9 Infinite Energy • ISSUE 24, 1999 • MIT Special Report Ronald Parker and others at the PFC. A group of PFC and Chem- istry Department scientists and students had immediately set out to check the Utah claims. There were regular calls to me at the News Office to provide status reports, photo opportunities, and interviews for members of the PFC team. Then in mid-April 1989, Professor Peter L. Hagelstein, a laser and quantum physics expert in the MIT Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, went public with a theory of how cold fusion might be explained in terms of “coherent nuclear reac- tions.” Professor Keith H. Johnson of the MIT Dept. of Materi- als Science, another MIT luminary, with deep knowledge of pal- ladium hydrides and superconductivity in his background, also put forth a theory that allowed nuclear reactions to occur in the Pons-Fleischmann cells. Unlike Hagelstein, who proposed pure nuclear reactions operating in a coherent fashion with a metal lattice, Johnson tried to explain the excess heat as a result of peculiar effects of so-called Jahn-Teller chemical bonding. I thought this was a wonderful honor for MIT, to have two open- minded theorists approaching the Utah results with caution, but attempting to pose explanations for it if it could be con- firmed. Others at MIT did not hold this view. The Hagelstein- Johnson work was almost immediately regarded with dis- dain—particularly by the plasma fusion people. So there were early-on two camps at MIT, one largely negative (but at that point generally restrained in its public comments), and another putting forth hope that the Utah discovery was no mistake and could be explained on theoretical grounds—much as Nobel Laureate Julian Schwinger began to try to do at that time. (See Julian Schwinger’s talk on cold fusion, which he delivered at MIT in November 1991.) The story was growing more fascinating every day, as reports of positive results in replication efforts came in from around the world, as well as news of negative results from other laboratories. I was able to write a series of articles* about MIT’s response to cold fusion for MIT Tech Talk , the administration newspaper that circulates on campus and is used as a public relations tool to influence the general mass media. ( Tech Talk is not to be confused with the MIT student newspaper, The Tech. ) [* April 5, 1989, Vol. 33, No. 27, “Recent ‘cold fusion’ claims baffle experts”; April 26, 1989, Vol. 33, No. 29, “Cold fusion: theories, controversy abound”: May 3, 1989, Vol. 33, No. 30, “Group finds flaw in cold fusion experiment”; May 31, 1989, Vol. 33, No. 34, “Cold fusion is still a hot topic.”] There were also a few immediate false-positive results from outside MIT, such as from Georgia Tech, that were reported pre- maturely to the press. These left several scientists embarrassed when they had to retract or sneak away with red faces—as Charles Martin did at Texas A&M University. Unfortunately, Dr. Eugene F. Mallove’s Input for MIT President Paul Gray’s Remarks for MIT Technology Day 1989 (Prepared, May 11, 1989) Two decades ago humanity was poised to begin an epic journey— the first manned landing on another celestial body, the Moon. We well recall the extraordinary contributions made by the thousands of scien- tists and engineers to the epic flight of Apollo 11 in July, 1969—in par- ticular the work of MIT engineers who developed the guidance and navigation systems for our spectacularly successful lunar missions. We remember the electric atmosphere and the spirit of global cele- bration—even amidst domestic conflict and war—as the world in rapt attention watched a tiny contingent of humanity make a giant leap onto a new world. And we remain very proud that a son of MIT who received his doctorate from the Department of Aeronautical and Astro- nautical Engineering, Col. Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., was aboard Apollo 11 and became the second human being to step onto the lunar surface. The launching of the first Sputnik in 1957 is often cited as the begin- ning of the space age. The era from 1957 through the watershed year of 1969—incidentally, the time of graduation of the 100th MIT class—con- trasts remarkably with the present. Slide rules were still the indispens- able companions of scientists and engineers; desk-top computers were unheard of and children did not play at video games; energy crises were only a theoretical possibility—as was the threat of global climate change; environmental issues were yet to rise to the fore of public attention; genetic engineering had not entered the public lexicon; and nuclear power seemed to have an endless, promising future. Today we aim to go beyond the Moon, not only with our space pro- gram, but with our ambitions to make a better planet Earth through sci- ence and technology. But these ambitions are beclouded by a worrisome anti-technology backlash and pervasive scientific illiteracy in our soci- ety that threatens not only our venture into space and efforts to reach a reasonable accommodation with nature, but our very standard of liv- ing. As MIT's recently released “Made in America” study suggests”. . . Office of the President May 6, 1988 Mr. Eugene F. Mallove Room 5-111 Dear Gene, I write, a bit belatedly, to express my appreciation to you for your tremendous help this spring in preparing those remarks on scientific illiteracy. As you know, I have gotten considerable mileage from them already (the Washington campaign opening, the New York Academy, and the Time-Life editors) and will get even more mileage from them in the months ahead. Your collaboration in this task was a tremendous help, and I am much in your debt. I suspect you were startled, as was I, by the revelations this week about the Reagans’ reliance on astrology. On second thought, I guess we should not be surprised. With warmest regards and best wishes, Sincerely yours, Paul E. Gray PEG/mmd cc: Kathryn W. Lombardi Eugene Mallove was held in high regard by many members of the MIT faculty and administration, as this 1988 letter from Dr. Gray attests. MIT Prof. Peter L. Hagelstein in his laser laboratory at MIT, circa 1994. ( Photo by Eugene Mallove ) MIT Prof. Keith H. Johnson at home in his movie production studio. MIT News Office

