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1 Infinite Energy • ISSUE 24, 1999 • MIT Special Report It is March 2003 as we mount permanently on the web this Special Report about MIT and Cold Fusion—almost the 14th anniversary of the announcement by Drs. Fleischmann and Pons at the University of Utah on March 23, 1989. We published this report in Infinite Energy Issue #24 in March/April 1999, but now it is available as a free internet download for all the world to see. Every citizen who is con- cerned about the future of clean energy generation and the future of our environment should read this report. Every MIT student, every MIT graduate, and every financial con- tributor to MIT should read it. Judge for yourself where the facts lead. When many people are asked today about cold fusion, if they recall the 1989 announcement at all, they may offer remarks such as, “The experiment couldn’t be reproduced.” Or, “Cold fusion was quickly dismissed by other laboratories as a mistake.” One of the most significant players in estab- lishing in the public mind that thoroughly erroneous view was a team of investigators at MIT at its lavishly funded hot fusion laboratory, then called the MIT Plasma Fusion Center. The MIT group rendered a highly negative assessment of the Fleischmann and Pons claims, in part by performing its own attempt to reproduce the heavy-water/palladium excess heat experiment. The announced “failure to confirm” by the MIT group became one of the three top negative reports weighing against cold fusion in those early days. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) cited the MIT PFC’s negative conclusion in rendering its rushed, condemning report in the fall of 1989; alphabetically, the MIT group’s report is the first technical reference cited in the DOE Cold Fusion Panel’s report. It is therefore of considerable interest to understand what really happened at MIT in 1989, and the several years fol- lowing, on the matter of cold fusion. The story is most cer- tainly not what is regurgitated in numerous journalistic accounts, which are most often unflattering to Drs. Fleis- chmann and Pons and those researchers who followed their pioneering path. In fact, the story of cold fusion’s reception at MIT is a story of egregious scientific fraud and the cover- up of scientific fraud and other misconduct—not by Fleis- chmann and Pons, as is occasionally alleged—but by researchers who in 1989 aimed to dismiss cold fusion as quickly as possible and who have received hundreds of mil- lions of DOE research dollars since then for their hot fusion research. The cover-up of fraud, sad to say, reaches the high- est levels at MIT and includes the current MIT President, Charles M. Vest. Remarkably, President Vest has recently been named by U.S. Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham to head the Task Force on the Future of Science Programs at the Department of Energy. The high level task force will “exam- ine science and technology programs across the department and consider future priorities for scientific research.” MIT President Vest also serves on the President’s Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) and is vice chair of the Council on Competitiveness. It is hoped that fair minded readers of the MIT and Cold Fusion Report will conclude that MIT’s Charles Vest, who represents what are now provably unethical vested academic interests, is not a person whose scientific advice should be sought about DOE’s science and technology plans. The top man who, for now, will be leading DOE’s panel of the “future of science” will get to pass judgment on whether hot fusion “science” should be funded at all, and if so to what extent, and at what institutions. One of those places just happens to be MIT, which receives tens-of-millions of dollars each year for its tokamak hot fusion research. Does this not seem to pose a slight conflict of interest—even had no scientific fraud been carried out against cold fusion at MIT in 1989, and even had Vest not participated in its cover- up? Will Vest recuse himself on the matter of hot fusion funding? Will there be any consideration of New Hydrogen Physics Energy (which includes cold fusion) by a DOE panel led by President Vest? We believe that under the circum- stances it is not possible for cold fusion/LENR to receive any re-assessment—let alone a fair one—for a role in DOE’s future science programs. If after reading this report con- cerned citizens feel the same way, they should consider writ- ing to the White House to express their displeasure. Those who are more directly concerned about the integrity of MIT’s research and reputation should write to Charles Vest or to other academic officers at MIT. Perhaps this might prompt a long-overdue official investigation of events in 1989-1992, followed by an official withdrawal of the MIT PFC’s fraudulent calorimetry paper from the scientific liter- ature. MIT and Cold Fusion: A Special Report Introduction by Dr. Eugene F. Mallove (MIT Class of 1969, Aero/Astro Engineering, SB 1969, SM 1970) Editor-in-Chief, Infinite Energy Magazine President, New Energy Foundation, Inc. Subscribe to Infinite Energy Magazine! Six issues per year. $29.95 North America $49.95 Foreign
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2 Infinite Energy • ISSUE 24, 1999 • MIT Special Report M IT has played an extraordinary role in the history of cold fusion. By acts of commission and omission it continues to do so. On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the startling announcement by Drs. Fleischmann and Pons on March 23, 1989, it is imperative that Infinite Energy explore the major role of MIT in shaping the history of the investigation of cold fusion. Excess power evolution and unexpected (“impossible”) nuclear changes in hydrogen-metal systems come under the rubric “cold fusion.” Whatever its complete microphysical explanation turns out to be, cold fusion is of surpassing impor- tance from the perspective of both science and technology. MIT’s role in this affair bears close scrutiny by all who value what they assume MIT stands for: the open-minded quest for the truth about Nature and the application of new discoveries in science toward the betterment of humanity. This report