United 93 ACARS Messages: Debunking The Debunkers

During my analysis of United 93 (UAL 93), which was based on the official FBI documents, I concluded that United Airlines (UAL) Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) logs, show that until 10:10 a.m., ACARS messages were still being sent and received by United Airlines dispatchers to UAL 93 (N591UA). I stated that an ACARS message was routed via Radio Ground Station (RGS) in Champaign IL, thus indicating that aircraft would have been in the vicinity of Champaign IL, being as the ACARS message was routed through the nearest RGS, which should have been impossible if the aircraft had crashed at 10:03 a.m.Source: 5 AWA 898 Printout of ARINC Messages ACARS (Flights AA11, UA93 & AA77). Recently (and in the past), there has been doubts raised by debunkers, stating that UAL 93 didn’t receive the ACARS message at 10:10 a.m., and that it is a misinterpretation that the ground-station ID, Champaign IL, was proof that the aircraft itself was still flying over Illinois. Firstly, I disagree with the debunkers, and also the argument that it is a misinterpretation to assume that ground station ID is proof of the aircraft’s location in the vicinity of Illinois. Below, I explain why the debunkers are incorrect. Michael J. Winter, was a Supervisory Air Traffic. Controller for United Airlines on 9/11, and was interviewed by the FBI, January 28, 2002. Winter had conducted an audit of the ACARS messages for United 175 and United 93 on 9/11. Winter explains how the ACARS messages were routed to the aircraft in his interview to the FBI. ”The Aircraft Communication and Reporting System (ACARS) uses radio ground stations (RGS) at various locations throughout the United States for communication. The messages from the aircraft utilize the RGS in a downlink operating system. A central router determines the strongest signal received from the aircraft and routes the signal/message to United Airlines (UAL) flight dispatch.”Source: Team7_Box11_FBI302s_ACARS [Page, 55 of 57]Essentially, Winter explains the routing of ACARS messages are determined via the “strongest signal” from the aircraft, which then routes the ACARS messages to the aircraft through the nearest ground station. According to messages #18 and #19, they were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the Radio Ground Stations near Champaign, IL (CMI) as designated in the line “AN N591UA/GL CMI”. Both messages were sent to the printer and Message #19 also activated an audible signal in the aircraft. It is also stated (highlighted in red box), Messages #20 to #24 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD. However, all of the messages were rejected indicating the aircraft did not receive them.The last message to UAL 93 which has two time stamps is #707, sent at 10:10 a.m. and affirmed at 10:11 a.m. Source: [FD-302 of Michael J. Winter 28-01-2002, Pg. 3].So it is confirmed in the “official” FBI investigation document, that the 10:10 a.m. ACARS message was received, and all messages following were rejected. This evidence shows that UAL 93 was still airborne after the alleged crash time at 10:03 a.m. This is also backed up in the “official” FBI document by David Knerr a Manager Flight Dispatch Automation, who carefully chose 10:12 a.m. as the point when UAL 93 ceased to receive messages, and not 10:10 a.m. or 10:11 a.m. So all messages before - like message #707 - have been received by UAL 93.Source: [FD-302 of Michael J. Winter 28-01-2002].Lastly, I want to address the debunkers assertion that it is a misinterpretation to assume that the ground station ID is proof of the aircraft’s location in the vicinity of Illinois.UAL 93 circling over Chicago?In the memorandums from the 9/11 Commission online release, on page 5 of this document: http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00762.pdf it states: “Marr told Commission staff that his focus was on UAL 93, which was circling over Chicago. Marr thought UAL 93 was waiting for word over what had been happening across the country to begin its attack.“ Note: Col. Marr is not “connected” to ACARS, but speaks from radar data, someone told him.This official testimony from Col. Marr proves that UAL 93 was in the vicinity of Chicago, which is 126 miles from Champaign IL. 126 miles is well within the radius of 200 miles for the ACARS message routing to the aircraft. See below:Champaign, IL covers 200 mile radius coverage which also includes Fort Wayne and ChicagoAs we can observe, the ACARS messages #13 to #19, together with the time when they were received establishes a rough flight path for UAL 93, which is not near Pittsburgh, but over Toledo, Fort Wayne, IN and Champaign, IL. 9:46 a.m. TOL (Toledo)9:51 a.m. FWY (Fort Wayne, IN)10:10 a.m. CMI (Champaign, IL)Col. Marr’s statement, that UAL 93 was “circling over Chicago” is independent evidence and confirmation that UAL 93 was flying in the vicinity of Champaign IL, and after the “alleged” crash time of 10:03 a.m. To ConcludeThe debunkers do not want to accept Col. Marr’s testimony, as it confirms UAL 93’s existence in the Chicago area, close to Champaign IL. So it stands to reason, that the ACARS message was routed through the nearest Champaign IL, Radio Ground Station, was because UAL 93 was flying over in that vicinity. Thanks for reading and caring!

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