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10 Infinite Energy • ISSUE 24, 1999 • MIT Special Report these and other political issues came to color the attitude of many observers of the cold fusion scene—especially because Pons and Fleischmann had been forced to make their announce- ment via a press conference, rather than through scientific pub- lication. The reasons for the press conference are too involved to explore here, although Dr. Fleischmann himself sheds some additional light on the topic in an essay in this issue (not reprint- ed here, see Issue 24 of Infinite Energy ). However, it is a matter of record that Fleischmann and Pons really did not want to make their disclosure for another eighteen months until they under- stood their discovery better. The parallel claims by physicist Steve Jones of nearby Brigham and Young University, patent issues, and other conflicts brought the issue into public view in March 1989. Further complicating the story and enraging other scientists, lawyers at the University of Utah prohibited or retard- ed the disclosure of experimental details by Fleischmann and Pons. As a historian of this subject, I feel confident in stating that if Fleischmann and Pons had been allowed to hand out at their press conference the pre-print of their paper which was later that spring published in the Journal of Electroanalytical Chemistry , the intensity of opposition to cold fusion would have been reduced by at least 50%. If one had any interest in the process of science, this was already a first-class captivating story. Naturally, I called my lit- erary agent at the time, Richard Curtis, and alerted him that there might be a new book for me in this saga. Because I had already written two books (at the time I was still completing The Starflight Handbook ), it was not difficult to convince John Wiley & Sons to offer me a contract for a book on cold fusion. I didn’t know how the story would turn out, but it was certainly going to be a matter of some interest given the already huge media cov- erage. My first book was The Quickening Universe: Cosmic Evolution and Human Destiny (St. Martin's Press, 1987), which had been published soon after I arrived at the MIT News Office. One of the stipulations in the cold fusion book contract was that if Nature or Science magazine (or both) were to reach the general editorial conclusion that cold fusion was not real, the pub- lisher could revoke the contract. As would transpire, that happened; the contract was revoked. In the spring of 1989 and beyond, the complex politics among the hot fusion program, the Department of Energy ERAB Cold Fusion Panel, the cold fusion camp, the media, and the main- stream science community led to widespread rejection of cold fusion as a Big Mistake—incompetence on the part of Pons and Fleischmann and others reporting positive results, or worse. “Possible fraud” and “scientific schlock” is how PFC Director Ronald Parker would characterize Pons and Fleischmann’s work to Boston Herald environmental reporter Nick Tate in an interview in late April 1989, which surfaced on May 1. That May day in Baltimore, the absent electrochemists were vicious- ly attacked at the meeting of the American Physical Society. The “F-word”—fraud—had been unleashed against cold fusion, thanks in no small way to the MIT PFC. Boston Herald Reporter Nick Tate would later write in a retrospective (June 8, 1991): “The MIT analysis debunked the Utah claims, and in an inter- view with the Herald , Parker—who wrote the report with Dr. Richard Petrasso—said the chemists misinterpreted their results. He also called it possibly fraudulent ‘scientific schlock.’ Some say those comments set the tone for the national criticism of the Utah work that followed.” But as we all know, the cold fusion story did not die. Positive results, as well as negative results in attempts to replicate the Pons and Fleischmann experiment, continued to be reported through 1989 and beyond. I was fascinated by the trend, not knowing how it would all come out. I was trying to be as objec- tive as possible within the tumult. Certainly, I was encouraged by much of what I heard, but I was also discouraged by what my contacts at the MIT Plasma Fusion Center were saying. Some of them, such as Dr. Stan Luckhardt, told me that the tri- tium detection in cold fusion experiments at Los Alamos National Laboratory should be ignored because it had been done by “third-rate scientists.” I assumed, provisionally, that these MIT experts knew what they were talking about. These were Dr. Edmund Storms and Dr. Carol Talcott—in retrospect definitely not “third rate.” Despite Nature and Science maga- zines’ negativity, eventually the sharp editor at John Wiley & Sons, David Sobel, perceived that it would be a good idea to reinstate the book contract, so I continued to follow the story. Even without the contract, I would have continued to be deeply immersed in the field. How could any serious person with a strong science background not be, so intriguing had become the physical evidence—and, in parallel, its public rejection. And several MIT professors remained very interested in it—not only Peter Hagelstein and Keith Johnson, but Prof. Louis Smullin, Prof. Lawrence Lidsky, Prof. Donald Sadoway (who filed a patent too!), and Prof. Philip Morrison. In May 1991, Fire from Ice: Searching for the Truth Behind the Cold Fusion Furor came out. Its general conclusion was that the evidence for cold fusion was overwhelmingly com- pelling. In my view, for four or five years now, the basic evidence has been 100% con- firmed; it is not merely compelling. Com- mercial opportunities abound for engineer- ing power-generating reactors, even though the precise microphysical characterization of “cold fusion” remains contentious. In 1991, Julian Schwinger offered this promo- tional comment for the jacket of Fire from Ice : “Eugene Mallove has produced a sorely needed, accessible overview of the cold fusion muddle. By sweeping away stub- bornly held preconceptions, he bares the truth implicit in a provocative variety of experiments.” (See page 17 for further positive comments on Fire from Ice by Schwinger and other MIT-affiliated people.) In 1991, I thought that both cold fusion and hot fusion could play a complementary role in the energy economy of the world— even though neither technology had been developed to the stage of commercial devices. I offered that opinion in Fire from Ice . But I was on dangerous ground. That was the last thing that the hot fusion people wanted to hear! They thought they had buried cold fusion about two years before. They had been fighting cold fusion in the press and in government from the outset. Today, it is hot fusion that will be buried. Once the first com- mercial prototype reactors using cold fusion get widespread public acceptance—and they inevitably will—the white ele- phant of the tokamak hot fusion program is likely to be abrupt- Nick Tate, then of Boston Herald, now with Atlanta Journal Constitution (Photo courtesy of AJC) Julian Schwinger Infinite Energy archives

