版权声明：
以下内容来自微信公共帐号“EOS技术爱好者”，搜索“EOSTechLover”即可订阅，翻译Freya，校对Lochaiching。转载必须保留以上声明。仅授权原文转载。
本文原文链接为https://steemit.com/eos/@iang/another-fine-mess-you-ve-got-us-into ，由本号“EOS技术爱好者”翻译。
"EOS技术爱好者"全程由EOShenzhen运营，喜欢我们请为我们投票（EOShenzhen的投票账号：eoshenzhenio）！
作者：Ian Grigg
翻译：Freya
校对：Lochaiching
Vitalik asked 7 questions. Here's my answers.
Vitalik问了7个问题。下面是我对此的答案。
For those who are steeped in 51% thinking, it is a breach. But for those who are more thoughtful, the number was always just a number. Miners always are encouraged by the cash flow they need to buy the energy. So just having "more hashrate" doesn't change the fact that you need to keep paying your bills, and given the size of these operations, the bills will keep coming for a while.
对于那些满脑子都是51％思维的人来说，这是一个背离。但对于那些更有思想的人来说，这个数字只是一个数字。矿工总是会受到购买能源所需的现金流的鼓舞。因此，仅仅拥有“更多的算力”并不会改变您需要继续支付账单的事实，并且考虑到这些操作的规模，账单将会持续一段时间。
What 51% means is that you can technically put in a dodgy transaction. Fine, but you still face several barriers, the primary of which is - everyone will know. As soon as it is known that there are dodgy transactions, the price will drop. Or the chain forks. See, bills, above, and now the clanger is that Bitmain needs a transaction that increases its cash flow overall, over time, so the price has to go up. What dodgy transaction is going to cause the price to go up?
51％的意思是你可以在技术上进行可欺骗的交易。很好，但你仍然面临一些障碍，问题的关键是每个人都会知道这些障碍。一旦大众知道存在可欺骗的交易，价格就会下降，或者这条链面临分叉。请参阅前文的议案，现在的问题是，Bitmain需要一个交易来增加它的总现金流量，因此，经过一段时间以后，价格一定会上升。所以有什么可欺骗的交易可以让价格上涨呢？
So, there is little danger here - for BTC. Where there is danger is if there is a more complicated system, such as BTC having the same mining rigs as BCH. But that's a post for another day.
所以，对于BTC来说，这样的问题几乎没有危险。存在危险的地方是，如果有一个更复杂的系统，例如BTC具有与BCH相同的矿机。但那是另一天的帖子了。
I've been presenting and writing on this for over 6 months. The answer is this - businesses are scared to deploy their capital because of 3-Security and 7-Governance, below.
我已经陈述和写这个问题超过6个月了。答案是这样的 - 由于3-Security和7-Governance，企业不敢配置资金。
The problem is that security is best seen as a holistic approach. It effects all elements of the technical system. This is a hard lesson for security people to learn, some never learn it, but the basic flaw in infosec thinking is this:
Infosec people think that security needs a technical solution, delivered to humans - but no: Security is of the humans, and security needs a human solution, with technical elements.
问题是安全性最好被视为一种整体方法，它影响技术系统的所有要素。对于安全人员来说，这是一门很难的课程，有些人从不学习它，但信息安全思维的基本缺陷是这样的：
信息安全人员认为安全需要一种提供给人类的技术解决方案，而不是：安全属于人类，安全需要具有技术要素的人类解决方案。
In particular, blockchain security thinking is blinkered. It thinks blockchain is secure because the chain is secure, and the chain is secure because e.g., 1-Hashpower above. But actually that's nonsense, because the only security result that matters is, does the human have the value at the end? And the answer is no - we're looking at something like a 30% loss rate over all for blockchain, which is worse than mattresses. It's also worse than banks, unless you include bailouts and QE stealth bailouts.
