In the last post we looked at the basics of Hans-Herman Hoppe's argumentation ethics (AE) and outlined the argument. Here, we'll look at some of the criticisms of the argument.
Robert P. Murphy and Gene Callahan (henceforth MC) have laid out a series of criticisms of Hoppe's argument. Their five main points are as follows:1
In response to Hoppe, MC argue that even if successful, AE can only demonstrate that one must own the parts of their body necessary for argumentation. They ask the reader to imagine one arguing that it is just to use force to compel a healthy person with two kidneys to give one kidney to a sick, dying person. Because two functioning kidneys are not necessary to engage in argument, therefore Hoppe’s argument fails.
This objection, it seems, would be applicable if one were to deny the homesteading principle – which Hoppe invokes explicitly as part of his libertarian theory – whereby he defines proper ownership of scarce means as being determined by first usage. It would be a bizarre type of argument for MC to make if they were to assume the homesteading principle, yet deny that one owned the kidneys in their bodies! Moreover, we know that, Murphy at least, does adhere to the homesteading principle as made clear in his personal blog. For Hoppe’s argument to be susceptible to critique on this point, it would be required to show incompatibility with the homesteading principle or that the homesteading principle (or libertarian ethics more broadly) is not the only theory of rights consistent with the prior assumptions of argumentation as defined by Hoppe and proponents of AE. However, this is not what is being contended - moreover, MC would have a tough road to hoe to deny that the person born with a pair of kidneys is not the proper owner, rather another party is to show incompatibility of the homesteading principle in their example.
In a similar manner, MC argue that the using property in debate does not entail proper ownership of said property. This ought to be an obviously true point, simply because one uses the apartment or car which they are renting does not imply they own it. Again, however, MC seem to overlook the importance of the homesteading principle in Hoppe’s argument. There is only one person that can use your body, and that’s you. Moreover, being the first user, it would follow that you are the rightful owner of yourself. Even if Hoppe does conflate use and ownership – which it seems to me he does not – the difference seems immaterial with respect to one’s own body.
What of MC’s second point of critique? In this instance, they ask us to imagine an argument being made in favor of conscription in the case of a national emergency, a position no doubt at odds with ideas of self-ownership. They pose the question: “Has Hoppe shown that someone uttering the above (during a policy debate) is engaging in a performative contradiction?” After all, the proponent of the draft is not using force or violence during the debate, even though he may be advocating its usage given certain conditions. To drive their point home, they offer another scenario whereby a patron at a movie theater and living in a Hoppean society disrupts the movie and is forcibly ejected as the unruly chap has violated an explicitly state rule outlined by the theater in a large sign on the wall.2 The force of this objection comes home as they are certain (as am I) that most Hoppean’s would see the latter as being justified aggression while the former as unjustified aggression. MC are quick to point out in both cases the policies are debated beforehand in the absence of coercion and violence, but Hoppe’s AE has clear temporal boundaries and is only valid during the course of debate.
MC’s objection, however fails as the scenarios outlined are disanalgous to one another within a Hoppean framework and thus their objection falls flat. The Hoppean’s, as well as MC themselves, are correct to note that the first instance of conscription is unjustified while the second may be justified within a Hoppean framework, further we can see the importance of Kinsella’s principle of estoppel in application. In the case of the proponent of conscription, he is arguing for a usurpation of the self-ownership of many individuals who have not first committed violence or are in need of retributive action. In the second case, as per the Rothbardian definition, the boisterous patron has committed aggression against the other patrons and owner of the theater by disrupting the showing and violating his implicit contract with the property owner. Thus, removal by force can be justified on estoppel’s grounds as being a proportional means of retaliation against the offender who has refused to consent to peaceful interaction.
MC also contend that AE is temporally bound to the time of argumentation itself. This objection seems to miss the point that Hoppe is making, any proposition that is advanced which advocates principles or ideas which are in contradiction to the assumptions of argumentation are self-contradictory. Therefore agitating for a draft or conscription itself could not be rationally justified. Why exactly MC think that this is a circumscribed by temporal bounds is unclear and akin to postulating that Turing’s Halting Problem proof is only valid while a Universal Turing Machine (UTM) is in operation. No, in fact the proof is applicable to all UTM’s whether or not they are operational or even in existence just as AE is applicable to all systems of thought which are propounded by argumentation, irrespective of whether one is currently propounding them or not.