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ly canceled by an outraged Congress. The U.S. DoE-Academia scandal against cold fusion demands a Congressional investiga- tion if ever a matter of pressing scientific, technological, and legal importance did. Congress has already killed U.S. involve- ment in the $10-billion ITER (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor). The media, in general, are still largely ignoring scientific and commercial developments in cold fusion, but commercial-scale reactors will be impossible to deny—even for some heretofore obtuse science journalists who should have been continuing their coverage had they not been so strongly influenced by the likes of the negativists at MIT and elsewhere. It Began at MIT By the spring of 1991, most of the media and certainly the vast bulk of the scientific establishment had written off cold fusion. For- tunately for us all, they were—and are—all wrong. How did the scientific community and the media get the idea that cold fusion was bunk, “pathological science,“ and worse, when experiments continued worldwide? Substantial, increasingly refined experi- mental proofs were published—even in peer-reviewed journals, but the goal posts kept being moved by the opposition. Today, these goal posts are so dis- tant, they are off the planet. In retrospect, I have concluded that much of the blame for the “cold fusion war”—and it cer- tainly has been just that—stems from a vitupera- tive campaign against the field with deep roots at MIT, specifically at the MIT Plasma Fusion Cen- ter. Not exclusively in that lab, however. Then chemistry Professor Mark S. Wrighton was also on the team that was investigating cold fusion. He later signed the infamous rush-to-judgement report against cold fusion by the U.S. Dept. of Energy (Prof. Mildred Dresselhaus of MIT also signed the negative DoE report but was much less involved, and as of 1999 is apparently “neutral” about cold fusion. One wonders about the propriety of her public silence). Wrighton became Provost of MIT in (1990) after Charles Vest (formerly of the University of Michigan) became President of MIT and picked him. Since 1995, Wrighton has been Chancellor at Washington Universi- ty in St. Louis.) In the spring of 1991, as I was finishing Fire from Ice , and feeling increasingly uncomfortable with what was happening at MIT with respect to cold fusion, I made a fateful discovery. Questions had already arisen about exactly how the MIT PFC-Chemistry Dept. team had analyzed their excess heat calorimetry study that com- 11 Infinite Energy • ISSUE 24, 1999 • MIT Special Report pared a heavy water/palladium cell with an ordinary water/palla- dium cell. This was the so-called “Phase-II Calorimetry” study that had been published in the Journal of Fusion Energy . (Edited at the MIT Plasma Fusion Center—how’s that for short-circuiting peer review!) From the pile of information that I had been collecting about the on-going work at MIT and elsewhere, I found two draft documents concerning this calorimetry that had been given to me by PFC team members during the rush toward publication. I could see immediately that there was a serious discrepancy between the unpublished, pre-processed raw data (the July 10, 1989 draft) and the final published data on the July 13, 1989 draft. (See page 11 graphs reproduced from these drafts). At first glance, it appeared that the data had been altered between July 10th and 13th to con- form to what would be most welcome to the hot fusion people—a null result for excess heat in the heavy water data. I would later publicly challenge the creation and handling of these graphs by MIT PFC staff (see extensive Exhibits J through Z-11). The Phase-II Calorimetry curves were later investigated in the outstanding analysis by my cold fusion colleague and fel- low MIT graduate Dr. Mitchell R. Swartz. There can be no doubt now that these curves were the end result of a serious lapse in scientific standards in this affair that happened at MIT. Our alma mater, which had played such a critical role in the development of radar in World War II, in the Apollo flights to the Moon, in deep space missions, in electronics, in biotechnology, in the chemical industry, in defense systems, and too many other fields to mention in one sentence, would acquire the reputation in the media as the “bastion of skepticism” against cold fusion. Trag- ically, MIT as an institution was not to fulfill the role it could have played in bringing cold fusion technology to the world. Quite the contrary, thanks to various false information coming from the hot fusion lab at MIT, the high-profile reputation of MIT was used to legitimize the view that cold fusion is bunk. It was said that the PFC calorimetry results disproved cold fusion—showed no excess heat. This is far from correct, as Dr. Swartz admirably showed. His analysis has been published in several venues. From the vantage point of 1999, the role of the MIT Plasma Fusion Center/Chemistry Department team that investigated the cold Prof. Mark S. Wrighton, then head of the MIT Chemistry Dept., signed the U.S. Dept. of Energy negative cold fusion report, which relied heavily on later contested results from the MIT PFC-Chemistry Department team. Photo: MIT News Office Journal of Fusion Energy. Vol. 9, No. 2, 1990 Measurement and Analysis of Neutron and Gamma-Ray Emission Rates, Other Fusion Products, and Power in Electrochemical Cells Having Pd Cathodes David Albagli, 1 