特别是，区块链安全思维是狭隘的。区块链被认为是安全的，因为链是安全的，而这个原因可能在于，例如1-Hashpower在上面。但实际上这是无稽之谈，因为唯一的安全结果是，人类在这件事上最终会有价值吗？答案是否定的——我们正在寻找类似于区块链上30％的损失率，这比床垫更糟糕，它也比银行更糟糕，除非你包括了救助和秘密救助。
Another conclusion of this is that because of the holistic and human-led nature of security, it is far better to do this as a vertical not an economy: Apple, Steemit/Bitshares, Corda and other permissioned products have a much easier time because security begins at the application and ends at the mind. EOS was the first open entry chain that had a chance to break this, but see 7-Governance, below. Ethereum and Bitcoin never stood a chance, again, because of 7-Governance.
另一个结论是，由于安全性具有整体性和人类主导的特性，最好将其作为纵向而非经济来实现：Apple，Steemit / Bitshares，Corda和其他获得许可的产品都开始于安全性应用，结束于思想。EOS是第一个有机会打破这一点的开放式入门链，但请参见下面的7-Governance。由于7-Governance，以太坊和比特币再也没有机会了。
Risk Management. Also called zero-conf in bitcoin world. But basically this is a solvable problem with good design.
风险管理。在比特币世界中也被称为zero-conf。但基本上这是一个具有良好设计的可解决问题。
What is apparently not an easy thing to solve is reliable interfacing, and in particular the price of access. All major chains have shown that there are artificial and natural bottlenecks that make access a hit & miss affair because the value needed to launch the transaction cannot be reliably predicted.
显然不容易解决的问题是可靠的接口，特别是访问的价格。所有的主链都显示，由于存在人为和自然的瓶颈，使得访问成为一种偶然事件，因为启动交易所需的价值无法可靠地预测。
Interestingly, EOS has introduced RAM pricing as a one-sided market which has caused leveraged speculation and blocked access due to high prices. In much the same way as gas or full mempool has afflicted the other main chains.
有趣的是，EOS将RAM定价引入了一个单边市场，这导致了杠杆投机，并阻碍了高价格的进入。与gas或full mempool一样，其他主链也受到了同样的影响。
Under these circumstances, big decentralised apps will not fly on chains with speculator-driven pricing models.
在这种情况下，采用投机者驱动定价模式的大型去中心化应用程序将无法在链上运行。
What people are really miffed about is that in times of global warming, we shouldn't be burning fossil fuels on yet another white boy's toy.
人们真正恼火的是，我们不应该在全球变暖的时候用化石燃料烧另一个白人男孩的玩具。
But it needs to be seen in context - as miners shift to (northern) hydro power and (equatorial) solar, it's less of an issue. If I buy a square kilometer of solar cells and put it on an equatorial spare patch of land, the externalities or sideeffects of this are economically nil. Or at least, efficient.
但这需要结合背景情况来看——随着矿工转向（北方）水力发电和（赤道）太阳能，这就不是一个大问题。如果我购买一平方公里的太阳能电池并将其放在赤道上的闲置土地上，其外部效应或副作用在经济上为零。或者至少是有效率的。
Whatever you think the problem is here, it isn't a tragedy.
无论你认为这里有没有问题，它都不是绝对的悲剧。
Then, inefficiency. Last figures I saw were that Ethereum was consuming 11% per annum and Bitcoin 4% per annum. That's pretty expensive for a payment system, but it isn't so bad compared to credit card (2% per tx) or Paypal (4.2% per tx). DPOS promises to be much cheaper, if we can get the governance safely working and past the RAM pricing variability.
然后，说到低效率。我看到的最后数据是，以太坊每年消耗11％，比特币每年消耗4％。这对于支付系统而言相当昂贵，但与信用卡（每次交易2％）或Paypal（每次交易4.2％）相比并不算太差。如果我们能够让治理安全地运行并经过RAM定价的可变性，DPOS应该会便宜得多。
It's simple. If one person has too much stake, they can push things around. And they will. Curiously, this isn't a problem with PoW.
这很简单。如果一个人拥有太多的股份，他们可以随意行事。相信我，这会发生的。奇怪的是，这不是PoW的问题。
This is tough to understand because Vitalik is looking at it from the perspective of a non-community. Let me explain from the point of view of Elinor Ostrom.