Hoppe has been criticized because many people who have been denied their own self-ownership (i.e. criminals) have engaged in debate.3 In sum, MC write:
Hoppe is arguing for a conclusion that by itself makes no empirical claims and hence cannot be falsified by observation, However, Hoppe’s chain of arguments to reach that conclusion crucially relies on an empirical assumption…It is simply not true that one needs to own his body in order to fairly debate, just as one doesn’t need to own standing room in order to fairly debate.
This objection seems predicated upon what Hoppe means by “self-ownership.” MC explicitly deny that Hoppe is arguing for a type of “transcendental self-ownership” of the sort denied to a puppet vis-à-vis a puppeteer. 4 While MC do not further define what they mean, it does seem that such “transcendental self-ownership” is part and parcel of Hoppe’s framework.5
To make this clear, imagine a slave and slave master are engaged in some disagreement whereby they attempt to rationally convince one another of the validity of their own views. On Hoppe’s position, the slave master and slave have both made certain assumptions regarding one another, included in this set of assumptions is the view that the other owns himself because reason – not coercion or command – is the only suitable tool to affect the other’s mind on the issue which must be changed by one’s own volition. If one’s own mind is free and self-owned in this sense, we can extend that to the body of the slave and the slave owner and have Hoppe’s entire framework. Thus, Hoppe’s position does undercut the justification for slavery based upon a “transcendental self-ownership.”6 Contra MC, AE has nothing to do with one’s legal status and everything to do with the justification of that status.
Moreover, it is a strawman to argue, as MC do, that AE depends upon an “empirical assumption…that a person needs to enjoy self-ownership if he is to successfully debate.” This is nowhere to be found in Hoppe’s argument. Instead what we see is that the act of argumentation requires the assumption that one is a self-owner. Without that assumption, then one is arguing with a puppet or other non-rational entity. 7
Finally, MC ask us to imagine Aristotle arguing with other Greeks about whether or not the non-Greek barbarians are natural slaves. In such an instance there would be no performative contradiction because the barbarians themselves are not privy to the debate as the discussion is confined to Greeks whom all involved agree do own themselves and can be engaged with rationally. Thus, MC argue that at best, “Hoppe has only proven self-ownership for the individuals in the debate…someone denying the libertarian ethic would only be only be engaging in contradiction if he tried to justify his preferred doctrine to its ‘victims.’”8 In the same manner, animals are not privy to the debate themselves. Instead humans argue with other humans regarding the rights animals may or may not possess. Aristotle justifies his position of Greek superiority over the barbarians because they are supposedly less rational in the same way that the defender of Hoppe may justify denial of self-ownership to animals because they are less rational than humans. This objection by MC is indeed quite critical, although they fail to draw it out to its conclusions. It does indeed seem to be a defeater for Hoppe’s AE insofar as the distinction between rationality and non-rationality is maintained. After all, the question is why ought Kantian universalization be extended to all humans (regardless of rationality) and not all (or even some) animals on Hoppe’s view? To put a finer point on it, why ought an infant – incapable of arguing – be a justified self-owner and a chimpanzee not?
Hoppe does not address this issue, however it seems - insofar that he agrees that those humans incapable of argumentation are self-owners - is alluding to something more fundamental than argumentation for establishing self-ownership.9
Rationality seems to be a plausible dividing line between self-owners and those who are not. Troubling however is the question of what one means by rationality. What are we rational with respect to? A Misesian view of rationality understands humans as goal-oriented; people act to achieve ends, whether their actions are efficacious or not is another matter entirely. This differs greatly from an Aristotelian view of rationality which entails that one knows how to act in a given situation.10 Other definitions of rationality exist as well which further compound the issue.11
Assuming the issue of rationality could be solved, other troubles arise, such as what to make of the rational individual who is comatose? Would that individual remain a self-owner in such a state? Hoppe has referred to such issues as "technical problems" and in a sense, he is correct insofar as this is a pragmatic endeavor as a foundation for property rights. However, as I read Hoppe, he does not want another theory on par with social contract theory, but an absolute foundation for rights and ethics. In such a case, insisting upon universalizability which may cover 98% of the cases and referring to the rest as technical matters to be adjudicated at a later time is insufficient. I remain dubious regarding the prospects of solving the above issues at hand, although would be pleased to be proven mistaken.
Hoppe's argument is an ingenious innovation, but in my estimation, falls just short of providing an absolute foundation for libertarian ethics and property rights. It seems that argumentation seems to trade upon a deeper principle of rationality to determine self-ownership and who may enjoy property rights, however rationality is marred by multiple difficulties. It remains possible that AE could be leveraged in a pragmatic sense and may have further implications for political discourse and rights, which would be a potentially worthwhile project.