Ron Ballinger, 3,4 Vince Cammarata, 1 X. Chen, 2 Richard M. Crooks, 1 Catherine Fiore, 2 Marcel P. J. Gaudreau, 2 I. Hwang, 3,4 C. K. Li, 2 Paul Linsay, 2 Stanley C. Luckhardt, 2 Ronald R. Parker, 2,5 Richard D. Petrasso, 2 Martin O. Schloh, 1 Kevin W. Wenzel, 2 and Mark S. Wrighton 1,5 Results of experiments intended to reproduce cold fusion phenomena originally reported by Fleis- chmann, Pons, and Hawkins are presented. These experiments were performed on a pair of matched electrochemical cells containing 0.1 x 9 cm Pd rods that were operated for 10 days. The cells were ana- lyzed by the following means: (1) constant temperature calorimetry, (2) neutron counting and γ -ray spec- troscopy, (3) mass spectral analysis of 4 He in effluent gases, and 4 He and 3 He within the Pd metal, (4) tritium analysis of the electrolyte solution, and (5) x-ray photoelectron spectroscopy of the Pd cathode surface. Within estimated levels of accuracy, no excess power output or any other evidence of fusion products was detected. KEY WORDS: Fusion; cold fusion; palladium; excess heating. fusion claims in 1989 grows clearer. It is a sad tale that cannot be fully addressed in a short space. Suffice it to say that early on, senior members of the PFC/Chem- istry group, such as Dr. Richard Petrasso and Prof. Ronald Parker, took the view that the Utah claims were flawed, or worse, fraudulent. It went downhill from there. In Prof. Mildred Dresselhaus MIT News Office TECHNOLOGY

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12 Infinite Energy • ISSUE 24, 1999 • MIT Special Report Excess Power Data. July 10, 1989 H 2 O Unpublished. Excess Power Data. July 13, 1989 H 2 O Published Excess Power Data. July 10, 1989 D 2 O Unpublished. Excess Power Data. July 13, 1989 D 2 O Published. How the MIT PFC Experiment Worked—Or Did- n’t! Accurate calorimetry of electrolytic cells is a difficult task, prone to many subtle errors, which crept into the 1989 MIT PFC Phase-II Calorimetry experiment. A schematic diagram of the experiment is at the right. A tem- perature sensor monitors the temperature of the water. Auxiliary heater power is automatically adjusted to maintain constant cell temperature, so the heater power is a measure of the energy released in the cell. Thus, if heat is generated within the cell, less heater power is required. However, water is lost from the cell during the experiment, reducing the ease with which heat is conducted to the environment, which also tends to reduce the heater power requirement. During the experiment, the input power shows a declining heater power trend from water loss. The graphs above have been compensated for this water-loss trend. “Compensation” is error prone, especially where the heat release (possible cold fusion power) may be steady. The MIT researchers later (after their report was challenged) said they expected a “sudden turn on” of excess heat. Dr. Swartz concludes that “The Phase -II methodology is flawed because it masks a constant [steady-state] excess heat.” He also notes, “. . .the PFC data itself indicates that evaporation was a minor source of solvent loss...most solvent loss occurred by electrolysis. Such solvent loss would be greater for the H 2 O solution...such electrolysis is used commercially to isolate heavy water...putative differential excess solvent loss for heavy water is not a rea- The two pairs of graphs (below), referring to the same experiment, are from two drafts (executed three days apart) of the MIT PFC Phase-II Calorimetry comparative study of a heavy water (D 2 O) Fleischmann- Pons cold fusion cell and an ordinary water (H 2 O) control cell. In the July 10, 1989 draft, there is clear evidence of excess heat (beyond elec- trical input power) in the D 2 O cell, but no visually apparent excess in the H 2 O cell. The data were averaged over-one-hour intervals to produce the July 13, 1989 draft, which shows no excess heat in the D 2 O cell. There is now no doubt that to produce the July 13, 1989 draft, the D 2 O data had to be treated differently than the H 2 O data to give the final impression of a “null” result—no excess heat for D 2 O. The results were published in this form in the Journal of Fusion Energy and a MIT PFC Tech Report, widely cited (especially by DoE) as evidence that the Fleischmann and Pons claim was false. In essence, the hour-averaged data were properly transformed from the intermediate processed form (July 10) for the H 2 O control experiment, but the D 2 O experiment curve in the July 13 draft appeared to be arbitrarily shifted down to make the apparent excess heat vanish. There is no justification for this curve shifting. The manipulation of the data between dates July 10 and 13 was more disturbing and unexplained, because the two sets were “asymmetrically” treated, as proved in the extensive analysis done by MIT graduate Dr. Mitchell R. Swartz. sonable explanation for the asymmetric algorithm used to shift the 7/10/1989 D 2 O curve.” On June 7, 1991, Prof. Ronald R. Parker publicly stated that data from the MIT PFC was “worthless,” yet it had been published in a fusion journal edited at MIT. Later in 1991, he said that he stood by the negative con- Heater power decline. MIT PFC Raw Data H 2 0 Schematic of PFC Experiment From Draft MIT PFC Report D 2 0 Unpublished data Published data Graphic Proof of Serious Scientific Misconduct at MIT in 1989

