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the statement was false or with a reckless disregard as to its truth.” Id. at 62. Defendant’s
assertion of a privilege will also be defeated if the defamatory statement was made “in
furtherance of an improper purpose.” Id. Here, Ms. Giuffre’s Complaint repeatedly alleges that
not only was Defendant’s statement false, but also that she made the statement with malice and
knowledge of its falsity. Accordingly, the Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on a claim of
qualified “self-defense” privilege must be denied.

1. The Qualified Pre-Litigation Privilege Does Not Protect Mass Publication Of
   Deliberately False Statements For The Purpose Of Harassment.
   Defendant fares no better in asserting the “pre-litigation” privilege. As with the “self-
   defense privilege,” the privilege is (at most) a qualified privilege. And, like the self-defense
   privilege, at the motion to dismiss stage, the privilege disappears in the face of a well-pleaded
   allegation that the statement is not pertinent to a good faith anticipated litigation and, instead, the
   Defendant has deliberately published the false statements for improper purposes, outside the
   scope of the privilege. See Front, Inc. v. Khalil, 24 N.Y. 3d 713, 719-20 (2015) (“To ensure that
   such [pre-litigation] communications are afforded sufficient protection the privilege should be
   qualified… This requirement ensures that the privilege does not protect attorneys who are
   seeking to bully, harass, or intimidate their client’s adversaries by threatening baseless litigation
   or by asserting wholly unmeritorious claims, unsupported in law or fact, in violation of counsel’s
   ethical obligations.”); See also Rodney A. Smolla, Vol. 1, Law of Defamation § 8:63; 8:64; (2d
   ed. 2014); Robert D. Sack, Sack on Defamation: Libel, Slander, and Related Problems § 9.3 and
   § 9.3.1; (4th ed. 2015); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 600, 605 (1977). Simply put,
   Defendant’s statements are outside the scope of the qualified pre-litigation privilege because they
   were not made pertinent to a good faith anticipated litigation, but, instead, were made to bully,
   harass, and intimidate the Defendant. Here, the 2015 actionable statement calling Ms. Giuffre’s
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claims “obvious lies” was issued by Maxwell’s press agent, Ross Gow, to the media for national
and international publication. New York courts have only extended the pre-litigation qualified
privilege to communications among counsel and parties directly discussing issues related to
anticipated litigation, and Defendant cites to no case in which courts have extended this qualified
privilege to a press agent who issues a press release. Defendant’s motion to dismiss on this
ground is, accordingly, without merit and provides no basis for a stay of discovery.

1. The Complaint Properly Alleges Defamatory Statements.
   Defendant’s motion to dismiss also argues that “[v]iewed in context,” the statements are
   not actionable. Here again, at the motion to dismiss stage, such an argument is frivolous. To
   prevail on her motion to dismiss, the Defendant would have to show that, as matter of law, the
   “context” of the allegations rendered them non-defamatory. But to prevail on a claim of
   “context”, the Defendant would have to show a fully developed factual record. Of course, that is
   impossible at this early stage of the proceedings.
   Moreover, Ms. Giuffre has properly alleged that the context of the statements proves a
   defamatory statement. The Complaint, for example, alleges that “Maxwell’s false statements
   directly stated and also implied that in speaking out against sex trafficking Giuffre acted with
   fraud, dishonesty, and unfitness for the task.” ¶ 12. In addition, the Complaint alleges,
   “Maxwell’s false statements directly and indirectly indicate that Giuffre lied about being
   recruited by Maxwell and sexually abused by Epstein and Maxwell. Maxwell’s false statements
   were reasonably understood by many persons who read her statements as conveying that specific
   intention and meaning.” ¶ 12. And the Complaint alleges, “Maxwell’s false statements were
   reasonably understood by many persons who read those statements as making specific factual
   claims that Ms. Giuffre was lying about specific facts.” ¶ 14. In the teeth of these specific
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allegations about context (never discussed by the Defendant), the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
is – once again – frivolous.
The Motion to Dismiss is frivolous for other reasons as well. Defendant argues that Ms.
Giuffre failed to allege defamation per se yet this is belied by the face of the Complaint. The
Complaint alleges that the Defendant’s false statements “also constitute libel per se inasmuch as
they intended to injure Ms. Giuffre in her professional capacity as the president of a non-profit
corporation designed to help victims of sex trafficking, and inasmuch as they destroyed her
credibility and reputation among members of the community that seek her help and that she
seeks to serve.” Complaint ¶ 11. See Celle v. Filipino Reporter Enterprises Inc., 209 F. 3d 163,
179 (2d Cir. 2000) (“a writing which tends to disparage a person in the way of his office,
profession or trade is defamatory per se and does not require proof of special damages.”)
(Emphasis original, quotations and citations omitted).
