Debate between Voluntaryism and other philosophies often times come down to the concept of "natural rights". Inevitably, the Voluntaryist position on the concept of "natural rights" is challenged; this is because if we allow the concept of "natural rights" then Voluntaryism is the only logically consistent conclusion. In the end, the other side will often challenge the idea of natural rights, in and of itself. They will seek to undermine this with the retort that nature only respects "might makes right". It is held that this negates Voluntaryist appeals to natural rights and that our rights are not gifts from government and are the individual's own against the assertion of collectivism.
In short, it asserted that there are no "natural rights" and ergo the state/collective is free to trump asserted natural rights as it wish.
It is true that the basic law of nature is, in essence "might makes right". That is, survival of the fittest; the "law of the jungle" that the strong may prey upon the weak and only those who survive to copulate may create a legacy.
However, it is ignored that this very same law has resulted in the development of humans: social primates with sufficient abstract cognition in order to create and communicate moral ideals. This has, in turn, allowed the human race to flourish far beyond the pale of all the rest of nature: we are able to cooperate with each other in achieving great works of body and mind, to create societies and even, it seems, to forget what makes us human.
To ignore the creations of our big, smart monkey brains which have allowed us to come so far is to, in fact, lose the very might that has made us right. Ergo, some form of natural cooperative structures must be not only right, but mighty.
In having reached this point, we can of course, conclude that indeed there are "natural" rights. At the very least, it must be conceded that whatsoever is better for the cooperation of our species in achieving great works is simultaneously our greatest might and right. Now, it can of course be pointed out that this idea we call "government" was as much a result of our evolution as this idea we call "rights"; it could even be asserted that it has increased cooperation and resulted in much of the aforementioned might of our species. Such a discussion is beyond this writing and I will leave it simply that free enterprise and voluntary cooperation has resulted in far greater increases in empowerment of the everyday person than all of the central planning and coercive governance throughout the entirety of the thread of human history.
Instead, we shall focus on the implication that such creates "natural rights" that are increase, through cooperation, the might of the species; that, in the words of Abraham Lincoln, "right makes might."
A right is, in essence, an assertion of morally legitimate power. When we discuss whether the government, a collective or any other corporation has a "right" to do something, we are putting to the question whether or not that entity has applied power with moral legitimacy. Power, being nothing more than the ability to do a thing, is thus what is the question here: what powers naturally exist?
Whether a government, a collective or a corporation can morally exercise any form of power is beyond the scope of this writing; what is important here is to solve the question of natural rights. Do any rights, that is morally legitimate exercises of power, exist naturally?
The idea that a legitimate exercise of power might exist naturally is already concluded; "morally legitimate" is itself a concept springing from our nature as social animals and "exercises of power" occur equally naturally from our existence as physical actors. We could stop right there: we have thus already shown that "natural rights" do in fact exist, that they are in fact the natural outcome of physically acting, higher thinking social animals.
However, in the interest of promoting Voluntaryism, we can continue this discussion and prove that just as "natural rights" are a true and inevitable outcome of our natures so too is the fact that these rights extend from the individual, not the collective (though, as mentioned, collective benefit is realized when individual rights are honored). We can show that not only are "natural rights" a real thing, but that those rights are held by the individual.
Again we will return to our definition of "natural rights": morally legitimate exercises of power. Moral legitimacy extending from our natures as social animals with higher abstract thought, and exercise of power being the ability to perform an action and thus extending from our existence as physical actors.
First, we shall see that in fact all rights - natural or otherwise - are held by the individual. From there we will briefly look into a framework for understanding natural individual rights.
To proceed we must then determine if "rights" extend from the collective or the individual. Quite likely, a socialist would love to've quite reading already: he is able to take what we've agreed upon (that rights extend from our existence as social animals and benefit the collective human species), after all, and easily twist it to his aims. This would be folly.
Collectives exist only because of the interactions between individuals. A collective does not have any independent existence without the individuals within it, while the individual may exist without the collective. Additionally, all powers that one may want - or indeed, ever have throughout human history - conveyed upon the collective (taxation, definition and defense of borders, providing rules which the individuals must follow) are never in fact exercised by a "collective" but rather by individuals acting on behalf of the collective through the assertion of authority.
Whether authority claims on behalf of a collective are in fact morally legitimate are beyond the scope of this writing.
What is important is that, even with an authority claim to prosecute the claim to collective rights, all rights - that is, morally legitimate exercises of power - are in fact exercised by individuals. We can therefore understand ipso facto that rights are held by individuals, regardless of whether or not authority to act on behalf of a collective is morally legitimate.
To conclude, therefore, that rights extend from anything other than the individual is ludicrous and demonstrably false. All rights are in fact individual rights.
Having demonstrated that rights are in fact natural and extend from the individual, we will conclude with a framework for determining natural rights of the individual. This will remain logically consistent with and extend from what we've already determined.
As all rights are held by the individual, we must therefore conclude that a "natural right" is the ability of the individual to do a thing which is morally legitimate. This creates and enforces the principals of self ownership and non-aggression: since rights extend from the individual, and since rights extend from moral legitimacy as we are abstract-thinking social animals we have the right to perform actions according to our will which are not likely to violate the good of the individuals that make up the collective humanity. This does not mean that all such actions must benefit the collective; we are discussing whether an action is morally legitimate, not whether it's the nicest, most "good" possible action. Since an individual cannot be expected to know the preferences, and thus highest benefit, of other individuals, he cannot know what would most benefit the collective. Thus a "natural right" is the right to do anything which does not violate the rights of others.
Natural rights are therefore not only real, direct results of our base natures, they are in fact proof of the basic principals of Voluntaryism: non-aggression (you have a right - may morally exercise the power - to do anything which does not violate the natural rights of others) and self-ownership (your rights extend from your existence as a human being and are held by you and no other legitimate claims of rights which compel a violation of your rights may possibly exist).