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13 Infinite Energy • ISSUE 24, 1999 • MIT Special Report William Broad’s 1991 front-page news story in the March 17, 1991 Sun- day New York Times , senior PFC physicist Richard Petrasso revealed his original views about Pons and Fleischmann: “I was con- vinced for a while it was absolute fraud. Now I’ve softened. They probably believed in what they were doing. But how they represented it was a clear violation of how science should be done.” This is final proof, as though more were needed, that the scientific experiments to investigate cold fusion were inappro- priately biased from the outset. Petrasso’s comments came within Broad’s arti- cle, bannered with “Cold- Fusion Claim is Faulted On Ethics as Well as Sci- ence.” The article amount- ed to a virtual promotional book review of UK physi- cist Frank Close’s book, Too Hot to Handle , which came out at about the time of Fire from Ice . The New York Times also reviewed Close’s book in its Book Review section. Curiously, Fire from Ice was never reviewed by the Times . Frank Close, who worked closely with Petrasso et al. in assaulting Pons and Fleis- chmann, falsely accused them of having fudged gamma-ray spectroscopy data. The bizarre truth is that even had Pons and Fleischmann faked gamma ray data—they most certainly had not—their all-important nuclear-scale excess power results, the key signature of cold fusion, has withstood the test of time. Cold fusion is now being devel- oped commercially. To their credit, Fleis- chmann and Pons were not comfortable with the preliminary nature of their neu- tron/gamma-ray data and have long since withdrawn those data. Others subsequently confirmed much lower levels of neutron emission. On the other hand, the use of the strawman of gamma-ray curves by Petrasso et al. at the MIT PFC is all the more reprehensible when the history of real data fudging in cold fusion is examined—the data “processing” ( i.e. improper manipulation) of calorimetry curves from electrochem- ical experiments performed at the MIT PFC in the spring of 1989. Let us not forget, these were serious experiments, funded by the U.S. Department of Energy under Federal contract. The authorization to investigate came from U.S. President George Bush through Energy Secretary Admiral Watkins. (As a general matter, people who file false reports to Federal agencies are sub- ject to criminal sanctions if this work is brought to the attention of appropriate investigative authorities before the statutes of lim- itation expire.) This calorimetry issue was not a small matter. In the spring of 1989 it was absolutely critical to determine whether there was anything to the Pons and Fleischmann claims. The energy and environmental future of the world hung in the bal- ance—and the MIT PFC people failed us. They preferred to get rid of a scientific claim in which they did not believe, and which threatened their federally-funded program, by playing politics with the media, trivializing their experiments, and ultimately foisting on the world highly flawed data—some would say fraudulently represented data—from a calorimetry experiment ostensibly performed to determine scientific truth. To understand how the curves that I and later Dr. Swartz ana- lyzed in his report came about, one should have some back- ground. In late April 1989, Professor Parker and Professor Ronald Ballinger, both members of the PFC team then investi- gating the claims of Pons and Fleischmann, held a covert inter- view with Herald reporter Nick Tate to plant a very negative story against the Utah work. No one at the MIT News Office was told of this interview until late on the night before the story was to appear in banner headlines in the Boston Herald . As Parker told Tate (a tape released by the Herald confirms this—see Exhib- it B ), Parker and Ballinger et al. were opposed to the “cheer-leading” for cold fusion by the Boston Globe . They wanted to give Tate an exclusive story about some nuclear physics evidence that they said they had developed, which they claimed would prove the Fleischmann-Pons experi- ments to be highly flawed. This evidence concerned the gamma-ray spectra coming from attempts to measure neutrons impinging on a water bath near the Pons- Fleischmann cells. Historically, it is evident that this Herald story helped unleash the tidal wave of negativity against Fleischmann and Pons and others who continue to work in the field. Ironically, Parker et al. accomplished what they really set out to do with that story, but at the time Parker attacked reporter Tate for allegedly mis-report- ing what he had said during his interview. Tate came very close to being fired on the spot by his editor; he would have been fired had he not had an audio tape of the interview to confirm what he had been told by Parker. After all, it was an MIT professor’s word against that of a young reporter. A frantic Ronald Parker, perhaps fearing that he would be sued by Pons and Fleischmann for the harsh words that were quoted a bit too explicitly for his taste, called me late on the night of April 30, 1989. He had me dispatch a press release to the wire services denying the impending Boston Herald story, the exact nature of which he had learned from a call from CBS television. Of course, I had at that time no reason to doubt what he was telling The energy and environmental future of the world hung in the balance—and the MIT PFC people failed us. They pre- ferred to get rid of a scientific claim in which they did not believe, and which threatened their federally-funded pro- gram, by playing politics with the media, trivializing their experiments, and ultimately foisting on the world highly flawed data—some would say fraudulently represented data—from a calorimetry experiment ostensibly performed to determine scientific truth. . . Prof. Ronald R. Parker, at hastily called MIT press conference on May 1, 1989, explains what the MIT PFC team believed to be the errors in the Fleischmann-Pons neutron measurements. He also denied using the harsh language against Fleischmann and Pons quoted in the Boston Herald story that day. Photo: MIT News Office

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14 Infinite Energy • ISSUE 24, 1999 • MIT Special Report me: that the story was a distortion. I would learn the stark truth about this deception only over a year later when Tate allowed me to listen to the actual tape. There can be no denying what Parker told Tate about Fleischmann and Pons. In one key passage in the interview, Parker says this: “So, what are you going to do with this, uh, Nick? You know this is. . .what you are hearing is that we think it’s a scam, right?” Tate responded: “Why is it today that you think it’s a scam?” Parker’s reply: “We have been studying the evidence together very slowly and we want to have a paper out on this before we actually blast them. Monday (May 1, 1989) we’re putting a paper out on it. . .” In addition to this, the actual word “fraud,” was used by Parker no less than five times on the audio tape—as he discussed Pons and Fleischmann’s work. This tape is a key “smoking gun” of the entire cold fusion controversy. The