CHORUS: Music is the natural cure for the soul, Freedom to choose is your control
VERSE: Medicate yourself with positive vibrations
Love one another is the key to meditation
Be mindful of all the bad pharmaceutical relations
Propaganda is steadily on the rise
CHORUS: Music is the natural cure for the soul, Freedom to choose is your control
VERSE: Second opinions freely come and go
Use your rights to ask for things you know
Respect one’s voice as partially true
Do your own research if you are confused
All the lies and corruption we must refuse
CHORUS: Music is the natural cure for the soul, Freedom to choose is your control
VERSE: Vote to voice your rights to the government
Call the congressman, administrator in democracy
Tolerance is something new called censorship
Cooperation in the nation is upon us
The key to eternity opens doors of justice
THE BRIGHTEST LIGHT
In the darkest days the father tells his son he must go on
The son replies in a cruel disguise that he trusts no one
Inherent in trust is the benefit for the good
Pervasive perversions mislead the cloaked hood
Straying down the thorny path, passion pricks the boy
A scar is left gifted as a toy
Playtime is among those given to the light
Ambiguous identities revive the ventured plight
Love binds inseparable nobilities
Kings discuss the expected possibilities
Surrogate bodies fight false realities
Evolution emulates man’s uncertainties
Crashing hard the truth is bare
The man’s opened eyes are aware
Waking from a generational slumber
A small axe cuts the hardest lumber
The saw blade is sharpened by autonomy
An alchemist conjures a potion for his majesty
Mixtures of mayhem increase the travesty
The cure is a pure hybrid rough around the edges
Taking words for actions he slowly walks the ledges
SECTION K
HOW HAS THE COURT ADDRESSED THE THIRD, FOURTH, AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS RIGHT TO PRIVACY?
The court stated that the Ninth Amendment simply lends strong support to the view that the liberty protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments from the infringement by the federal government or the States is not restricted to rights specifically mentioned in the first eight Amendments.
The court held the right of privacy is a fundamental personal right emanating from the totality of the constitutional scheme under which we live.
In addition, the court discussed that these statutes demonstrate that means for achieving the same purpose of protecting marital fidelity are available to Connecticut without the need to ”invade the area of protected freedoms.”
In Palko v. State of Connecticut, 302 U.S 319 (1937), the court stated the proper constitutional inquiry in this case is whether this Connecticut statute infringes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the enactment violates basis values “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,”
In addition, the court reasoned that while the relevant inquiry may be made by resorting to one or more of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, it is not dependent on them or any of their radiations.
Justice Black and Justice Stewart Dissenting, the Court discussed a constitutional “right of privacy: as though there is some constitutional provision forbidding any law ever to be passed which might abridge the “privacy” of individuals. However, the court concluded that there is not. In addition, the court provided guarantees in certain specific constitutional provisions which are designed in part to protect privacy at certain times and places with respect to certain activities.
The court reasoned that it gets nowhere in this case by talking about a constitutional “right of privacy” as an emanation from one or more constitutional provisions. Justice Black and Justice Stewart emphasized that they like their privacy as well as the next one, but they were compelled to admit that government has a right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional provision.
The court stated that it is the essence of judicial duty to subordinate our own personal views.
Furthermore, the court expressed that the government is classifying rather than using equal protection.
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the court ruled that the statutory scheme distinguishes among distinct classes of distributors. First, the married persons may obtain contraceptive to prevent pregnancy, but only from doctors or druggists on prescription. Second, single persons may not obtain contraceptives from anyone to prevent, not pregnancy, but the spread of disease.
The court questioned whether there is some ground of difference that rationally explains the different treatment accorded married and unmarried persons under Massachusetts laws Section 21, 1879 statute.
Moreover, the court stated that whatever the rights of the individual to access contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and married alike.
Under Griswold, the court held the distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot be prohibited; a ban on distribution to unmarried person would be equally impermissible.