这很难理解，因为Vitalik是从一个非社区的角度来看待它。让我从Elinor Ostrom的视角来解释一下。
Governance is of the people. So when there are problems with the governance of EOS - and admittedly there are - the problems are of the people. Hence, if EOS governance has failed, and that's not a foregone conclusion although titilating to those on other chains, it will be primarily because of intervention, see 6-Centralisation above, and collapse of support - actions by the people.
治理是人民的事。因此，当EOS的治理存在问题时——而且不可否认的确存在——问题出在人民身上。所以，如果EOS治理失败了，即使激发了其他的链上治理，这也不是一个必然的结论，它主要是因为干预，见上面的6-Centralisation，以及支持的崩塌——这都是人民的行为。
This is a fundamental limitation with the system of governance. Because it is of the people, it can only move forward and operate with support from the people. If there are detractors, they can undermine it. If they undermine it, it becomes "choice" for some and not for others. Then it fails, because criminals claim the choice side.
这是治理体系的一个基本限制。因为治理是人的治理，它只能在人民的支持下前进和运转。如果有批评者，他们可以破坏它。如果他们破坏它，它就会成为某些人的“选择”，而不是其他人的。要是它失败了，因为罪犯声称是选择方的错。
Governance is the choice of a community that define themselves on their choice of governance.
治理是一个社区的选择，社区可以根据自己的治理选择来定义自己。
Then, if the governance is failing, it is because the community isn't - it is not a community. That's by definition, because a community is defined only loosely by how we handle ourselves in the positive. A community is defined primarily by how we handle ourselves, and how we all agree to handle ourselves in the negative - in dispute, in difficulties, at war, in disaster. Refer to Ostrom for more here.
那么，如果治理失败，那是因为社区不能成为社区。这就是由定义决定的，因为社区只是由我们如何积极的处理自己宽泛的定义。一个社区的定义主要是我们如何处理自己，以及我们如何在消极的情况下处理自己——在争论中、在困难中、在战争中、在灾难中。更多信息请参阅Ostrom。
Ethereum doesn't have a community, as seen with the DAO, with the scams, with the desperation of many to follow the leader (which to his credit, Vitalik recognises). If people are not agreed on the negative, then ... they're not a community, they are a set of self-interested persons with some overlap of interest that makes everyone money in the short term. But that's not a community.
以太坊没有社区，就像在DAO和其他骗局中看到的那样，许多人不顾一切地跟随领导者（这是基于他的声望，Vitalik承认）。如果人们不同意反对者，那么，他们不是一个社区，他们是一群自私自利的人，他们有一些兴趣重叠，在短期内让每个人都有钱。但那不是一个社区。
And Ethereum can never be a community because the people that access the chain will never agree to lose their sovereignty over their own particular patch of interests. It goes further than that, as Ethereum and Bitcoin champion the process of win-lose, but more on that in The Governed Blockchain.
而以太坊永远不可能成为一个社区，因为访问该链的人永远不会同意失去对自己特定利益的主权。它远不止于此，相比区块链的治理，以太坊和比特币的更致力于争夺输赢。
So Vitalik's question is really, can we build a community on blockchain? And the answer is, start with the principles of community, and support your community. If EOS governance fails, which it hasn't yet, it will be because the principles were breached and the community wasn't supported.
所以Vitalik的问题是，我们能否在区块链上建立一个社区？答案是，从社区原则开始，并支持你的社区。如果EOS治理失败（当然它还没有），那将是因为违反了原则并且不被社区支持。
本文图片来源于网络
了解更多关于EOShenzhen：
关于我们更多联系：
Website：https://eoshenzhen.io
Steem：https://steemit.com/@eoshenzhen
Busy：https://busy.org/@eoshenzhen
Telegram：https://t.me/eoshenzhen
Twitter：https://twitter.com/eostechlover
简书：EOS技术爱好者
新浪微博：EOSTechLover
EOShenzhen的投票账号：eoshenzhenio