will be of special interest to all who are concerned about the well-being of MIT—its alumni/ae, students, faculty, and administration. What this brief history says about the actions and inactions in the area of cold fusion by one of the world’s great technical universities has far-reaching implica- tions for everyone interested in the heated cold fusion contro- versy. The history of MIT’s reaction to cold fusion will become a remarkable case study in how a major scientific revolution is affected by the strong news media influence of MIT, by govern- ment funding of MIT, and by the scientific involvement of MIT professors, administration, students, and staff. Extraordinary circumstances demand extraordinary action. It is our obligation—our moral imperative—to publish the detailed report that follows. Unfortunately for the world, many people still believe that the claims of a new, clean, abundant energy source and nuclear reactions occurring near room tem- perature were quickly and definitively disposed of by the care- ful work of scientists at MIT in the spring of 1989. Nothing could be further from the truth. These investigators at MIT did not produce definitive work. In fact, quite the contrary. A great opportunity for pioneering by MIT was missed and the baby was thrown out with the bath water—at least temporarily. The actions of certain MIT staff members in 1989 were a major influence on the news media, on other scientists, and on the funding support for cold fusion. This is a matter of record. Though a small group of open-minded, involved faculty, staff, and alumni pursued and continue to pursue cold fusion, MIT as a whole did, indeed, acquire the deserved reputation as a “Bas- tion of Skepticism” on cold fusion. Sad to say, it was initially only a handful of MIT staff and faculty who gave MIT this rep- utation. They inappropriately drove many others—on campus and off—to dismiss the claims from Utah in 1989 and the research that has followed. Thus, the role of MIT in cold fusion— apart from the stellar accomplishments of those who persevered in scientific investigations—must be regarded as a permanent blemish on MIT’s otherwise undisputed role as a leader in sci- ence, technology, and education. Fortunately, it is a bad mark that could be expunged by future good deeds—and apologies for past mis deeds. Is the MIT of 1999 up to that? We shall see. One hopes that this true characterization of MIT’s institutional behavior in the early 1990s and beyond will be but a temporary aberration. Yet if the past is any guide, there is little cause for opti- mism that a sudden awakening to the truth will occur at MIT. Perhaps the greatest hope lies in the youth—the students and graduates of MIT who will examine the scientific literature objec- tively. Most MIT professors today are simply oblivious to the sub- ject. If they were to examine the research record of the past decade, they would readily see the opportunities to enter what is clearly an area of enormous potential. MIT students and alum- ni/ae may need to become catalysts that move faculty members and administration in the right direction, away from the present untenable position of denying well-established experimental facts and the theoretical developments by Professors such as Peter L. Hagelstein (Electrical Engineering and Computer Sci- ence) and Keith H. Johnson, formerly of the Department of Mate- rials Science and Engineering. I defy any previously uninvolved MIT student or graduate to examine the thirty-four references that are cataloged on pages 29-34 of this issue (“Key Experiments that Substantiate Cold Fusion Phenomena”) and conclude that the information is not strong enough to warrant further investigation and action. These are only a small sample of many other papers and devel- opments that can be cited. In 1999, it is possible for MIT gradu- ates to visit laboratories in the U.S. and abroad where cold fusion investigation and development are moving forward. And soon enough there will be a host of demonstration sets and kits that research laboratories can purchase to observe the effects themselves. Some of these will be distributed by compa- nies in which MIT graduates are involved. The events of 1989-1992 are past history, but one must learn from the past or be condemned to repeat it. I hope that MIT stu- dents will also study the wrongs that have been done by MIT faculty and staff, which perverted the process of science in this area. Ironically, those very faculty and staff who so loudly pon- tificated about the alleged unethical actions of cold fusion researchers Drs. Martin Fleischmann and Stanley Pons are themselves most culpable. They launched distortions about cold fusion that have gained such wide currency. As the record shows, the first assault against the truth in 1989 was press manipulation by faculty members engaged in the lav- ishly funded hot fusion research at MIT’s Plasma Fusion Center (PFC). They did not believe the Utah work at all. They suspect- ed that Pons and Fleischmann were engaged in a “scam,” and they were concerned that if the public were to have a too open- minded attitude toward the prospect of cold fusion as an ener- gy solution, funding for their beleaguered thermonuclear pro- gram would be endangered—even more so than in its perenni- al brushes with budgetary extinction. The truth about the calorimetry experiment performed at MIT in 1989 under DoE contract funding (DoE Contract DE-ACO2- 78ET51013) is stark and unambiguous. Its purported “negative” Why “MIT and Cold Fusion”? by Eugene F. Mallove, Sc.D. MIT Class of 1969 (Aero/Astro Engineering ‘69 SB; ‘70 SM) Chief Science Writer, MIT News Office 1987-1991 The Official MIT Logo MENS ET MANUS [MIT Motto—”Mind and Hand”]
