FEDERALIST No. 11 The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy For the Independent Journal. Saturday, November 24, 1787 HAMILTON 제목 그대로임. 통과~
FEDERALIST No. 12 The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue From the New York Packet. Tuesday, November 27, 1787. HAMILTON 제목 그대로임. 통과~
FEDERALIST No. 13 Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government
For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, November 28, 1787 HAMILTON
* The entire separation of the States into thirteen unconnected sovereignties is a project too extravagant and too replete with danger to have many advocates. The ideas of men who speculate upon the dismemberment of the empire seem generally turned toward three confederacies--one consisting of the four Northern, another of the four Middle, and a third of the five Southern States. There is little probability that there would be a greater number.
● 반-연방주의자들은 북쪽 공동연방정부, 가운데 공동연방정부, 남쪽 공동연방정부, 이렇게 3개로 아메리카를 쪼갤려고 했었나 봅니다. 나머지는 제목 그대로임. 통과~
FEDERALIST No. 14 Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered
From the New York Packet. Friday, November 30, 1787. MADISON
* It is, that in a democracy, the people meet and exercise the government 인격 안에서in person(직접); in a republic, they assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents. A democracy, consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic may be extended over a large region.
● 간략하게 10편 안에서 주장했던 바를 매딘슨이 한번 더 요약함.
FEDERALIST No. 15 The 불충분함Insufficiency(부적당함) of the Present 공동연방Confederation(식민지 연맹제도) to Preserve 통일체the Union(연맹체제)
For the Independent Journal. Saturday, December 1, 1787 HAMILTON
* there are 물질적material(상당한) imperfections in our 국민적인 체계national system(국가체계), and that something is necessary to be done to rescue us from impending anarchy
* a reluctant confession of the reality of those defects in the scheme of our 연방적인 정부통치federal government(연맹정부), which have been long pointed out and regretted by the intelligent friends of the 통일체Union(연맹).
* The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing 공동연방Confederation(연맹) is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in their 몸체화된CORPORATE(공동) or 집적된COLLECTIVE(집합적인) 역량들CAPACITIES(능력), and as 대항-구별된contradistinguished(대조되는) from the INDIVIDUALS of which they consist.
* But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation; if we still will adhere to the design of a 국민적인 정부통치national government(단일정부), or, which is the same thing, of a 최상위-의도의 권력superintending power(감독권), under the direction of a 공통된 공의회common council(공동의회), we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those ingredients which may be considered as forming the characteristic difference between a 연맹league and a government; we must extend the authority of the 통일체Union(연맹) to the persons of the citizens,--the only proper objects of government.
* Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea of a law, that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more than advice or recommendation. This penalty, whatever it may be, can only be inflicted in two ways: by the agency of the courts and ministers of 떳떳함Justice(정의), or by military force; by the COERCION of the magistracy, or by the COERCION of arms. The first kind can evidently apply only to men; the last kind must of necessity, be employed against bodies politic, or communities, or States. It is evident that there is no process of a court by which the observance of the laws can, in the last resort, be enforced. Sentences may be denounced against them for violations of their duty; but these sentences can only be carried into execution by the sword. In an association where the general authority is confined to the collective bodies of the communities, that compose it, every breach of the laws must involve a state of war; and military execution must become the only instrument of civil obedience. Such a state of things can certainly not deserve the name of government, nor would any prudent man choose to commit his happiness to it.
● 이 15편에서 해밀턴은 계속해서 강력한 통일체의 정부통치 필연성을 역설하는데, 흥미로운 점은 붉게 칠해서 강조한 부분이다.
이제껏, 심지어는 스피노자조차도 입법권은 반드시 주권이므로, 국민/시민.인민/다중들에게 속하는 것이었는데, 여기서 해밀턴은 이제까지의 입법적 권력의 일반적인 개념설계를 넘어선, 위반하는 중대한 발언을 한다.