Defendant’s argument that her statement is not defamatory because it is a “mere denial”
is also flatly contradicted by the prevailing case law. Indeed, the case law makes quite clear that
the Defendant’s public accusation that Ms. Giuffre lied about her sexual abuse goes beyond a
“mere denial” and, therefore, properly alleges a defamatory meaning. In McNamee v. Clemens,
762 F. Supp. 2d 584, 601-602 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) the court held that “denials coupled with
accusations that the accuser will be proven a liar and has lied in front of members of Congress
cross the line from general denial to specific accusations reasonably susceptible of a defamatory
meaning,” because “some of Clemens’ statements branding McNamee a liar contain the
‘actionable implication that [Clemens] knows certain facts, unknown to his audience, which
support his opinion.’” Id., 762 F. Supp. 2d at 601. Accordingly, “[a]n attack on a person's
integrity by impugning his character as dishonest or immoral may form the basis of a defamation
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if an ordinary listener would tend to credit the statements as true.” Id. at 602. Here, Defendant
has attacked Ms. Giuffre’s integrity, calling her dishonest and a “liar,” implying that Defendant
knows certain facts unknown to her audience that support her opinion, and an ordinary listener
would tend to credit these accusations of lying as true because Defendant knew Ms. Giuffre
personally at the time of the alleged abuse.
It is well established under New York law and in the Second Circuit that falsely calling a
person a liar is defamatory and not subject to a motion to dismiss. See Edwards v. Natn’l
Audubon Soc., Inc. 556 F. 2d 113, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1977) (“The appellees were charged with
being “paid to lie”. It is difficult to conceive of any epithet better calculated to subject a scholar
to the scorn and ridicule of his colleagues than “paid liar.” It is this completely foundationless
accusation of venality that constitutes the essence of the calumny against the appellees.”); Seung
Jin Lee v. Tai Chul Kim, 16 Misc. 3d 1118(A), 847 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 2007) (denying a
motion to dismiss when the defendant stated that plaintiff “is a liar; she tried to cover all the
truth; how could she serve the Lord with lies; and she and her followers are satanic”); Brach v.
Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc., 265 A.D. 2d 360, 360-61, 696 N.Y.S. 2d 496, 498 (2d
Dep't 1999) (reversing an order of dismissal and reinstating defamation action based upon a
publication stating that a court action was won “by lies and deceit,” finding that the statements at
issue were actionable statements of “mixed opinion,” and noting that they suggested to the
average reader that they were supported by some unknown facts); Kaminester v. Weintraub, 131
A.D. 2d 440, 441, 516 N.Y.S. 2d 234, 234 (1987) (“inasmuch as the defendant Dr. Weintraub
accused the plaintiff of personal dishonesty, the allegedly libelous statements are not
constitutionally protected expressions of opinion”); Mase v. Reilly, 206 A.D. 434, 436, 201
N.Y.S. 470, 472 (App. Div. 1923) (“The charge that a man is lying, at least, in a matter of public
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interest, is such a charge as tends to hold him up to scorn, as matter of law, and prima facie a
complaint stating the making in writing of such a charge is good.”).
Indeed, just last year, the New York Court of Appeals addressed a case with facts
strikingly similar to this one. In Davis v. Boeheim, 24 N.Y. 3d 262, 22 N.E. 3d 999 (2014),
plaintiffs were victims of sexual molestation by Bernie Fine, a former associate head basketball
coach for Syracuse University. Following plaintiff’s accusations of sex abuse, James Boeheim,
Fine’s friend and another Syracuse Basketball coach, made statements to ESPN.com calling
plaintiffs liars. Plaintiffs filed a suit for defamation for those and other statements made by
Boeheim and published by the media.
The lower court granted a motion to dismiss on the basis that the statements were non-
actionable opinion because a reasonable reader would conclude that the statements were biased
personal opinion. But the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the complaint was sufficient
to survive a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Boeheim court held that “[t]here is a reasonable
view of the claims upon which [plaintiffs] would be entitled to recover for defamation; therefore
the complaint must be deemed to sufficiently state a cause of action.” Id. at 274.
Similarly, Defendant asserted readily understood facts, not opinion, by falsely stating the
alleged “fact” that Ms. Giuffre’s accusations of sexual abuse are lies, an allegation that is capable
of being proven true or false. As we know, this is a specific allegation in the Complaint. See
Complaint, ¶ 14 (“Maxwell specifically directed her false statements at Giuffre’s true public
description of factual events, and many persons who read Defendant’s statements reasonably
understood that those statements referred directly to Ms. Giuffre’s account of her life as a young
teenager with Maxwell and Epstein.”). Also, similarly, given the close relationship between
Defendant and Epstein, and that Defendant knew Ms. Giuffre from the time when she was a
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