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3 Infinite Energy • ISSUE 24, 1999 • MIT Special Report result was used to influence the U.S. Department of Energy’s rushed 1989 report against cold fusion. In alphabetical sequence, it is the very first report cited in the U.S. DoE’s ERAB (Energy Research Advisory Board) Cold Fusion Panel report of 1989. Some would characterize the data manipulation in the sixteen- author MIT paper of 1989 as mere “data fudging.” We do not mince words: the use of improperly handled scientific data to draw in the public mind and in the mind of the scientific com- munity a completely false conclusion about an emerging discov- ery of overarching importance to humankind is high-level scien- tific misconduct, plain and simple. We do not know for certain who unethically manipulated the data, and that is not important, but it was, indeed, inappropriate- ly manipulated. “Inappropriately manipulated” is actually a very charitable way of describing what was done. We do know, how- ever, that this erroneous study in the spring of 1989 at the MIT Plasma Fusion Center was defended by then Plasma Fusion Center Director Ronald R. Parker. Parker continues to play a leading role in hot fusion. For several years after leaving the MIT PFC, he was stationed at the ITER (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) in Garching, Germany. Since 1989, the U.S. Government has funnelled billions of dollars into magnetically confined ther- monuclear fusion development on projects, such as ITER. Though ITER funding was recently killed by the U.S. Congress, funding of tokamak hot fusion continues at MIT and elsewhere. The record is clear: Had MIT researchers behaved responsibly and ethically as scientists in the spring of 1989, it is most probable that a position of open-mindedness by MIT on the difficult sub- ject of verifying the Utah claims would have averted the highly negative U.S. Department of Energy Report drafted in the sum- mer of 1989. History would have been far different. Most likely, expensive engineering programs aimed at hot fusion reactors would have been cancelled in the early 1990s; plasma physics studies would have continued at MIT, and MIT researchers, including those at the Plasma Fusion Center, might have become the most eminent cold fusion researchers in the world. It was not to be. Cool heads could have reserved judgement. They could have followed the experimental facts where they would ultimately lead, but they chose not to. Heads were not cool, they were hot. MIT could have been in the vanguard of the new scientific field as befits its leadership role in science, but this did not happen. MIT chose—and is continuing to choose— defense of its existing professional support from the Federal government over meticulously documented evidence of a new scientific field and the pathway to revolutionary technologies. In fact, the current President of MIT, Dr. Charles M. Vest, who ignored my written concerns in 1991-1992, is on a Federal panel that now has major impact on U.S. DoE energy research fund- ing. Dr. Vest played a key role in papering over the misdeeds of 1989, as the following report clearly shows. To use press manipulation and data manipulation to misdirect billions of dollars in Federal scientific funding is scandal of the highest order. To coin a phrase in this era of various “-Gate” scan- dals and cover-ups—this is HeavyWatergate, one of the greatest (but still to be acknowledged) scandals in the history of science. To use the phrase “scientific schlock” which then MIT Plasma Fusion Center Director, Prof. Ronald R. Parker used against Fleis- chmann and Pons’ work in 1989 (and later falsely denied using it, perhaps fearing legal action), aptly characterizes the methods used by certain MIT researchers against the new science of low- energy nuclear reactions. It was not only data manipulation or “processing,” as Parker later would contend on the 1994 BBC and Canadian Broadcasting Corporation cold fusion documentary, “Too Close to the Sun,” but there was a whole range of dirty tricks, deceptions, and self-deceptions that MIT professors and senior officials employed against cold fusion. We have catalogued most of them; this report is lengthy, but it is not comprehensive. Still, we urge you to read this history and learn from it. Perhaps concerned MIT graduates or faculty will have something to say about this. I encourage your feedback. Some may say, “Why drag up the negative past, why not just emphasize the positive in the pages of this magazine?” To some degree that argument has merit, and we would like to be as pos- itive as we can be. But we cannot ignore the reality that MIT’s reputation as a “bastion of skepticism” against cold fusion has had a devastating effect on the progress of sci- entific investigation. As an article in Infinite Energy Issue No. 11, revealed, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office is using bogus conclusions from MIT investigators in 1989 to deny U.S. citizens their Constitutional rights to be granted patents on their intellectual property. Some of those—at least two to my knowledge—are MIT graduates! If gener- ations of MIT students, alumni/ae and professors do not learn from the tragic errors of the past, how can the future be anything but dim? How can the scientific and technological might and the vast resources of MIT be turned to this most important sci- entific problem of cold fusion and new energy, if the sub- ject is relegated to nonsense and pseudoscience by past unac- knowledged misdeeds—done by individuals , but with the implied imprint of MIT? How many scientists are not tuned into cold fusion precisely because in their minds MIT’s “smart people” back in 1989 proved that there was nothing to cold fusion claims? Lots. We hear from them all the time. When they first learn about what is happening in the cold fusion field today they are shocked, and then amazed to hear of the farce at MIT in 1989 and beyond. MIT’s Plasma Fusion Center continues to receive tens of mil- lions of dollars per year for its tokamak hot fusion program. This clearly makes no sense now that cold fusion has begun to demonstrate its commercial potential as both an energy source and in the low-energy remediation of radioactivity generated in the past from the commercial and defense industry fission nuclear enterprises. Who would wish to waste further billions of dollars on a technology—hot fusion—that has already come under serious question for its technological and economic via- bility as a twenty-first century energy source, if there were a clear alternative? The alternative is here. Come home to your traditions, MIT. Arise ye sons and daughters of MIT—help bring MIT back to excellence and intellectual integrity on a new science frontier.