“정부가 법률들을 만든다”는 발언이 그것이다. 입법권력이 가능한 정도가 아니라, “재판권력을 거치지 않고, 집행권력이 법률을 집행하고, 처벌할 수 있다”고 발언한다.
아마도 해밀턴의 이런 발언이 제퍼슨을 비롯한 반-연방주의자들의 저항을 더욱 자극했을 듯 하다. 이러한 해밀턴의 집행권력이 입법을 한다는 개념설계가 대통령 입법권력으로 이어진 듯 하며, 재판권력을 거치지 않고 처벌할 수 있다는 개념설계가 비상계엄령같은 것으로 이어지지 않았나 억측해 본다.
FEDERALIST No. 16 The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the PresentConfederation to Preserve the Union)
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, December 4, 1787. HAMILTON
● 선동, 동요, 반란, 파국이랄까, 비상상황에 대한 대처에서도 통일체 정부통치가 더 나음을 논증함.
FEDERALIST No. 17 The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the PresentConfederation to Preserve the Union) For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, December 5, 1787 HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 18 The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the PresentConfederation to Preserve the Union) For the New York Packet. Friday,December 7, 1787 MADISON, with HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 19 The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the PresentConfederation to Preserve the Union)
For the Independent Journal. Saturday, December 8, 1787 MADISON, with HAMILTON
* Out of this 봉건적인 체계feudal system(봉건제도), which has itself many of the important features of a 공동연방정부confederacy(동맹), has grown the federal system which constitutes the Germanic empire. Its powers are vested in a diet representing the component members of the confederacy; in the emperor, who is the executive magistrate, with a negative on the decrees of the diet; and in the imperial chamber and the aulic council, two judiciary tribunals having supreme jurisdiction in controversies which concern the empire, or which happen among its members.
● 중세 서양 봉건제도를 좀더 공부할 때, 이 19편은 한번 읽어보면 좋을 듯하네요. 이 19편은 중세 서양 독일신성로마제국, 폴란드, 스위스 등을 본보기로 들면서, 통일체가 못된 공동연방정부통치의 나쁜 점을 논증합니다.
FEDERALIST No. 20 The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the PresentConfederation to Preserve the Union) From the New York Packet. Tuesday, December 11, 1787. MADISON, with HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 21 Other Defects of the Present Confederation
For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, December 12, 1787 HAMILTON
* The next most palpable defect of the subsisting Confederation, is the total want of a SANCTION to its laws.
* The want of a mutual guaranty of the State governments is another capital imperfection in the federal plan.
* The principle of regulating the contributions of the States to the common treasury by QUOTAS is another fundamental error in the Confederation.
FEDERALIST No. 22 The Same Subject Continued (Other Defects of the Present Confederation)
From the New York Packet. Friday, December 14, 1787. HAMILTON
* The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all parties allowed to be of the number.
* No nation acquainted with the nature of our 정치적 어쏘시에이션political association(정치적 연합) would be unwise enough to enter into stipulations with the United States, by which they conceded privileges of any importance to them, while they were apprised that the 참여engagements(계약) on the part of the 통일체Union(연맹) might at any moment be violated by its members, and while they found from experience that they might enjoy every advantage they desired in our markets, without granting us any return but such as their momentary convenience might suggest.
* A circumstance which crowns the defects of the Confederation remains yet to be mentioned, the want of a judiciary power.
* all nations have found it necessary to establish one court paramount to the rest, possessing a general superintendence, and authorized to settle and declare in the last resort a uniform rule of civil 떳떳함Justice(정의).
* The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. The streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure, original fountain of all legitimate authority.
FEDERALIST No. 23 The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to thePreservation of the Union
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, December 18, 1787. HAMILTON
* The principal purposes to be answered by union are these--the common defense of the members; the preservation of the public peace as well against internal convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of commerce with other nations and between the States; the superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries.
