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以下内容来自微信公共帐号“EOS技术爱好者”，搜索“EOSTechLover”即可订阅，翻译Joey，校对Lochaiching。转载必须保留以上声明。仅授权原文转载。
本文原文链接为https://steemit.com/eos/@todor/scaling-the-worker-proposal-distribution-system ，由本号“EOS技术爱好者”翻译。
Scaling the Worker Proposal distribution system
扩展Worker Proposal资金分配机制
作者：Todor
译者：Joey
The management of the Worker Proposal fund has been under a lot of discussion lately - and for a good reason. The eosio.saving account that is supposed to be distributed for funding Worker Proposals generates about $20M USD monthly (at current EOS prices).
最近，对Worker Proposal资金池管理的讨论愈演愈烈，这是有充分理由的。应该被分配去给Worker Proposal资金池提供资金的eosio.saving帐户（增发EOS临时存放账户）每月产生约2000万美元（按目前的EOS价格）。
The options
选择
The most straightforward way to distribute funds in the Worker Proposal fund would be by having everyone vote on each proposal through the referendum method that is to be implemented soon. Of course, with so much money to spend, we can all imagine the amount of proposals that will be coming in. Can we really expect each voter to look at all of these projects individually and take an informed decision.
在Worker Proposal资金池中分配资金的最直接方式是让每个人通过即将实施的公民投票方法对每项提案进行投票。当然，有这么多钱可花，我们都能想象出将要提出的提案数量。我们真的能期待每个选民能够逐一查看所有这些项目并做出明智的决定吗？
Delegation comes to mind, but statistics disagree. Data from Steem and BitShares shows that very few people users vote through proxies. So unless we want to close our eyes and hope for the best, we shouldn’t count on this to solve scaling.
考虑授权的方法，但统计的数据与这种方法相悖。来自Steem和BitShares的数据表明，很少有人通过代理投票。因此，除非我们想要闭上眼睛抱着最好的希望，否则我们不应指望这一点来解决扩展问题。
Perhaps we can solve this by creating an organisation that takes care of this fund? Perhaps something similar to a government of a real-world country that is elected by the token holders and takes care of the budget? Sure, we can try to do that, and it will probably be much better than any current government’s cabinet because we have a great community and great tools to ensure transparency and accountability. But there is still chance for corruption, misuse of funds, and plain old inefficiency.
也许我们可以通过创建一个负责该资金池的组织来解决这个问题？也许类似于一个现实世界的国家政府，由代币持有人选出并且要负责预算？ 当然，我们可以尝试去创建一个这样的组织，它可能会比任何现任政府的内阁都要好得多，因为我们有一个很好的社区和很好的工具来确保透明度和问责制。但仍存在腐败、滥用资金和普遍存在的低效率问题的可能性。
A hybrid approach
一个混合方法
Instead of creating an official gatekeeper of the fund, I propose that we solve scaling by looking at a different vector - amount of proposals to be voted on. Proposals can be batched into different types: marketing, dapp development, core software updates, Todor’s cool ideas, insurance fund, etc. You get the idea. We could submit these batches to community votes instead of individual proposals, and then get each “batch” to propose a way for managing it. If they come up with a good way to do that, it will be more likely that they will win the referendum and get a portion of the fund to distribute around.
我建议我们通过查看另外的矢量——需要投票的提案数量来解决扩展问题，而不是创建该基金池的官方把关组织。提案可以分不同的类型：市场营销、dapp（译者注：基于区块链的分布式应用）开发、核心软件更新、来自Todor的有趣想法、保险基金等。你大概明白了吧。我们可以将这些分批而不是作为一个单独的提案交给社区投票，然后让每个“批次”提出管理它的方法。如果他们想出了一个很好的方法，那么他们更有可能赢得公投并获得一部分资金来分发。
So the community will get to approve these different departments separately, but each of them will be responsible for properly distributing its own budget between individual proposals. Each of these microfunds will be transparent and accountable, because, if they are not, they will be voted out.
因此，社区将分别批准这些不同的部门，但每个部门都要对在各个提案之间正确分配自己的预算负责。 每一笔小额资金池都是透明的和可以知道来向和去处的，因为如果不是这样的话，它们将被投票出局。
Some criticis
一些评论
One valid concern is that we may get a less efficient system because some of the microfunds will compete with each other. Two or more microfunds may receive fully or partially overlapping proposals, which could lead to inefficiencies. Additionally, microfunds constantly competing for a larger piece of the pie to prove their relative importance may lead to abuse. This has to be weighed in against the possibility for abuse by a fully hierarchical system - with a single organization at the top that controls all its divisions and subdivisions. It’s hard to say which option is more likely to be abused, so we should settle for a mechanism to adjust how flat the structure is. This can be achieved through changing the voting threshold level for accepting/supporting separate microfunds. The higher the threshold, the fewer microfunds we will have, getting closer to a more hierarchical system. A few years from now we will have enough data to adjust this parameter to what works best.
一个很实际的问题是我们可能会得到一个效率较低的机制，因为这些小额资金池中将会出现相互竞争。两个或更多个小额资金池可能会收到完全或部分重叠的提案，这可能会导致效率低下。此外，小额资金池不断争夺更大的馅饼去证明它们相关的重要性可能会导致滥用。这必须得到权衡来抵制完全分层机制滥用的可能性，这个机制顶层有一个单独的组织控制其所有部门和子部门。很难说哪个选项更容易被滥用，所以我们应该寻求一种机制来调整结构的扁平化。这可以通过改变接受和支持不同小额资金池的投票门槛水平来实现。门槛越高，我们将拥有的小额资金池越少，越接近更加分层的机制。几年后，我们将有足够的数据来调整此参数以达到最佳效果。
What else?
还有什么？
We will also need an “oversight” proposal - one that receives reports from these microfunds, investigates them, and reports back to the community. Or maybe several independent oversight organizations. More importantly, the community will have much fewer proposals to consider for funding, and we can expect much better voter turnout.
我们还需要一个“监督”提案 —— 一个接收来自这些小额资金池的报告、调查它们并向社区汇报的提案。可能是几个独立的监督组织。更重要的是，社区需要考虑资金问题的提案会越来越少，这样我们可以期待更好的选民投票率。
With time, this two-layer approach may turn into multiple layers. Microfunds may create their own structure of sub-funds, perhaps with separate voting structure and decentralized micro-governance. This is the right approach to scaling - break everything down into layers. We just need to create the right system infrastructure to support this.
随着时间的推移，这种双层方法可能会变成多层。小额资金池可以创建自己的子资金结构，可能具有单独的投票结构和去中心化的微观治理。这是扩展的正确方法——将所有内容分解为层。我们只需要创建正确的系统基础架构来支持这一点。
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