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4 Infinite Energy • ISSUE 24, 1999 • MIT Special Report Introduction When on March 23, 1989 Drs. Martin Fleischmann and Stan- ley Pons announced that they had measured nuclear-scale excess energy from a palladium-heavy water electrochemical cell, and that they had also detected some preliminary evidence of nuclear signatures from their exotic energy-producing reac- tions, the world was in awe. Their famous afternoon press con- ference at the University of Utah, coming less than twelve hours before the Exxon Valdez ran aground off Alaska’s pristine coast and spilled millions of gallons of oil, reminded us of the serious problems linked with fossil fuel dependency. The Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident of 1986 also hovered in the back- ground. It was already clear that conventional fission nuclear power was in deep political trouble in many countries. The close coupling of energy and the environment was growing ever more apparent. Following the Utah disclosure, the prospect loomed of a quantum leap in energy technology—a solution to the dilemma of fossil fuel domination and its threats to the environment and world peace. The Utah claims soon came to be known as “cold fusion,” because the electrochemists were saying that they had solved the problem that the plasma physicists and engineers in the “hot” fusion program had been working on for four decades. The hot fusioneers had been trying to mimic the stars—to “bring the power of the Sun down to Earth” in the form of con- trolled, thermonuclear fusion. This was the attempt to use the deuterium in ordinary water as an effectively infinite fuel sup- ply. In only one cubic kilometer of ocean, the nuclear fusion energy that could be extracted from the approximately 1/6,500th fraction of water’s hydrogen that is heavy hydrogen exceeds the combustion energy content of all the known oil reserves on Earth. Tantalizing as the prospect of infinite energy from the oceans was, the hot fusion program had never generated even a single watt of excess power in its huge plasma reactors, which cost hundreds of millions of dollars per year to support. Success— “break-even” or “more energy out than in”—with magnetical- ly-confined hot plasma fusion always seemed to be twenty years away. This led to the perennial joke that hot fusion is “the energy source of the future. . .and always will be.” Moreover, even if the hot fusion program were to succeed in building a commercially viable central-station generator of electricity sometime in the year 2050 or beyond, the technology would have serious limitations. The energy from the hot fusion reac- tion of deuterium and radioactive tritium, which had to be sup- plied in bootstrap-fashion from the reaction, would emerge in the form of deadly neutron radiation (14 MeV neutrons). That would have to be transformed into more benign thermal ener- gy in a hot jacket of molten lithium in order to heat water for steam-generated electricity. The practical engineering problems would be enormous, the technology would add more nuclear waste to the global inventory (though not as much as conven- tional fission power, or so claim the tokamak hot fusion advo- cates), and it was far from certain to be economically viable. In fact, in October 1983 MIT Professor of Nuclear Engineer- ing, Lawrence M. Lidsky, published an article (“The Trouble with Fusion”) condemning the hot fusion program. It was a high-profile cover story for MIT’s Technology Review . The stark black and white cover of the issue read, “Even if the fusion pro- gram produces a reactor, no one will want it.” Other key remarks made by the outspoken Lidsky, who was then an Asso- ciate Director of the Plasma Fusion Center: “Long touted as an MIT and Cold Fusion: A Special Report Compiled and written by Eugene F. Mallove, Sc.D. MIT Class of 1969, S.B. Aero/Astro Eng., 1970 S.M. Aero/Astro Eng. Photo: E. Mallove
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5 Infinite Energy • ISSUE 24, 1999 • MIT Special Report March 23, 1989, afternoon Fleischmann and Pons announcement at the University of Utah. April 17, 1989 Richard Saltus of the Boston Globe writes to MIT President Paul Gray complaining about lack of access to the MIT Plasma Fusion Center (see Exhibit D— May 1 response by MIT President Gray ( see Exhibit E ). April 26, 1989 MIT Professor Ronald Ballinger testifies before U.S. House of Representa- tives Committee on Science, Space and Technology (see Exhibit A ). April 28, 1989 Professors Ronald R. Parker and Ronald Ballinger give interview to Nick Tate of the Boston Herald , planting anti-cold fusion story (see Exhib- it B ) . April 30, 1989 A late-night call by Professor Parker to Eugene Mallove’s home in Bow, New Hampshire triggers press release to wire services denying the sub- stance of the Herald’s banner page-one story the next day (see Exhibit C ). May 1, 1989 Press release from the MIT News Office issued, which denies Boston Herald's characterization of Professor Parker’s remarks about Pons and Fleischmann’s work as “scientific schlock” and “maybe fraud.” (See Exhibit C. ) • MIT President Paul Gray sends letter to Boston Globe . June 26, 1989 MIT Plasma Fusion Center holds “Wake for Cold Fusion” party weeks before Phase-II calorimetry data are analyzed! July 10, 1989 Section of PFC/JA-89-34 report exists which shows intermediate processed Phase-II calorimetry data. Data are not yet time-averaged. This was not published (see graphs , p. 11). July 13, 1989 Section of PFC/JA-89-34 exists which shows intermediate processed Phase II calorimetry data. Data for both H 2 O and D 2 O have been time- averaged in one-hour intervals. Power curve for D 2 O result retains roughly the same shape as unaveraged data but has been shifted down. This