(열정) or 이득관계interests(이익) in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent 정념passion(열정) or 이득관계interests(이익), must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect 스키마들schemes(음모) of 억압oppression(압제). If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of 개인들individuals(개인), and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.
From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government 인격 안에서in person(직접), can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of 분파faction(파벌). A common 정념passion(열정) or 이득관계interests(이익) will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the 전일체whole(전체); a 의사소통communication(협의) and 협조concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with 인격적personal(개인의) security or the 라이트들rights(권리) of 프로퍼티property(재산권); and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect 평등equality(동등성) in their political 라이트들rights(권리), they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their 정념들passions(열정).
● 직접민주주의에 대한 매디슨의 비판은 경청할만 하다고 봅니다. 물론 즉각적이고, 잘못없는, 완벽한, 전일적인, 전자적인 선거 및 투표 장치가 마련될 미래 사회 안에서는 직접 민주주의가 실현될 것이라고 나는 봅니다만, 현재까지는 아닌 듯 합니다. 직접민주주의는 프라이빗센트릭한 선거 및 투표제도의 기술공학적 개발수준에 달려있다.
A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the 통일체Union(연맹).
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.
The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the 공적인 관점들public views(대중의 의견), by passing them through the medium of a chosen 시민들의 몸체body of citizens(시민집단), whose wisdom may best discern the true 이득관계interests(이익) of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a 규제regulation(규정), it may well happen that the 공적인 목소리public voice(대중의 목소리), pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the 공적인 선public good(대중의 이익) than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of 분파적인 성미factious tempers(당파성), of local prejudices, or of 악의찬 설계들sinister designs(불순한 목적), may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the 정치참여suffrages(참정권), and then betray the 이득관계들interests(관심사), of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the 공적인 번영public weal(공공복리); and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations:
In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a 일정한 숫자certain number(최소한의 수), in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a 일정한 숫자certain number(특정수), in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.
In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the 악덕스런 솜씨들vicious arts(부도덕한 술책) by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive 공적merit and the most diffusive and established characters.
It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser 이득관계들interests(관심사); as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national 대상들objects(목적). The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate 이득관계들interests(관심사) being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures.
The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders 분파적인 조합들factious combinations(파벌의 형성) less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and 이득관계들interests(관심사) composing it; the fewer the 구별된distinct(개별적인) parties and 이득관계들interests(관심사), the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they 협조하고concert(구상하고) and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and 이득관계들interests(관심사); you make it less probable that a majority of the 전일체whole(전체) will have a common motive to invade the 라이트들rights(권리) of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always 검사된다checked(규제된다) by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.
Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of 분파faction(파벌), is enjoyed by a large over a small republic,--is enjoyed by the 통일체Union(연맹) over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the 통일체Union(연맹) will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the 통일체Union(연맹), increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and 이득관계된interested(이권에 개입된) majority? Here, again, the extent of the 통일체Union(연맹) gives it the most palpable advantage.
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political 분파faction(파벌) in a part of the 공동연방정부Confederacy(연맹); but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the 국민적인 공의회들national councils(교회의 중앙회의) against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of 프로퍼티property(재산권), or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the 전일적인whole(전체) 통일체body of the Union(연맹) than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State. In the extent and proper structure of the 통일체Union(연맹), therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the 영성spirit(정신) and supporting the character of Federalists.
PUBLIUS
● 10편의 요점은 어째서 분파의 뿌리샘이 무엇인가를 논증하는 앞부분, 그리고 공화주의 vs 직접민주주의를 대조비교한 뒷부분으로 나뉩니다.
특히 <공화주의= 연방주의자, 직접민주주의= 반-연방주의자>로 대조비교한 뒷부분 안에서, 매디슨의 통찰과 논증은 <대표들의 민주주의(대의제도)>에 대한 페인의 책들에 언급되었던 부분들을 한번더 일깨워 줍니다. 매디슨은 페인의 공민적인 정부통치 이념을 고스란히 이어받고 있네요.
매디슨은 공화주의가 직접민주주의보다 상대적으로 더욱 공적인 선을 향해 깨어있는 덕목있는 정치가들을 대표들로 선출한다는 (따라서 분파적 이득관계를 넘어설 수 있다는) 점, 공화주의는 더 광범위한 영토를 정부통치하므로, 분파의 조합을 덜 두려워하게 된다는 점, 이 두가지가 핵심입니다.
두가지 모두다, 결국 F주도적인(하다못해 최소한 C주도적인) 정치가들이 더많이 선출되고, 행동할 수 있어야 한다는 가치설계를 실현하려는 몸부림입니다.
정말이지 분파라는 것은, aprcf 독수리들 그리고 APR 독수리들의 경우에는, 피할래야 피할 수가 없습니다. 왜냐하면 이들의 가치지향 자체가 진영논리이고, 분파지향적이며, 고정관념적인, 경로의존적인 퍼스펙티브 곧 존재론들에 근본기초되어 있기 때문입니다.
물론 이들 독수리들의 눈으로 보자면, 자신들이 맞고, 나으며, 올바르고, 참되기 때문에, 결코 이들은 자신의 정체를 객관화시켜보지 못합니다. 객관적인 대상화, 뉴런표상과 실재현실의 분리는 C에서부터 나타나기 때문입니다.
