Prof. Kathryn Weathersby

As we discussed in the previous post, the new policy for Korea the US adopted in April 1948, titled NSC-8, specified that before US occupation forces withdrew, they would create a military for the ROK that would be strong enough to defend the South from internal subversion or attack from the North. The problem, however, was that the tragic division of the country naturally led political leaders in the South to want to use their new military force to subdue the northern half and bring it into the Republic of Korea. The United States, however, feared that such action would lead to a wider war with the Soviet Union and therefore did not equip the ROK Army to carry out offensive operations. This policy had catastrophic consequences when the South faced a full-scale invasion by a well-armed Korean People’s Army in June 1950.

Meanwhile, in the spring of 1948, General MacArthur and the Army leadership in the Pentagon decided to fulfill NSC-8 by enlarging the Korean Constabulary to 50,000 men. The US would equip this force by transferring rifles and carbines, light artillery, machine guns, M-2 half-tracks, M-24 light tanks, and M-8 “Greyhound” armored cars. Already by March the Constabulary was nearly at full strength and in April General Hodge received orders to prepare this force for every military contingency except an invasion of North Korea.

To fulfill his orders, General Hodge created schools for the Constabulary using weapons and instructors from two American divisions. The new senior adviser to the Department of Internal Security, Brigadier General William L. Roberts, played a key role in shaping the new armed services for South Korea. He created a Military Police Command to maintain discipline and root out subversion, and devoted much effort to securing weapons and equipment from the rapidly demobilizing US XXIV Corps. He also established a Provisional Military Advisory Group-Korea (PMAG-K) to provide operational and training counterparts down to the Constabulary battalion level. Finally, he recruited junior officers from the rifle companies of the US 6th Infantry Division who had experience training Constabulary companies. These men were then assigned to stay in Korea to continue this training mission rather than depart with their division.

As the Constabulary force took shape, the US Army was determined to withdraw from Korea on schedule in 1948. Early in June the Secretary of the Army authorized the shipment of a six-month supply of ammunition, equipment, and replacement parts, then proposed that logistical and administrative preparations for tactical withdrawal begin on July 1.

As it turned out, withdrawal of US forces was not accomplished so quickly. The plan was for the State Department to take over responsibilities in South Korea from the Army on September 2. By the end of July, the Army had evacuated the last of the military dependents. However, the State Department was concerned about the political conditions in the South and was not ready to move further. On July 8, Robert Lovett reminded the Secretary of the Army that NSC-8 called for flexibility on withdrawal and also committed the US to coordinate with the United Nations as it proceeded. Disengagement could begin as scheduled on August 15, but the State Department insisted that the Army had to be ready to suspend, adjust, or delay the withdrawal on a moment’s notice.

In the next post, we will examine the political complexities in the South that led the State Department to delay troop withdrawal.

[Sources: This post relies on James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (University of Hawaii Press, 1985); and Allan R. Millett, The War for Korea, 1945-1950, A House Burning (University Press of Kansas, 2005).]

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