FEDERALIST No. 41 General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution For the Independent Journal. Saturday, January 19, 1788 MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 42 The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered From the New York Packet. Tuesday, January 22, 1788. MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 43 The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Conferred by the ConstitutionFurther Considered) For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, January 23, 1788 MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 44 Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States From the New York Packet. Friday, January 25, 1788. MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 45 The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments. Considered
For the Independent Journal. Saturday, January 26, 1788 MADISON
* But if the Union, as has been shown, be essential to the security of the people of America against foreign danger; if it be essential to their security against contentions and wars among the different States; if it be essential to guard them against those violent and oppressive factions which embitter the blessings of liberty, and against those military establishments which must gradually poison its very fountain; if, in a word, the Union be essential to the happiness of the people of America
FEDERALIST No. 46 The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, January 29, 1788. MADISON
* Notwithstanding the different modes in which they are appointed, we must consider both of them as substantially dependent on the great body of the citizens of the United States. I assume this position here as it respects the first, reserving the proofs for another place. The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and 신임받은이들trustees(수탁자) of the people, constituted with different powers, and designed for different purposes.
* A 지역적인 영성local spirit(지역정신) will infallibly prevail much more in the members of Congress, than a 국민적 영성national spirit(국가주의 정신) will prevail in the legislatures of the particular States.
FEDERALIST No. 47 The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution ofPower Among Its Different Parts. For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, January 30, 1788. MADISON
* it will be proper to investigate the sense in which the preservation of liberty requires that the three great departments of power should be separate and distinct
* From these facts, by which Montesquieu was guided, it may clearly be inferred that, in saying "There can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates," or, "if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers,"
* The reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim are a further demonstration of his meaning. "When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body," says he, "there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest THE SAME monarch or senate should ENACT tyrannical laws to EXECUTE them in a tyrannical manner." Again: "Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for THE JUDGE would then be THE LEGISLATOR. Were it joined to the executive power, THE JUDGE might behave with all the violence of AN OPPRESSOR.“
* The 컨스티투션constitution(헌법) of Massachusetts has observed a sufficient though less pointed caution, in expressing this fundamental article of liberty. It declares "that the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them."
FEDERALIST No. 48 These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have NoConstitutional Control Over Each Other.
From the New York Packet. Friday, February 1, 1788. MADISON
* IT WAS shown in the last paper that the political apothegm there examined does not require that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be wholly unconnected with each other. I shall undertake, in the next place, to show that unless these departments be so far connected and blended as to give to each a 컨스티투션의constitutional(헌법적인) control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a free government, can never in practice be duly maintained.
FEDERALIST No. 49 Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department ofGovernment by Appealing to the People Through a Convention. For the Independent Journal. Saturday, February 2, 1788. MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 50 Periodical Appeals to the People Considered From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 5, 1788. MADISON