The court discussed if the right of privacy means anything it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
Under Griswold, the court reasoned that there is no bar to a prohibition on the distribution of contraceptives. In addition, the state could not, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, outlaw distribution to unmarried but not to married persons. In each case the evil as perceived by the state, would be identical, and the under inclusion would be invidious.
Chief Justice Burger dissenting, I cannot view it as controlling authority for this case. The Court was there confronted with a statute flatly prohibiting the use of contraceptives, not one regulating their distribution. In addition, strict scrutiny must be met for the government to justify a law restricting access to contraceptives.
Justice Brennan stated that “compelling’ is of course the key word; where a decision is fundamental as that whether to bear or beget a child is involved, regulation is imposing a burden on it may be justified only be compelling state interests, and must be narrowly drawn to express only those interests.”
HOW HAS THE COURT ADDRESSED THE RIGHT TO ABORTION?
In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the court stated in examining the right to abortion, the analysis is divided into five parts. First, reviews the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the U.S. Constitution protects the right of women to choose to terminate their pregnancies prior to viability.
What types of state regulations of abortion are permissible and which are unconstitutional. The third are laws that prohibit the use of government funds or facilities for performing abortions. The fourth a particular type of government regulation that has been declared unconstitutional: spousal consent and spousal notification requirements for married women’s abortions.
Finally, the law concerning the ability of a state to require parental notice and/or consent for an unmarried minor’s abortion
XII
KNOWING AND UNKNOWING
Knowing is glowing through twist and turns
Unknowing is faltering to what blisters and burns
Knowing is wisdom sprouting from seed
Unknowing is perception drowning by greed
Knowing has patience for those who are unclear
Unknowing is frustrated by the unfamiliar objects closing near
Knowing is faith in peace and tranquility
Unknowing is reverting to beliefs of falsity
Knowing understands humbleness
Unknowing humbly stands ignorance
Knowing is a contortion of stability
Unknowing risks unstable minds without proper remedy
Knowing is certainty into what is unknown sequences
Unknowing is uncertain of the probable consequences
Knowing is knowledge attainable by diligence
Unknowing is understanding knowledge as pure vigilance
Knowing wills from within
Unknowing lacks will from the outside looking to end
Knowing begins with reason, logic, and sound
Unknowing accepts treason, deceit, and unholy ground
SECTION L
HOW HAS THE COURT ADDRESSED THE RECOGNITION AND REAFFIRMATION OF THE RIGHT TO ABORTION?
In Roe v. Wade (1973), Justice Blackmun delivered opinion stating the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action.
The district court determined that the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decisions whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
The court’s decisions recognizing a right of privacy also acknowledge that some state regulation in areas protected by that right is appropriate. As noted above, a State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life. At some point in pregnancy, these respective interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that govern the abortion decision.
Moreover, the court concluded that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.
Furthermore, the court held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only be a “compelling state interest,” and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.
The court stated the pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy. In addition, it is reasonable and appropriate for a state to decide that at some point in time another interest, that of health of the mother or that of potential human life, becomes significantly involved.
Furthermore, the pregnant woman’s privacy right is no longer guaranteed and any right of privacy she possesses must be measured accordingly.
In consideration of the aforementioned, the court disagreed by adopting one theory of life, Texas may override the right of the pregnant woman that are at stake.
The state does have an important and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman, whether she is a resident of the state or a non-resident who seeks medical consultation and treatment there, and that it has still another important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life.
Here, the statute cannot survive the constitutional attack for the following reasons.
First, a state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type, which excludes from criminality only a life-saving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, is a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Second, for the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant women’s attending physician.
Third, for the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the state, in promoting its interest in health of the mother, may if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.
Fourth, for the state subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.
In addition, the state may define the term “Physician” to mean only a physician currently licensed by the State, and may proscribe any abortion by a person who is not a physician as so defined.
Justice Rehnquist Dissenting
Justice Rehnquist stated that this was not the constitutional framer’s intent.