treachery and conniving by Parker and Ballinger are there for all to see—dis- graceful! By June of 1989, the hot fusion com- munity and the physics establish- ment were very sat- isfied that they had debunked cold fusion. Any of the growing numbers of positive reports could readily be dis- missed by reporters and other, less involved scientists. After all, the plasma physicist authorities at MIT had spoken. In fact, so convinced were the PFC people that they had killed off cold fusion, they held a celebratory party—billed as a “Wake for Cold Fusion” on June 26, 1989. The humorous poster for the party notes: “Brought to you by the Center for Contrived Fan- tasies—Black Arm- bands Optional.” What is most interesting about this anything-but- funny mockery by the PFC is that at the time the party was held, the data for the Phase-II calorimetry experiments had not yet been analyzed! It was not until mid-July 1989 that the calorimetry data were put in anything like final published form. No formal conclusion had been set into print. How do we know this? Simple. In the course of my investigations into cold fusion, I would of course regu- larly ask PFC team members for their latest impressions, data, etc. So I was given many, many documents that piled up on my desk, not all being closely examined when received. But as I was completing Fire from Ice in the spring of 1991, questions about the PFC calorimetry had been brought up by my cold fusion colleague, electrochemist Dr. Vesco Noninski. Was the methodology and analysis of the PFC Phase-II calorimetry reported in the paper published by the PFC in the Journal of Fusion Energy sound? Noninski had many doubts and so did I. We approached a team member for clarification and got no sat- isfaction—just continued brush-off. I then looked through my stacks of papers from the PFC and found to my complete aston- ishment (and dismay) the two draft reports on the Phase-II calorimetry. One was dated July 10, 1989 and the other July 13, 1989, a clearly more com- plete version—the ver- sion that was actually published in both a for- mal PFC report and the Journal of Fusion Energy . Only a week after this MIT PFC analysis solidi- fied, PFC Director Parker occupied himself dis- pensing “humorous” cold fusion mugs that were obtained “wholesale” in Utah ( see Exhibit F )! On June 7, 1991 I resigned from the MIT News Office, to protest the outrageous behavior of the PFC and others at MIT against cold fusion. Among other disgraceful happenings, an article of mine on cold fusion that had been approved for pub- lication by the then editor of MIT Tech- nology Review , was canceled after being trashed by MIT Physics Department Professor Herman Feshbach. Feshbach told me over the phone when I inquired, “I have fifty years of experi- ence in nuclear physics and I know what is possible and what is impossi- ble.” He also told me that he did not want to see any more evidence for cold fusion, which I offered to show him, because, “It’s all junk!” Hours before my formal resignation, the PFC was having another of its “cele- brations” for the death of cold fusion. Dr. Frank Close was speaking at a seminar there, billed “An Exposé of Cold Fusion,” in which he lashed at Pons and Fleis- chmann for their alleged fudging of gamma ray curves. He had nothing of sig- nificance to say about the P&F calorime- try, consistent with this appalling high- energy physicist mind-set that “knew everything that could and could not hap- pen” among nuclei. After Close was fin- ished, Dr. Petrasso as master of cere- monies, very reluctantly gave me some time to comment. (“Just one minute, Gene!”) I showed the July 10-July 13 curve shifting with overhead transparencies and suggested sarcastically to Close that he should consider covering this impor- tant documentary finding in the next edi- tion of his book (Heaven forfend that there should be another!). It was as though I were talking to a wall. This was Electrochemist Dr. Vesco C. Noninski questioned MIT PFC’s analysis of its calorimetry data. Photo by E.Mallove MIT Prof. Herman Feshbach MIT News Office Dr. Frank Close Princeton University Press Dr. Richard Petrasso Photo by E. Mallove

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15 Infinite Energy • ISSUE 24, 1999 • MIT Special Report not deemed important. After all, hadn’t he just “proved” that cold fusion was dead? PFC Director Parker then stated that this was the first time he had seen the data I had flashed on the screen—it probably was. Then Parker made the astounding assertion that “you can put those curves anywhere you wish.” He publicly stated that the data from the MIT PFC was “worthless.” (See Exhibit K ). Many weeks later, after I had revealed the PFC story to the world, Park- er reverted to defending the conclusions of the calorimetry data— in an informal press release put out by the MIT News Office (see Exhibit T ). It must take many years of training to maintain such mutually contradictory opinions with a straight face—on nation- al television and in written documents. Let me be clear: There was likely no grand “conspiracy” to suppress a positive finding for excess heat in the MIT PFC- Phase-II calorimetry, it’s just that the mind-set of the MIT hot fusioneers and Chemistry Department people allowed lower echelon persons to monkey with the data. He or she could not possibly bring anything to his superiors—Ronald Parker and then MIT Chemistry Dept. Head Mark Wrighton—that looked remotely positive for excess heat. This would have opened up the cold fusion story again in the summer of 1989, this time with MIT coming in with some encouraging news. So, the data was “fudged.” I can think of another F-word—beyond “fudging”— that applies. It is closer to the truth. Ronald Parker likes to bandy it about in interviews with newspaper reporters. This groundless, manipulated and fabricated data has subsequently been cited over and over again by the U.S. Patent Office to reject cold fusion patent applications. It was even used, in part, ulti- mately to kill the Pons and Fleischmann patent itself, which happened in the Fall of 1997. Other MIT-trained cold fusion inventors have also had their patent applications attacked with this unscientific travesty from MIT. Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the MIT PFC experi- ment was that after I publicly challenged it, the objective of the experiment was redefined by its defenders! Thus, it is quite liter- ally true that the experiment published in the Journal of Fusion Energy and the MIT PFC technical report is by definition fraudu- lent— if only because the ground rules for comparing the heavy water and ordinary water experimental outputs were subsequently changed and are not as stated in the article. These ground rules went from the obvious implication that can be taken from the lack of dif- ference between the published curves to the statement that the MIT PFC team were looking for “fast turn on” of 79 mW excess heat and didn’t find it! See NIH physicist Dr. Charles McCutchen’s letters to the MIT Administration about this key point— Exhibits Z-4, Z-8, and Z-11 . Dr. Mitchell Swartz has pro- duced a remarkable, clear analysis of the data produced by the MIT PFC—including all of the various inconsis- tent versions of the data and their interpretation). The work speaks for itself. Interested readers may request the original color-graphic paper which is included in a paperback book from JET Technology, P.O. Box 81135, Wellesley Hills, MA 02481. • Swartz, Dr. Mitchell R., “Re-Examination of a Key Cold Fusion Experiment: ‘Phase-II’ Calorimetry by the MIT Plasma Fusion Center,” Fusion Facts , August 1992, pp. 27-40. • Swartz, Dr. Mitchell R., “A Method to Improve Algorithms Used to Detect Steady State Excess Enthalpy,” Proceedings: Fourth International Conference on Cold Fusion (December 6-9, 1993, Lahaina, Maui, Hawaii), and in Transactions of Fusion Technology , Vol.26, December 1994, pp. 369-372. • Swartz, Dr. Mitchell R., “Some Lessons from Optical Exami- nation of the PFC Phase-II Calorimetric Curves, Proceedings: Fourth International Conference on Cold Fusion (December 6-9, 1993, Lahaina, Maui, Hawaii). The Sham MIT “Inquiry” I am very glad that Dr. Swartz undertook the task of this essential analysis, because certainly he was more capable than I in this kind of detailed examination of points that appeared and disappeared in various versions put out by the PFC. He did it himself after I turned over to him the materials that I had dis- covered. I was so revolted by the handling of this matter by the MIT Administration, that I really could not stand to wallow in the falsehoods coming out of the MIT PFC. My feeling was: “Let them stew in their own self-created problems. The world will eventually understand what they did.” It will. After my formal complaint to MIT President Charles Vest in August 1991 (see Exhibit R ), in which I asked for an appropriate investigation of scientific misconduct in the data handling and in the planting of a false press story by Parker in 1989, the whole matter was, in effect, swept under the rug by Vest after an utterly insufficient examination of the technical issue by Pro- fessor Professor Philip Morrison, who was a friend of MIT PFC report co-author, Dr. Petrasso. Morrison’s down-playing of the issues involved was a great disappointment, but not surprising for someone who to this day does not comprehend the significance of the research results in the cold fusion field. A symptom of this: To my knowledge, Prof. Mor- rison—at least as of early 1999—has never reviewed in his wide ranging columns any cold fusion books—either positive or nega- tive. In one of his notes to President Vest ( Exhibit V ), Morrison stat- ed that cold fusion findings “would at most open some way to build a new battery, possibly a fuel cell.” This kind of ill-informed remark should be beneath the author of The Ring of Truth! Concerning the ethical issues of Parker’s dealings with the press and the MIT News Office, President Vest stated that his legal counsel advised him no action was necessary. It was a shameful, sham “inquiry,” not a thorough investigation, as the subsequent portion of this report and the var- ious Exhibits show. I com- plained vigorously to President Vest that the inquiry was totally inade- quate. In fact, the people who should should have been under investigation were allowed to continue Dr. Mitchell R. Swartz of JET Technology, Inc. lectured on cold fusion calorimetry, January 20, 1996 at Cambridge Marriott Hotel. Meeting sponsored by Infinite Energy Magazine. Photo by E. Mallove MIT President Charles M. Vest, who continues to ignore cold fusion research. He excused the unethical behavior of MIT PFC staff against cold fusion. He is on a Federal panel that has advised the Clinton Administra- tion to increase funding for hot fusion—a benefit for the MIT PFC (see Exhibits R through Z- 11). MIT Photo by Edward McCluney

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16 Infinite Energy • ISSUE 24, 1999 • MIT Special Report 1991 complaint to President Vest (see Exhibit R ) that a “20% dis- crepancy in heater power, used to heat the same volume of fluid, has been suggested as corroborating evidence that the heavy water cell produced excess heat.” At the very least it was scientifically and morally required that the MIT PFC group repeat its experiments, rather than hav- ing them cited year after year against cold fusion, when they should have been retracted or corrected, per the suggestion of physicist Dr. Charles McCutchen—see Exhibit Z-11 . To cover up a sorry episode may have been comfortable for the MIT admin- istration in an era in which cold fusion had not yet achieved gen- eral acceptance (thanks in no small way to some on the MIT staff), but that era will pass. An age of enlightenment is coming that will make the tokamak hot fusion program at MIT a foot- note to history. The era of safe, clean, and abundant energy from water—non-chemical energy from hydrogen—will drown the deceivers from MIT to Princeton. (If anyone has any doubt about this emerging commercial reality, they should consult one of the energy-from-water corporations that was influenced by the announcement of Fleischmann and Pons—see BlackLight Power Corp. [www.blacklightpower.com]. No doubt many bright MIT graduates will be employed there.) No one can say that we did not warn MIT officials of the consequences if this important mat- ter was allowed to be mishandled at MIT the way it was and continues to be. Other Issues The preceding is the basic