was published (see graphs, p. 11). July, 1989 Publication of PFC/JA-89-34 cold fusion experiments report based on work funded by DoE contract No. DE-AC0278ET51013. • Mid-July ini- tial draft of DoE ERAB Cold Fusion Panel report is negative. July 18, 1989 MIT PFC Director Parker’s Memo on “Cold Fusion Mug” and “stamp out scientific schlock” t-shirt (see Exhibit F ). November 1, 1989 Final DoE ERAB Cold Fusion Panel report is issued. It cites negative MIT PFC report—“Albagli et al .” as the first reference. (By contrast, pos- itive results from U.S. Naval Surface Weapons Center are omitted.) March 26-28, 1990 “Energy and Environment in the 21st Century” conference at MIT. MIT President Paul E. Gray makes unflattering comparison of cold vs. hot fusion (see Exhibit G ). July 19, 1990 Chief Science Writer Dr. Eugene Mallove of the MIT News Office hears for the first time parts of the Parker/Ballinger/Tate interview tape played over telephone by Nick Tate of the Boston Herald (see Exhibit B ). August 15, 1990 Meeting with Dr. Stanley Luckhardt (MIT Plasma Fusion Center) and independent scientist, electrochemist Dr. Vesco Noninski, in Dr. Luck- hardt's office. Within a week Dr. Noninski is challenging the analysis of the MIT PFC calorimetry on analytical grounds. September 8, 1990 Letter from PFC team member rejecting Noninski’s analysis of the MIT experiment—letter provides minimal technical details. October 10, 1990 Letter to Dr. Noninski from Chemistry Dept. head Professor Mark Wrighton saying “no evidence whatsoever” has been obtained to verify Pons and Fleischmann claims. Wrighton provides no technical details in rebuttal (see Exhibit H ). January 16, 1991 Eugene Mallove meets with Prof. Ballinger in his office and Ballinger remarks about Pons and Fleischmann being “crooks“ who could have been “locked up in jail.” At Gordon Institute lecture Ballinger makes other negative remarks about Pons and Fleischmann (see Exhibit A ). January 19, 1991 Mallove discovers the July 1989 down-shifted MIT excess-heat curve (See graphs, p. 11), which later became the subject of controversy. January 25, 1991 Mallove has lunch at “Networks” in MIT Student Center with Dr. Luck- hardt. Luckhardt can’t explain how “bias” was taken out. Luckhardt said there could be 20 milliwatts excess power in the MIT PFC results, but “not the 80 mW that Fleischmann was talking about.” April 12, 1991 Letter from Eugene Mallove to MIT President Charles M. Vest, copy to former President Paul E. Gray, suggesting organizing an MIT panel to re- examine cold fusion in light of accumulating knowledge. No response was ever received from either MIT President (see Exhibit I ). April 29, 1991 Eugene Mallove writes letter to Dr. Luckhardt requesting calorimetry information (see Exhibit J ). May 13, 1991 Mallove’s first call to Dr. Luckhardt to try to get MIT PFC H 2 O curve. May 20, 1991 Dr. Luckhardt cancels previously scheduled get-together with Mallove and says he forgot to get raw data at his other office. He puts Mallove off until the following Friday. May 24, 1991 Two calls to Dr. Luckhardt (10 am and 1:30 pm)—phone messages left about getting data on H 2 O curve. No response to Mallove’s messages. •Near final version of Eugene Mallove’s resignation letter exists. May 29, 1991 Taping of WGBH Boston Channel 2 clip on Cold Fusion—Mallove and MIT PFC’s Dr. Richard Petrasso. • Final refusal by Stan Luckhardt to turn over PFC calorimetry data. June 7, 1991 Professor Ronald Parker publicly disparages the PFC team's calorime- try work on cold fusion! (See Exhibit K .) • Eugene Mallove submits his resignation from the MIT News Office (see Exhibit L ) following the one- hour talk on cold fusion by Frank Close at the PFC and a heated ques- tion and answer session (see Exhibit K ). June 14, 1991 Eugene Mallove’s request faxed to Professor Parker for promised data relating to PFC cold fusion calorimetry experiments (see Exhibit M ). July 30, 1991 No response yet received from the PFC. Second request sent to Profes- sor Parker (see Exhibit N ) • Press release from MIT PFC “stands by” the 1989 PFC results and conclusions (see Exhibit T ). August 8, 1991 Fax letter from Parker to Mallove giving Stan Luckhardt’s revised objec- tives of MIT PFC experiments and stonewalling again on data transfer (see Exhibit O ). August 9, 1991 WBUR program about Mallove’s resignation and charges airs in Boston (see Exhibit P ). August 13, 1991 Fax received by Mallove from Parker with heavy water and light water curves (see Exhibit Q ). August 18, 1991 Formal request by Eugene Mallove to MIT President Vest for investiga- tion of scientific misconduct at MIT PFC, concerning both data mis-han- dling and deception of press and MIT News Office (see Exhibit R ). September 16, 1991 Eugene Mallove responds to August 30, 1991 MIT PFC Press Release (see Exhibit T ). October 9, 1991 President Vest writes to Prof. Philip Morrison requesting misconduct inquiry opinion (see Exhibit U ). October 14, 1991 P ARTIAL C HRONOLOGY OF E VENTS R ELATING TO MIT’ S H ANDLING OF C OLD F USION
