A work of our friend 
Often a person decides to write an article that attacks the Evidence of Violence of the Accused (DPOS) on a certain basis. One of the most hated examples is the 
Before I continue the Anonymint claim, I feel it is important that people have realized that everything in life must have its design sacrifice and its secret is to make the best sacrifice. To make the best sacrifice you should see the whole picture. You can not attack an idea in a vacuum, everything must be compared to something else. Furthermore, if comparisons are to be made, they must resist an accurate description of work alternatives and do not conflict with unknown or proven theoretical alternatives.
Blockchains vs. Proof of Work consortium
In his blog,
His claim is Proof of Work is "Open Entry"; However, to believe that one should ignore the economic barriers to entry. For example, nobody can include proof of the game unless it can mine profitable. Mining profitably means economies of scale and ultimately alternative income streams derive from the political power of miners. Many governments in the world can make mining unprofitable for all free market participants. They can do this with relatively little capital cost because all mining profits or losses are based on margins. Because the government is not concerned with direct economic benefits and can make a profit by maintaining their monopoly, all proof of the work system will be dominated by the present field authorities who use their fiat press to subsidize and control the cooperative miners.
Furthermore, no minority can create their own smaller consensus system without the risk of abuse by existing mining forces. All you have to do is look at the mining attack between BTC and BCH to see how this goes.
What we can conclude from here is that mining is a dead end, the winner takes all, the system. After economies of scale optimize the mining algorithm, the algorithm can not be used by minorities that conflict with mining forces.
Liveliness and the 1/3+ attack
One of the criticisms levied by
Colluding evil 33% of the shares can be permanently and irreparably shut off the blockchain.
This statement is one example of many misconceptions about existing DPOS systems, such as Steem. DPOS as it was originally designed for BitShares uses the longest chain rule. Because the DPOS limits the frequency that block producers can generate, the chain with the most participation will eventually become the longest chain. This means that stakeholders can choose malicious actors even up to 51% dangerous, provided they have at least one honest producer who is willing to accurately calculate an election on a temporary fork. The "bad fork" will start at 2/3, and the fork will honestly operate at a speed of 1/3. As soon as the selection occurs on the 1/3 network it will get up to 3/3 and eventually overtake the "bad guy".
This is still the underlying "DPOS rule" on STEEM and BitShares and the other just specifies high irreversibility probabilities.
The Importance of Minimizing Finalities Minimization
Bitcoin never reaches the finality and without the proper finality between blockchain communication is impractical. Imagine all consensus systems in place of digital signatures. Now imagine if every time a user signs a transaction takes 1 hour for 99.9% certainty (6 blocks) and the transaction is never really final. At some point the public needs to take the decision to receive a signature and "transfer money" or refuse a signature and not transfer it. If the signature does not apply then the money should not be transferred; However, if the product has been shipped or "exchange made", then it is not possible to simply release the transfer.
We need to accept things as final even if there are some potentials they can think wrong or because higher level processes can not be done until the low-level process is final. Finalities of cost approach infinity as demand certainty is close to 100%. At some point, the additional cost of certainty is greater than the loss if it turns out to be fraudulent.
Since finality is critical to inter-block communication and inter-blocking communications are critical to major world-scale solutions, we can conclude that declaring nothing last is not an acceptable solution. Furthermore, latency in finality dramatically influences inter-blockchain communication for real-world applications. If we must have a finality, then we must have it as soon as possible.
Bitcoin received 6 blocks as a "final" which meant that 5 mining votes pointed to the final transaction. Even if miners can replace pools if the pool is corrupt, they can not identify corruption or transitions within the final 1 hour window. This is even without considering the potential for corruption at the hash power distribution level.
If we rely on 5 mining pools, we might as well be marking things in seconds rather than waiting an hour or more. The resulting security will be the same, but the latency will decrease dramatically.
Conclusion
Improving each dimension of the problem will come at the expense of the whole and reduce the overall volume (value). The optimal solution will maximize its volume carefully pay attention to the 80/20 rule: 80% profit (value) achieved 20% of effort (cost). Furthermore, no system exists in a vacuum and therefore all security analyzes that ignore the wider environment are incomplete and tend to be misleading.
Security should always consider any use of physical threats, use of short selling to reverse POS incentives, and potential alternative revenue streams.
Next one of the works from 
Rumors continue to circulate that China will regulate all crypto. These rumors include closing the mines and cutting Bitcoin itself on a large fire wall (GFW) that controls the incoming / outgoing pipeline for the Internet. However, one letter circulating that claims all this is fake news, but it is a lot of fear.
Can they close the mines? Probably, and much bigger than any other government. The reason there are two - censorship is the normal part of life there, and the rules are much more stringent, so (1) censorship is done. If you combine this with the fact that the mining company is large and consumes a lot of resources, then we can see it clearly - (2) Large hash mills are hard to hide. Therefore, it is very likely an instruction to stop and stop will be taken seriously. And voluntarily. And no one will be wandering around with a secret net or IP IP or a dove radio.
Thus, the potential for attacks against Bitcoin and Ethereum make sense, even though the current status of false news is true. As a result, about 80% of mining purchasing power will be sliced, and Bitcoin is used to be isolated domestically. One can even see the potential of Bitcoin to work in state and state chains, something that is in line with the interests of the PRC but perhaps not with others.
Surprisingly, and quite deliberately, the DPOS is more or less immune to this attack. The reason is simply that (a) the DPOS is much more decentralized than mining and (b) the DPOS responds to state regulatory surprises quickly and without any loss of efficacy.
Mining is more centralized because the concentration of power (or economies of scale) on it is much stronger: Bitcoin and Ethereal Mining require a large amount of electricity. As outlined in an old paper (Güring & Grigg 2011), hashing leads to the cheapest electrical spot. Who currently resides in places like Inner Mongolia for various reasons that will not go away. Furthermore, it does not quite have some nice boxes and nets, you have to be a big warehouse. Which means we know where they all are, and they can not move easily. Plenty of electricity, lots of boxes, lots of money, lots of workers: This is a very centralized installation.
Instead, the resources used in the DPOS are much lighter. They are not subject to local circumstances, and are much easier to move. Basically, every block manufacturer needs some big boxes with a good net. There are in most countries, there are even hobby / volunteer sites like Funkfueur in Vienna that are in accordance with the law, and many countries provide a real quick net into homes with fibers that are likely to be enough for a year or two.
Moreover, manufacturers can be reappointed by the public within a lap range - about a minute. So when a major country decides to act, people can respond and if disturbed - by choosing to replace the suspect's node with others. This can be done on rumors, or we can wait until the node drops off, then fix the network knowing where it should be fixed.
All this with zero turned into effective block production, and the risk to that production, because there are manufacturers ready to wait for block manufacturers. While a successful Chinese attack will result in an 80% drop in hajj around the world and thus potentially for a fork.
That's the theory - how do the numbers accumulate? If we choose 75% as an effective decentralization indicator, we can see the eyeball (above) and see that 8 mining pools do 75% hashing for Bitcoin. Etereum (below) is even worse at 5!
Meanwhile, the DPOS is mathematical because the block is distributed 1 per round to 21 producers, each round, and then shuffled. Then, 75% of the 21 producers are ... 16, rounded, as are others.
Therefore, the DPOS is much more decentralized than Bitcoin or Ethereal, with a factor of 2 or 3 if the 75% metric is any guide. The fact that there are thousands of knots in blocking Bitcoin or Ethereal, is irrelevant if the chain is dominated only by a small number of ponds, and the pool is in a known and noted place that is vulnerable to forking attacks. Like China. Like 80%.
@dan