story of what went on at MIT in 1989-1992. Much of this could have been avoided if President Vest had had an open-door policy toward appropriate scientific dissent. On April 12, 1991, I had sent a letter to President Vest (see Exhibit I ), at a time when I was feeling optimistic about what could be accomplished. I had hoped that the new MIT President, who had replaced the outgoing Dr. Paul E. Gray, would take action on its important message. I recommended that a study group be formed to re-examine what had been learned about cold fusion since 1989. Should I have been sur- prised at not receiving a response? Not when President Vest had chosen Chemistry Department head Mark Wrighton, to be Provost. Examine Wrighton’s brusk and totally inappropriate response to Dr. Noninski ( Exhibit H) . Wrighton’s “let me make this perfectly clear I have no comment” letter is not a response that a scientist with integrity would have written. After the events of 1991-1992, there followed many hard years of struggle, working with other engineers and scientists in cold fusion research, and trying to correct false impressions about cold fusion investigations that were being made by journalists and government officials. The launching of Infinite Energy maga- zine in 1995 (and its short-lived precursor, Cold Fusion magazine, 1994) was, in part, a response to the egregious distortions about cold fusion that were initiated by members of the MIT PFC. Fire from Ice was well received by many reviewers, but its mes- sage was largely drowned out by an onslaught of scurrilous anti- cold fusion books, the first one by Frank Close, Too Hot to Handle (1991). Dr. Richard Petrasso of the MIT PFC had aided Close’s work. He was in complete agreement with Close’s opinions; wit- ness his comment published on the front page of the Sunday New York Times , March 17, 1991, which was essentially a laudatory review of the book by Close. Recall Dr. Petrasso’s words: “I was convinced for a while it was absolute fraud. Now I’ve softened. They [Pons and Fleischmann] probably believed in what they were doing. But how they represented it was a dear violation of how sci- ence should be done.” A case of the pot calling the kettle black, I’d say, in light of the technical publication to which Petrasso (and fif- to handle the data and write a subsequent “Technical Appendix” that made further excuses for data mishandling. As Dr. Swartz has shown, the data was, indeed, altered yet again during the “investigation”! For now, I hope that Dr. Swartz’s analysis, and my own assessments and exchanges with President Vest, will be examined carefully by all who still have an open mind about the historical development of the cold fusion controversy. My conclusions about the inappropriate data manipulation at the MIT PFC are my own and my opinions about the implica- tions of this data mishandling are to be considered distinct from Dr. Swartz’s. My assessments of the MIT calorimetry and data han- dling appear in my Letter of Resignation ( Exhibit L ), my formal request for an investigation of scientific misconduct ( Exhibit R ), and other exchanges with President Vest that form the exhibits to this report. But let me quote Dr. Swartz’s summary conclu- sions from his fourteen-page technical paper: From: Dr. Mitchell R. Swartz’s, “Re-Examination of a Key Cold Fusion Experiment: ‘Phase-II’ Calorimetry by the MIT Plasma Fusion Center,” Fusion Facts , August 1992, pp. 27-40. The light water curve was published by the PFC essentially intact after the first baseline shift, whereas the heavy water curve was shift- ed a second time. The cells were matched, 12 and solvent loss would be expected to be greater for H 2 O. The Phase-II methodology is flawed because it masks a constant [steady-state] excess heat. Furthermore this paradigm fails to use either the true baseline drift, and may avoid the first 15% of the D 2 O curve in Types 3, 3 B , 4, and 5 curves. What constitutes “data reduction” is sometimes but not always open to scientific debate. The application of a low pass filter to an electrical signal or the cutting in half of a hologram properly con- stitute “data reduction,” but the asymmetric shifting of one curve of a paired set is probably not. The removal of the entire steady state signal is also not classical “data reduction.” In the May 1992 Appendix, the PFC retroactively claims its “systematic errors now total 100 to 400 milliwatts, implying an insensitivity of >30 kilojoules. Much current skepticism of the cold fusion phenomenon was created by the PFC paper’s reporting “failure-to-reproduce.” 12 as opposed to its later claimed “to insensitive-to-confirm” experi- ments 17 ]. Because it may be the single most widely quoted work used by critics of cold fusion to dismiss the phenomenon, the paper should have clarified all “data” points and the methodolo- gy used. Apparent curve proliferation, volatile points, asymmetric curve shifts, combined with an impaired methodology have need- lessly degraded the sensitivity, and believability of the Phase II calorimetry experiment. 12. D. Albagli, R. Ballinger, V. Cammarata, X. Chen, R.M. Crooks, C. Fiore, M.P.J. Gaudreau, I. Hwang, C.K. Li, P. Linsay, S.C. Luckhardt, R.R. Parker, R.D. Petrasso, M.O. Schloh, K.W. Wensel, M.S. Wrighton, “Measurement and Analysis of Neutron and Gamma-Ray Emission Rates, other Fusion Products, and the Power in Electrochemical Cells Having Pd Cathodes,” Journal of Fusion Energy , 9 , 133, 1990. 17. S.C. Luckhardt, “Technical Appendix to D. Albagli et al., J. Fusion Energy, 1990, Calorimetry Error Analysis,” MIT Report PFC/RR-92- 7, (May 1992). Present MIT students as well as alumni should investigate this most unfortunate episode for themselves, and take action—for the well-being of MIT. There is no doubt in my mind that the MIT PFC calorimetry was mishandled and fraudulently mis- represented. Dr. Swartz’s paper, using proper analysis that could have been performed by the MIT PFC, determined that “the average power by this method is 62 milliwatts (±34 milli- watts).” As Dr. Swartz states, this is “qualitatively similar to the value expected for a ‘successful’ experiment.” Furthermore, Dr. Swartz credits in his references and conclusions my August

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