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child victim, the circumstances signal that what is being read is likely to be fact. Accordingly,
upon any reasonable view of the stated facts, plaintiff would be entitled to recovery for
defamation, and therefore, the complaint must be deemed to sufficiently state a cause of action.
Defendant also attempts to rely on the alleged fact that her press release from 2011 was
directed at the British Press as a threat that litigation could be forthcoming. Defendant
obfuscates the fact, however, that Ms. Giuffre’s defamation claim alleges a direct attack on Ms.
Giuffre’s character in 2015 – a separate attack and apart from any four-year-old theoretical
threats to the British press. As specifically recounted in the Complaint, the Defendant’s 2015
attack on Ms. Giuffre included this statement:
The Allegations made…against Ghislaine Maxwell are untrue. The Original
allegations are not new and have been fully responded to and shown to be untrue.
Each time the story is retold it changes, with new salacious details about public
figures. (The woman’s) claims are obvious lies and should be treated as such and
not publicized as news as they are defamatory. Ghislaine Maxwell’s original
response to the lies and defamatory claims remains the same. Miss Maxwell
strongly denies allegations of any unsavory nature, which have appeared in the
British press and elsewhere and reserves her right to seek redress at the repetition
of such claims.”
(Emphasis added to mirror statements set forth in paragraph 30 of the Complaint).
Nor is any merit to Defendant’s claim that the Complaint allegations are deficient.
Defendant does not deny making the statements, and Ms. Giuffre has adequately pled all of the
elements of a defamation claim with particularity and supporting facts. First, she has pled a
defamatory statement concerning another: Defendant stated, through her press agent, that Ms.
Giuffre’s reports of her child sexual abuse were “obvious lies.” Complaint at ¶ 30. Second, she
has pled publication to third parties, stating that Defendant’s agent “issued an additional false
statement to the media and public,” and to “a reporter on a Manhattan street.” Id. at ¶ 30, ¶ 37.
Third, Ms. Giuffre has alleged more than “fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of
Case 1:15-cv-07433-RWS Document 20 Filed 12/10/15 Page 19 of 26
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the publisher.” Indeed, Ms. Giuffre has specifically alleged malice. Among other similar
allegations, the Complaint states: “Maxwell’s statements were published intentionally for the
malicious purpose of further damaging a sexual abuse and sexual trafficking victim; to destroy
Giuffre’s reputation and credibility” and that Defendant “made her false statements knowing full
well that they were completely false. Accordingly, she made her statements with actual and
deliberate malice, the highest degree of awareness of falsity.” Complaint at p. 8-9.
Even if there were some kind of technical deficiency in the pleadings, that does not
justify a stay of discovery. As Judge McKenna noted in In re Chase Manhattan Corp. Securities
Litigation, even if dismissal were to be granted, plaintiffs might thereafter successfully amend
their complaint, and allowing discovery to go forward could move the action along toward a
speedier resolution. No. 90 Civ. 6092 LMM, 1991 WL 79432, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 1991)
(“Should the complaint (or an amended complaint) be sustained .., commencement of the
discovery process, while no doubt imposing some burden on defendants, will advance the
ultimate disposition of this action”). Defendant has not established that Ms. Giuffre’s pleading is
deficient in any way – much less that any deficiency could not be easily corrected through
amendment. Accordingly, her motion to stay discovery should be denied.
C. Defendant Has Not Shown “Undue Burden”
Defendant also falls woefully short of supporting her claim of undue burden in fulfilling
her discovery obligations. Her failure is understandable given the voluminous number of
decisions denying stay requests in contexts analogous to this case. See, e.g., Howard v. Galesi,
107 F.R.D. 348, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (denying a motion to stay discovery pending a motion to
dismiss because plaintiff’s discovery request was not futile, it was limited in scope, and the
“motion to dismiss was not necessarily dispositive since it concerns the particularity of the
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pleadings, which may be amended.”) (Emphasis added.); Waltzer v. Conner, No. 83 CIV. 8806
(SWK), 1985 WL 2522, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1985) (denying a motion to stay discovery
pending resolution of the motion to dismiss, stating, “‘[b]urdensome and oppressive’ is a
shibboleth of little value to this Court. Furthermore, good cause is not necessarily established
solely by showing that discovery may involve inconvenience and expense”) (Emphasis added).
Two related factors a court may consider in deciding a motion for a stay of discovery are
the breadth of discovery sought and the burden of responding to it. See Brooks v. Macy's, Inc.,
No. 10 CIV 5304 (BSJ/HBP), 2010 WL 5297756, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2010) (citing Anti–
Monopoly, Inc., 1996 WL 101277, at *3, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2684, at *6–7).
Plaintiff served thirty (30) specific and narrowly tailored discovery requests that are
intended to gather information about the key documents and witnesses in this case. The requests
are not overly burdensome and relate directly to the Plaintiff’s claim that she was a victim of
sexual abuse, and therefore, Maxwell’s statement that she is a “liar” is defamatory.
Take Juan Alessi, the housekeeper for Jeffrey Epstein’s Palm Beach home, where
Defendant also resided. He testified that the Defendant kept a book of nude photos of females on
her desk. See Decl. of Sigrid McCawley at Exhibit 6, Juan Alessi September 8, 2009 Depo Tr. at
16
pleadings, which may be amended.”) (Emphasis added.); Waltzer v. Conner, No. 83 CIV. 8806
(SWK), 1985 WL 2522, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1985) (denying a motion to stay discovery
pending resolution of the motion to dismiss, stating, “‘[b]urdensome and oppressive’ is a
shibboleth of little value to this Court. Furthermore, good cause is not necessarily established
solely by showing that discovery may involve inconvenience and expense”) (Emphasis added).
Two related factors a court may consider in deciding a motion for a stay of discovery are
the breadth of discovery sought and the burden of responding to it. See Brooks v. Macy's, Inc.,
No. 10 CIV 5304 (BSJ/HBP), 2010 WL 5297756, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2010) (citing Anti–
Monopoly, Inc., 1996 WL 101277, at *3, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2684, at *6–7).
Plaintiff served thirty (30) specific and narrowly tailored discovery requests that are
intended to gather information about the key documents and witnesses in this case. The requests
are not overly burdensome and relate directly to the Plaintiff’s claim that she was a victim of
sexual abuse, and therefore, Maxwell’s statement that she is a “liar” is defamatory.
Take Juan Alessi, the housekeeper for Jeffrey Epstein’s Palm Beach home, where
Defendant also resided. He testified that the Defendant kept a book of nude photos of females on
her desk. See Decl. of Sigrid McCawley at Exhibit 6, Juan Alessi September 8, 2009 Depo Tr. at
RE: Ghislaine Maxwell Redacted Documents