The court discussed the state’s interest, if compelling after viability, is equally compelling before viability. In addition, an unusual joint opinion by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter overruled the trimester distinctions used in Roe, and the use of strict scrutiny for evaluating government regulations of abortions.
Furthermore, the court stated Casey remains the major case articulating current protections and constitutional standards for the right to abortion.
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the court held that notification is invalid.
The court recognized the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State. Moreover, the court expressed that before viability, the state’s interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the procedure.
In addition, the court confirmed the state’s power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the law contains exceptions for pregnancies endangering the woman’s life or health.
Moreover, the principle that the state has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child.
The constitutional protection of the woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of states at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendments marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty that the Fourteenth Amendment protects.
In Eisnestadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), held “the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”
The court reasoned that the woman’s interest in terminating her pregnancy may originate within the zone of conscience and belief encompassing more than a philosophic exercise. Abortion is a unique act with consequences for others. The court determined that consequences exist for the woman who must live with the implications of her decision. In addition, there are repercussions for the persons who perform and assist in the procedure; for the spouse, family, and society which must confront the knowledge that these procedures exist. Some courts view these procedures as an act of violence against an innocent human life, and depending on an individual’s beliefs, for the life or an aborted potential life. Although abortion is conduct, it does not follow that the state is entitled to proscribe it in all instances. That is because the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human condition and so unique to the law.
The court stated that a mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear. Furthermore, the sacrifices from the beginning of the human race that women endure with pride that ennobles her in the eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond of love that cannot alone be grounds for the state to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman’s role. However, that vision has been in the course of our history and our culture. In specific, the court determined that a woman’s destiny is determined largely in her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.
The court rejected the trimester framework because it does not consider the trimester framework to be a part of the essential holding of Roe.
In Roe, the court held the necessary reconciliation of the liberty of the woman and the interest of the state in promotion prenatal life, requiring, in our view, that we abandon the trimester framework as a rigid prohibition on all relevant regulations aimed at the protection of the fetal life. The trimester framework suffers from basic flaws including its formation, the fact that it misconceives the nature of the pregnant woman’s interest, and the practice undervalues the state’s interest in potential life, as recognized in Roe.
Moreover, the court stated that not every law that makes a right more difficult to exercise, pursuant to the facts, is an infringement of that right.
In addition, the court reasoned that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it. The court ruled that only when state regulations impose an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make this decision does the power to the state reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In addition, the court ruled that the state has a substantial interest in a potential life leads to the conclusion that not all regulations must be deemed unwarranted. Moreover, not all burdens on the right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy will be unnecessary.
The court concluded that a state regulation having the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus is an undue burden.
Furthermore, the court held the statute with this purpose is invalid because the means chosen by the state to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, and not hinder it.
The court reasoned that a statute furthering the interest in potential life or some other valid state interest has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice cannot be a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.
In specific, the court stated that regulations do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the state, or the parent or guardian of a minor, expressing a profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.
HOW HAS THE COURT ADDRESSED UNDUE BURDEN TEST?
The court expressed that the undue burden exists because a provision of law is invalid when its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.
The court reasoned the regulation’s purpose is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion. Thus, these measures must not be an undue burden on the right.
Furthermore, the state may enact regulation, as with many medical procedures, to further the health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion. Unnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the right.
The court held that a state may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability.
The court concluded, “subsequent to viability, the state in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.”
In Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), the court discussed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act (PBABA).
Justice Kennedy delivered this opinion, stating this case considers the validity of the PBABA of 2003, a federal statute regulating abortion procedures.
The court held that the statute was not constitutionally vague.
The court discussed the issue of ending fetal life and responded congressional factual findings that among other things, that “[a] moral, medical, and ethical consensus exists that the practice of performing a partial-birth abortion ….is a gruesome and inhumane procedure that is never medically necessary and should be prohibited.”