FEDERALIST No. 24 The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, December 19, 1787 HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 25 The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Necessary to the Common DefenseFurther Considered) From the New York Packet. Friday, December 21, 1787. HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 26 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to theCommon Defense Considered. For the Independent Journal. Saturday, December 22, 1788 HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 27 The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the LegislativeAuthority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered) From the New York Packet. Tuesday, December 25, 1787. HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 28 The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the LegislativeAuthority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered) For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, December 26, 1787 HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 29 Concerning the Militia From the New York Packet. Wednesday, January 9, 1788 HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 30 Concerning the General Power of Taxation From the New York Packet. Friday, December 28, 1787. HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 31 The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) From the New York Packet. Tuesday, January 1, 1788. HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 32 The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) From The Independent Journal. Wednesday, January 2, 1788. HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 33 The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) From The Independent Journal. Wednesday, January 2, 1788. HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 34 The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) From The Independent Journal. Saturday, January 5, 1788. HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 35 The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) For the Independent Journal. Saturday, January 5, 1788 HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 36 The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) From the New York Packet. Tuesday, January 8, 1788. HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 37 Concerning the Difficulties of the 컨스티투셔널 협의convention(헌법제정회의) in Devising a Proper Formof Government. From the Daily Advertiser. Friday, January 11, 1788. MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 38 The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to theNew Plan Exposed. From The Independent Journal. Saturday, January 12, 1788. MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 39 The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, January 16, 1788 MADISON
* Could any further proof be required of the republican complexion of this system, the most decisive one might be found in its absolute prohibition of titles of nobility, both under the federal and the State governments; and in its express guaranty of the republican form to each of the latter.
* "But it was not sufficient," say the adversaries of the proposed 컨스티투션Constitution(헌법), "for the 컨스티투셔널 협의convention(헌법제정회의) to adhere to the republican form. They ought, with equal care, to have preserved the FEDERAL form, which regards the Union as a 공동연방정부CONFEDERACY(연합) of 주권자의sovereign(독립) states; instead of which, they have framed a 국민적인 정부통치NATIONAL government(단일정부), which regards the 통일체Union(연맹) as a 공동일체화CONSOLIDATION(통합) of the States."
* The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the people of America; and the people will be represented in the same proportion, and on the same principle, as they are in the legislature of a particular State. So far the government is NATIONAL, not FEDERAL. The Senate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from the States, as political and coequal societies; and these will be represented on the principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress. So far the government is FEDERAL, not NATIONAL.
* The difference between a federal and national government, as it relates to the OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT, is supposed to consist in this, that in the former the powers operate on the political bodies composing the Confederacy, in their political capacities; in the latter, on the individual citizens composing the nation, in their individual capacities. On trying the 컨스티투션Constitution(헌법) by this criterion, it falls under the NATIONAL, not the FEDERAL character
* The proposed 컨스티투션Constitution(헌법), therefore, is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them, again, it is federal, not national; and, finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor wholly national.
● 39편 안에서 매디슨은, 통일체로써의 아메리카 컨스티투션의 중요한 특징이, 연방적인 것과 국민적인 것의 짬뽕임을 논증합니다.
근본기초, 일상적인 권력들의 원천, 이들 권력들의 작동, 수정들을 도입하는 권한부여의 모드 등등에서, 어떤 경우는 연방적이고, 어떤 경우는 국민적임을 논증하네요.
“연방적”이라함은 구성인자가 스테이트라는 바디 폴리틱이란 뜻이고, “국민적”이라함은 구성인자가 개인적인 시민들이란 뜻입니다. 로크-몽테스키외-페인 계열은 일반적으로 "바디 폴리틱"을 "시민사회"와 동일시하고, "스테이트"는 "커뮤니티, 더 퍼블릭, 커번먼트와 동일시하는데, 매딘슨은 다르게 쓰고 있군요.
FEDERALIST No. 40 On the Powers of the 컨스티투셔널 협의convention(헌법제정회의) to Form a Mixed Government Examined andSustained For the New York Packet. Friday, January 18, 1788. MADISON