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6 Infinite Energy • ISSUE 24, 1999 • MIT Special Report Prof. Morrison’s initial inquiry report to President Vest (see Exhibit V ). October 17, 1991 President Vest’s response letter to Mallove (see Exhibit W ). October 24, 1991 Mallove’s letter to President Vest rejecting Morrison’s assessment and requesting a formal investigation (see Exhibit X ). November 11, 1991 Nobel Laureate Julian Schwinger speaks about cold fusion at MIT physics gathering celebrating birthday of his former student. Evidently this has no effect on Physics Dept. resistance (see pages 18-20). December 31, 1991 Mallove’s letter to President Vest asking for status (see Exhibit Y ). January 2, 1992 Electrochemist Dr. Andrew Riley dies in cold fusion explosion at SRI International. Dr. Brian Ahern (an MIT graduate) tried to warn SRI of danger, but telephone call did not go through. January 6, 1992 President Vest sends brush-off letter to Eugene Mallove (see Exhibit Z ). February 9, 1991 Eugene Mallove sends new evidence of scientific misconduct to President Vest based on report of MIT graduate Dr. Mitchell Swartz’s independent investigation. Mallove demands thorough investigation (see Exhibit Z-1) . Further prompt to Vest on February 21 (see Exhibit Z-2 ). March 10, 1992 Dr. Luckhardt sends memo to Prof. Morrison giving further explana- tions of 1989 work. Redefines the objective of experiment as “turn on” of “anomalous heating event” rather than D 2 O vs. H 2 O comparison! (See Exhibit Z-3 .) March 19. 1992 NIH physicist Dr. Charles McCutchen’s letter to President Vest com- plaining about ethical problems with MIT PFC experiment (see Exhibit Z-4 ). March 20, 1992 Prof. Morrison’s second report to President Vest. Suggests Dr. Luck- hardt continue to have possession of data and should make further assessments! (See Exhibit Z-5 .) April 1, 1992 President Vest’s final brush off letter to Eugene Mallove giving an unac- ceptable conclusion. This was no April Fool joke (see Exhibit Z-6 ). April 2, 1992 MIT Associate Provost Sheila Widnall’s letter to Dr. McCutchen—a fur- ther brush-off and statement that experimenters will continue to be pro- cessing contested data and will be writing a future memo with experi- ment “clarifications.” (See Exhibit Z-7 .) May 1992 Publication of MIT PFC Technical Report (PFC/RR-92-7), a single- author (Luckhardt) “Technical Appendix to D. Albagli et al. Journal of Fusion Energy article” (originally 16 authors!) Error limits of MIT PFC calorimetry are further expanded and the nature of the experiment was further redefined to deflect data mishandling accusation. July 26, 1992 Dr. McCutchen letter to Provost Widnall, asks MIT PFC to publish a cor- rection that the experiment was not as advertised (see Exhibit Z-8 ). August 3, 1992 Provost Widnall’s letter to Dr. McCutchen giving final MIT brush-off (see Exhibit Z-9 ). August 18, 1992 Dr. McCutchen letter to Eugene Mallove details his frustration with Provost Widnall’s response (see Exhibit Z-10 ). August 19, 1991 Dr. McCutchen’s final letter to Provost Widnall saying, “I am sorry MIT continues to tough it out. Apparently the university feels it need not be fair to cold fusion people.” (See Exhibit Z-11 .) August 1992 Dr. Mitchell R. Swartz publishes fourteen page analysis of MIT PFC Phase II Calorimetry in Fusion Facts newsletter. Also published, in part, in subse- quent Proceedings of Fourth International Conference on Cold Fusion and else- where. MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW AND COLD FUSION To its credit, MIT Technology Review published an excellent feature review article about cold fusion by Dr. Edmund Storms (Los Alamos National Laboratory, ret.) in the May/June 1994 issue. This might have been a turning point in media coverage of cold fusion, had this influential magazine continued to fol- low the subject. It did not. A firestorm of protest against the Storms article had confront- ed then TR editor Dr. Steven J. Marcus, which led him to write an editorial in the August/September 1994 issue, “Don’t Blame the Parent.” He wrote, “. . .we’ll occasionally make people angry for having allowed an author to present the ‘wrong’ point of view. But reaction to the cold fusion story marks the first time in my memory that dissenting readers criticized the magazine’s editors not only for choosing to run this material—variously describing it as ‘dreadful,’ ‘appalling,’ ‘pseudo-scientific,’ ‘irre- sponsible,’ and ‘an example of the goggle-eyed approach to sci- ence’—but for hurting the institutional parent in the process.” Marcus heard from so-called scientists who said that the article “casts disgrace on MIT,” one who said that it “trashes research at MIT,” and one who wrote that it “embarrasses the Physics Department, MIT, and all graduates of MIT.” (MIT students are advised to look up these articles to see for themselves what all the commotion was about.) There were, of course, positive responses as well, which praised the editor for having found the courage to publish the Storms cold fusion article, but these did not apparently reflect the majority of the sentiments received. Marcus published six response letters in that August/September issue, including a positive one from cold fusion theorist and MIT Professor Keith Johnson and a negative letter from MIT Nuclear Engineering and Materials Science Professor Kenneth C. Russell. Unfortunately, the protest of the Storms article in Technology Review was not the first time MIT faculty had become upset with Technology Review on the matter of cold fusion. The negative opin- ion of MIT Physics Professor Herman Feshbach caused the pre- vious editor of Technology Review , Jonathan Schlefer, to back down in the spring of 1991 from his intent to publish my cold fusion review article. This 1991 article would have said essential- ly what Storms did in 1994, but by 1994, even more confirmatory evidence could be cited. Schlefer had accepted my article after much editorial revision! Both positive and negative viewpoints were presented in that approved article, plus my clearly identi- fied opinion that the evidence was building strongly toward proof of the phenomenon. That was not negative enough for Feshbach—who called all evidence for cold fusion “junk.” This sorry episode of censorship was one of the key reasons for my resignation from the MIT News Office in June 1991 (see Exhibit K for more on this event). Prof. Feshbach had told me his other reason for not wanting the article to be published. He said that he had “. . .fifty years of experi- ence in nuclear physics and I know what’s possible and what’s not.” He later demon- strated the same sort of monu- mental arrogance and igno- rance when he appeared on ABC Television’s Nightline program, June 11, 1997. Even though Feshbach admitted that he knew absolutely noth- ing about the Patterson Power Cell TM cold fusion device which was the subject of the program, he told viewers that he could “categorically” state that there were no nuclear reac- tions occurring in it.— EFM