The PBABA states the knowingly performing a partial-birth abortion and thereby kills a human fetus…for the purpose of performing an overt act that the person knows will kill the partially delivered living fetus.
Before viability, a state “may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy.” The court stated that it also may not impose upon this right an undue burden existing when a regulation’s purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the court ruled that “[r}egulations that do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the state, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.”
The court held the act is void for vagueness because its scope is indefinite.
The respondents argued the act’s text proscribes all dilation and evacuations (D&E), which is the most common second-trimester abortion method, imposing an undue burden.
The attorney general did not dispute that the act would impose an undue burden if it covered standard D&E procedures.
Moreover, the court concluded that the act is not void for vagueness, and not imposing an undue burden from any over breadth, and is thus facially valid.
The court reasoned that the act applies to both pre-viability and post-viability because, by common understanding and scientific terminology, a fetus is a living organism while within the womb, regardless if the fetus is not viable outside the womb.
The attorney general conceded and the court agreed that if an abortion procedure involves the delivery of a living fetus to one of these anatomical landmarks where either the fetal head or the fetal trunk is past the navel outside the body of the mother then the prohibitions of the act do apply.
Furthermore, the court ruled the overt act causing the fetus’ death must be separate from delivery for purposes of criminal liability. Moreover, the over act must occur after the delivery to the aforementioned anatomical landmark.
The court stated that the general principle requires the proscribed mental intent for criminal liability to apply.
The respondents argued the language described above is indeterminate, and thus the act is unconstitutional because the act is vague on its face.
The court conceded “[a]s generally stated the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”
Moreover, the scienter requirements involving the guilty knowledge of a criminal offense alleviates vagueness concerns.
The court concluded that the respondents’ arguments concerning arbitrary enforcement, furthermore, are somewhat speculative. In addition, this is a pre-enforcement challenge, where “no evidence has been, or could be, introduced to indicate whether the [act] has been enforced in a discriminatory manner or with the aim of inhibiting [constitutionally protected conduct].”
The court discussed the issue of whether the act imposes an undue burden, as a facial matter, because its restrictions on second-trimester abortions are too broad.
In addition, the court reasoned that by adding an overt act requirement congress sought further to meet the court’s objections to the state statute considered in Stenberg.
Moreover, the fatal overt act must occur after delivery to an anatomical landmark, and it must be something “other than [the] completion of delivery.” The court suggested that the distinction matters because unlike the intact D&E standard, the D&E does not involve a delivery followed by a fatal act.
The court interpreted the act would be unconstitutional when its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.
In addition, the abortions affected by the act’s regulations take place both pre-viability and post-viability whereas the quoted language and the undue burden analysis it relies upon are applicable.
The court discussed the issue of whether the act, measured by its text in this facial attack, imposes a substantial obstacle to late-term, but pre-viability, abortions.
The court rejected the facial challenge to its validity because the act does not facially impose a substantial obstacle.
In addition, the court discussed the issue of whether the act has the effect of imposing an unconstitutional burden on the abortion right because it does not allow use of the barred procedure where necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the health of the mother. Moreover, the court suggested the act is in the furtherance of a legitimate government interest.
Under the controlling precedents, the court concluded that the prohibition in the act would be unconstitutional if it “subject[s] [women] to significant health risks.”
In Justice Thomas and Scalia concurring, the court ruled that state and federal legislatures have wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty.
The court reasoned that the medical uncertainty does not foreclose the exercise of legislative power in the abortion context any more than it does in other contexts. Furthermore, the medical uncertainty within the act’s prohibition of creating significant health risks provides that the act is not invalid on its face where there is uncertainty over whether the barred procedure is ever necessary to preserve a woman’s health, given the availability of other abortion procedures that are considered to be safe alternatives.
Moreover, the court reasoned that challenging the nature of the medical risk can be better quantified and balanced than in a facial attack.
In Justice Ginsburg and Stevens, Souter, Breyer dissenting, there is no exception safeguarding a woman’s health.
The court has consistently required that the laws regulating abortion, at any stage of pregnancy and in all cases, safeguard a woman’s health furthering the right to reproductive choice.
In addition, the court ruled that a state must avoid subjecting women to health risks not only where the pregnancy itself creates danger, but also where state regulation forces women to resort to any less safe methods of abortion.
In addition, the purpose of a health exception is to protect women in exceptional cases.
The notion that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act furthers any legitimate governmental interest is irrational.
The court states when “a statute burdens constitutional rights and all that can be said on its behalf is that it is the vehicle that legislators have chosen for expressing their hostility to those rights, the burden is undue.”
The court held that a “rational basis” is enough to uphold the act instead of the heightened scrutiny the courts have previously applied.
The courts discussed another type of government regulation of waiting periods for abortion.
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992), the Supreme Court used the undue burden test, rather than strict scrutiny as in Akron, and upheld the constitutionality of a waiting period.
The court contended, under the undue burden standard “a state is permitted to enact persuasive measures that favor childbirth over abortion, even if those measures do not further a health interest. And while the waiting period does not limit a physician’s discretion, that is not, standing alone, a reason to invalidate it.”
In addition, another type of government regulation of abortions are the informed consent requirements.
The court stated, as in Akron, the Pennsylvania law was unconstitutional because it induces a desire to discourage women from having abortions and compels a rigid requirement that a specific body of information be communicated regardless of the needs of the patient or the judgment of the physician.
In Casey, the court held that a provision virtually identical to that invalidated in Thornburgh. The court opinioned that “[t]o the extent Akron and Thornburgh find a constitutional violation where the government requires… the giving of truthful, non-misleading information about the nature of the abortion procedure, the attendant health risks and those of childbirth, and the ‘probable gestational age’ of the fetus, those cases are inconsistent with Roe’s acknowledgment of an important interest in potential life, and are overruled.”
In specific, the court held a section of the statute that required that women be informed of the availability of other materials that describe the fetus, provide information about medical care for childbirth, and list adoption providers.
The courts abandoned the position that the state may not regulate abortions in a way to encourage childbirth clearly reflecting a shift from Akron and Thornburgh to Casey.
The court discussed the issue that Casey leaves unresolved is how far the government can go in this direction the form of informed consent laws. For example, does Akron go in this direction in laws requiring informed consent? In addition, does Akron and Thornburgh remain good law that the government could not require that a women be given detailed descriptions of the fetus, or shown photographs, or told that human life begins at conception? The court suggested that a strong argument for all of these go much further than the Pennsylvania law in Casey and thus that the court might find them to be an undue burden on access to abortion.
HOW HAS THE COURT ADDRESSED GOVERNMENT RESTRICTIONS ON FUNDS AND FACILITIES FOR ABORTIONS?
In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), the court discussed the issue of whether the constitution requires a participating state to pay for non-therapeutic abortions when it pays for childbirth.
The court held that the government is not constitutionally required to subsidize abortions even if it is paying for the childbirth.
The court defined “therapeutic abortions” as abortions that were not performed to protect the life or health of the mother.
HOW HAS THE COURT ADDRESSED MONEY FOR ABORTIONS?
The courts have held that the constitution imposes no obligation.
Here, the appellees’ claim is that Connecticut must accord equal treatment to both abortion and childbirth, and may not evidence a policy preference by funding only the medical expenses incident to childbirth under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court discussed whether the regulation “impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly protected by the constitution.”
In specific, the right protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.
The State may have made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the women’s decision, but it has not imposed a restriction on access to abortions that was not already there.
We conclude that the Connecticut regulation does not infringe upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe.
The court stated there is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consistent with legislative policy.
Justice Brennan dissenting
The court discussed forcing a woman to carry because of money by citing the Hyde amendment utilizing Medicaid appropriations for abortions.