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7 Infinite Energy • ISSUE 24, 1999 • MIT Special Report inexhaustible energy source for the next century, fusion as it is now being developed will almost certainly be too expensive and unreliable for commer- cial use.”; “The scientific goal of the fusion program turns out to be an engineering nightmare.”; “A fusion reactor might well produce only one- tenth as much power as a fission reac- tor of the same size.”; “The drawbacks of the existing fusion program will weaken the prospects for other fusion programs, no matter how wisely redirected.” Foreshadow- ing the benefit of cold fusion that would emerge over five years later, Lidsky also wrote of aneu- tronic hot fusion: “Neutrons induce radioactivity and damage reactors. Neutron-free fusion might provide inexhaustible, benign power.” Prof. Lidsky later moved into work at MIT on advanced fission reactors, but kept an open mind about cold fusion after it emerged. Enter Fleischmann and Pons Onto the scene on March 23, 1989 came two world-class elec- trochemists, Professors Martin Fleischmann and Stanley Pons, who were boldly claiming on international television that they had already achieved break-even in some form of nuclear fusion, but in a humble jar of heavy water—without lethal attendant radiation! This was an instant prescription for contro- versy. By analogy, it was as shocking and insulting to the hot fusion people as if they had been told that their television set had not been able to turn on for decades because they had neglected to plug it in! The threat to the hot fusion enterprise was palpable and real. More to the point: even if the hot fusion people did not believe the Utah claims were sound, the threat that some hot fusion funding (perhaps $25 million) would be diverted by the U.S. Congress to study cold fusion was very real. The always financially embattled hot fusion program was running scared in the onslaught of cold fusion news. MIT Professor Ronald Ballinger, who would play a key role in the scandalous attacks against cold fusion, testified before the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on Science, Technolo- gy, and Space (see Exhibit A ). His April 26, 1989 testimony had a seemingly appropriate “wait and see” message, but behind the scenes Ballinger, Parker, and other MIT hot fusioneers had among themselves already dismissed cold fusion. They were sharpening their knives against Fleischmann and Pons. (See recorded interview with Boston Herald , Exhibit B .) The idea that deuterium in heavy water might be undergoing some kind of nuclear fusion reaction within the palladium cath- odes of the Pons-Fleischmann cells was, of course, very difficult to accept. Where was the expected lethal radiation, for example, which standard nuclear physics would seem to predict? Why weren’t Pons and Fleischmann dead if they had truly generated even a minor fraction of a watt of cold fusion-derived energy? This became known as “the dead graduate student” problem. Furthermore, how could the palladium cell have overcome the natural, very high electric repulsion force between the positive- ly charged deuterium nuclei—the so-called Coulomb barrier that had been thought to put an absolute barrier between high energy nuclear physics and ordinary chemistry? Elements (except those that are radioactive or which spontaneously fis- sion) should retain their identities. This is basic scientific “fact” doled out in high school science classes. Room-temperature fusion of even light elements such as hydrogen or lithium was considered to be prima facie impossible. (There was an old pre- Alcator-C hot fusion tokamak reactor at MIT Plasma Fusion Center. Magnetic fields confine a hydrogen plasma while the temperature and density are increased. (From MIT Plasma Fusion Center pamphlet, “Fusion Energy Research”) Dr. Stanley Luckhardt of the MIT Plasma Fusion Center poses in the spring of 1989 with nest of cold fusion cells on a lab cart. Iron- ically, this cold fusion equipment was removed from the cavernous neutron-shielded room to make way for the next generation Alca- tor-C hot fusion reactor. ( MIT News Office Photo ) Technology Review October 1983 Professor Lawrence M. Lidsky Professors Martin Fleischmann (R) and Stanley Pons (L). Infinite Energy archives
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8 Infinite Energy • ISSUE 24, 1999 • MIT Special Report cold fusion era joke among MIT students about the need for a Department of Alchemy, but MIT was apparently not quite ready for the real thing!) Conventional understanding was that nothing at ordinary conditions could bring the nuclei of deuterium close enough together such that the nuclear forces, at very close approach, would take over and facilitate fusion to helium—or to anything else. That two “miracles” were implicit in cold fusion was just too much to bear for the mainstream physics community. Nonetheless, the establishment held its skepticism in check—at least publicly—for several weeks. Some scientists told the news media that the claims were “very interesting,” but they thought they were unlikely to be true. By implication, they suggested there might be a mistake, which they would likely find after doing their experiments to check up on Fleischmann and Pons. Immediately, the cold fusion story became very big news all around the world. Thousands of scientists and basement inven- tors tried to verify—or disprove—the claims from Utah. The May 8, 1989 editions of Time , Newsweek , and Business Week ran prominent cover stories on cold fusion—a first for science cov- erage apart from events in space exploration. The question of the hour was—as Business Week editorialized on its cover: Is cold fusion a “miracle or a mistake”? Of course that was the possibility that had to be excluded—a major mistake in either excess heat measurement or nuclear measurements. When cold fusion was announced, I had the good fortune to be the chief science writer at the MIT News Office, the main public relations arm of MIT. My tenure was from September 1987 through June 1991. Previously, I had written major scien- tific articles for MIT Technology Review , the magazine of my alma mater’s Alumni/ae Association. After leaving my job as an aerospace engineer at MIT Lincoln Laboratory in 1985, I shifted careers and had worked as a science writer and broad- caster for the Voice of America in Washington, DC. I would also eventually teach science journalism both at Boston University and at MIT in the Department of Humanities (both when I was in the MIT News Office, and for a time afterward). My position at the News Office required me to interact daily with members of the national and international press. Thus, when the Pons and Fleischmann announcement occurred, it was my job to report to the media what certain key scientists at MIT were thinking about the amazing claims out of Utah. I had already been instrumental, some weeks before March 23, 1989, in exposing the entire science writing staff and senior editors of The Wall Street Journal to the hot fusion program at MIT, where the Alcator line of tokamaks were being developed. I did that proudly. In fact, I remember introducing Plasma Fusion Center (PFC) Director Ronald R. Parker to the Wall Street Journal’s Jerry Bishop, the senior reporter who would later write an award-win- ning series of articles on cold fusion. As an engineer turned writer- engineer, I had been since age sixteen an advocate for hot fusion. While a student in engineering at MIT in 1967, I remember being impressed by the Russian hot fusion exhibit at the world Expo in Montreal. I thought that hot fusion offered a real though difficult-to-develop solution to the world’s energy needs. Because I had been trained as an aerospace engineer with a par- ticular interest in interstellar propulsion methods, I was fond of hot fusion, because it might offer a very high per- formance propulsion system for limited travel to the “local” stars. I would write of this in my 1989 book, co-authored with colleague Dr. Gregory Matloff, The Starflight Handbook: A Pioneer’s Guide to Interstellar Travel (John Wiley & Sons). In 1969 I had written a lengthy term paper for MIT course 16.53 on the Bussard Interstellar Ramjet concept, which used the hydrogen of the interstellar medium as fusion fuel. In the 1970s and 1980s, I collaborated with physicist Robert L. Forward of Hughes Research Laboratories on lengthy bibliographical stud- ies of the related subjects of advanced interstellar propulsion concepts and the search for extra-terrestrial civilizations (SETI). The cold fusion story quickly drew very heavy media atten- tion, and I was rapidly drawn into the frenzy that resulted at the MIT News Office. There were many requests for interviews with Massachusetts Institute of Technology TECH TALK September 16, 1987 Volume 32, Number 7 Dr. Eugene Mallove '69 named News Office science writer Dr. Eugene F. Mallove '69, an engineer and scientist who has written widely on science for the Voice of America, The Wash- ington Post and Technology Review , has been appointed chief science writer for the MIT News Office. The appointment, as assistant director, was announced by Kenneth D. Campbell, director of the News Office. “Gene Mallove brings three great strengths to the News Office: his background in science and engineering; his MIT experience; and, most importantly, his ability to communicate his fascination for science, both in the written word and on the air-waves. I am delighted to welcome Dr. Mallove back to MIT,” said Mr. Campbell. A science writer for the past five years, Dr. Mallove’s most recent position was as international science writer and broad- caster at the Voice of America, which he joined in 1985. He was responsible for a weekly 15-minute “New Horizons” program on science, technology, and medicine, and for a daily five-minute program of science teaching to the world, “Science Notebook.” He has written free-lance articles for the Washington Post and other newspapers, and for Technology Review and a new mag- azine, “Computers in Science.” He is the author of The Quick- ening Universe , to be published by St. Martin's Press this fall. Dr. Mallove received his SB in aeronautical and astronautical engineering from MIT in 1969, and his SM in the same field in 1970. In 1975, he received from Harvard University his ScD degree in environmental health sciences, specializing in aerosol physics and air pollution control. His career in science and engineering includes work as a con- sulting astronautical engineer on space propulsion systems with Hughes Research Laboratories, 1970-77; engineer with The Analytical Science Corporation, 1977-79, and with Northrop Co. (Precision Products Division), 1980-81; systems engineering manager with Jaycor, Systems Engineering Division, 1981-82; and engineer with MIT Lincoln Laboratory, 1983-85. He founded a firm, Astronomy New England, Inc., which developed and marketed astronomy-related products for six years, ending in 1985. (Reprinted from MIT Tech Talk )
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