(47) 20180405 [페더럴리스트 페이퍼](1787) 제1~9편

(47) 20180405 해밀턴(1755~1804), 매디슨(1751~1836), 제이(1745~1829)의[페더럴리스트 페이퍼](1787)  



FEDERALIST No. 1   General Introduction   
For the Independent Journal. Saturday, October 27, 1787   HAMILTON  

To the People of the State of New York:   

AFTER an 어정쩡하지않은 경험unequivocal experience(명백해진) of the 비효율성inefficacy of the 존속하는 연방적인 정부통치subsisting federal government(현 정부), you are called upon to 심사숙고해야할deliberate on a new 컨스티튜션Constitution(제정되는 헌법) for 아메리카의 통일된 스테이트들the United States of America(미합중국). The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the 실존existence(존재) of the 통일체UNION(연맹), the 안전safety(안보) and 복지welfare(번영) of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to 이러한 나라의 인민the people of this country(우리 국민들), by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their 정치적 컨스티투션들political constitutions(정치체제) on 우발성accident(우연) and 강제력force(무력). If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the 인류의 일반적인 불행general misfortune of mankind(전 인류의 불행).   

This 이념idea(생각) will add the inducements of 인간애philanthropy(박애) to those of patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all considerate and good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a 재판스러운judicious(현명하게) 견적estimate(판단하여) of our 진실한true(진정한) 이득관계들interests(관심사), unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the 공적인 선public good(대중의 이익). But this is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations affects too many 개별적particular(특정) 이득관계들interests(이익), innovates upon too many 지역적 제도들local institutions(지방제도), not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its 공적들merits(계획), and of views, 정념들passions(감정) and prejudices little favorable to the discovery of 진실truth.   Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new 컨스티튜션Constitution(헌법) will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious 이득관계interest(이해관계) of a certain 계급class(계층) of men in every 스테이트State(주정부) to resist all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, 봉급emolument(수입), and consequence of the 공직들offices(직책) they hold under the State establishments; and the 변태적인erverted(왜곡된) 야심ambition(야망) of another class of men, who will either hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial 공동연방들confederacies(동맹) than from its union under one government.   

It is not, however, my 설계design(의도) to dwell upon 관찰들observations(생각) of this 본성nature(종류). I am well aware that it would be 순정하지않은disingenuous(정당하지 않은) to resolve indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely because their situations might subject them to 의혹suspicion) into 이득관계의interested(이권만 찾거나) or ambitious views. 솔직하게Candor(공정하게) will oblige us to admit that even such men may be actuated by 똑바른upright(정당한) intentions; and it cannot be doubted that much of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not respectable--the honest errors of 마음들minds(감정) led astray by 앞서-관념화된preconceived(기존의) jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed and so powerful are the causes which serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we, upon many occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right side of questions of the first magnitude to society. This circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of 중용moderation to those who are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right in any controversy. And a further reason for caution, in this respect, might be drawn from the reflection that we are not always sure that those who advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists. Ambition, avarice, 인격적personal(개인적) animosity, party opposition, and many other motives not more laudable than these, are apt to operate as well upon those who support as those who oppose the right side of a question. Were there not even these inducements to 중용moderation(온건함), nothing could be more ill-judged than that 불관용의intolerant(완고한) 영성pirit(정신) which has, at all times, characterized political parties. For in politics, as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution.   

And yet, however just these 감정들sentiments(생각) will be allowed to be, we have already sufficient indications that it will happen in this as in all former cases of great 국민적인national(전국적인) discussion. A torrent of angry and malignant 정념들passions(감정) will be let loose. To judge from the conduct of the 반대하는 정당들opposite parties(반대그룹), we shall be led to conclude that they will mutually hope to evince the 떳떳함justness(정당성) of their opinions, and to increase the number of their converts by the loudness of their declamations and the bitterness of their invectives. An 깨어있는enlightened(개화된) 열심zeal(열의) for the 에너지energy(원동력) and efficiency of government will be stigmatized as the offspring of a 성미temper fond of 전횡적인despotic(독재) power and hostile to the principles of liberty. An over-scrupulous 시샘jealousy(관심) of danger to the 라이트들rights(권리) of the 인민people(국민), which is more 공통적으로commonly(흔히) the fault of the head than of the heart, will be 표상될represented(묘사될) as mere pretense and artifice, the stale bait for 쪽수많음popularity(인기) at the 비용expense(희생) of the 공적인 선public good(대중의 이익). It will be forgotten, on the one hand, that 시샘jealousy(관심) is the usual concomitant of love, and that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will be equally forgotten that the vigor of government is essential to the 안전보장security(안전) of liberty; that, in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed judgment, their interest can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people than under the 금지된forbidden(심각한) appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government. History will teach us that the former has been found a much more 일정한certain(확실한) road to the introduction of 전횡주의despotism(독재정치) than the latter, and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the 인민people(국민); commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants.   

In the course of the preceding observations, I have had an eye, my fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts, from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the utmost moment to your welfare, by any impressions other than those which may result from the evidence of truth. You will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected from the general scope of them, that they proceed from a source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I own to you that, after having given it an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your interest to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I affect not reserves which I do not feel. I will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I have decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely lay before you the reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness of good intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not, however, multiply professions on this head. My 동기들motives(의도) must remain in the depository of my own breast. My arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of by all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not disgrace the cause of truth.    

I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following interesting particulars:    

THE 효용UTILITY(유용성) OF THE 통일체UNION(연맹) TO YOUR POLITICAL PROSPERITY THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT 공통연맹CONFEDERATION(연맹) TO PRESERVE THAT 통일체UNION(연맹) THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED, TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECT THE CONFORMITY OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION TO THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT ITS ANALOGY TO YOUR OWN STATE CONSTITUTION and lastly, THE ADDITIONAL 안전보장SECURITY(보증) WHICH ITS ADOPTION WILL AFFORD TO THE 보존PRESERVATION(보호) OF THAT SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT, TO LIBERTY, AND TO PROPERTY.   

In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made their appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention.   

It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the utility of the 통일체UNION(연맹), a point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts of the great body of the 인민people(시민) in every State, and one, which it may be imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we already hear it whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new Constitution, that the thirteen States are of too great extent for any general 체계system(체제), and that we must of necessity resort to 분리된separate(개별적) 공동연방들confederacies(동맹) of distinct portions of the whole.(1) This 교리doctrine(생각) will, in all probability, be gradually propagated, till it has votaries enough to countenance an open avowal of it. For nothing can be more evident, to those who are able to take an enlarged view of the subject, than the alternative of an adoption of the new Constitution or a 탈퇴dismemberment(분할) of the 통일체Union(연맹). It will therefore be of use to begin by examining the advantages of that 통일체Union(연맹), the certain evils, and the probable dangers, to which every State will be exposed from its dissolution. This shall accordingly constitute the subject of my next address.   

푸블리우스PUBLIUS(해밀턴, 매디슨, 제이, 3명이 [페더럴리스프 페이퍼]를 쓸 때 공통으로 쓴 이름)   

1. The same idea, tracing the arguments to their consequences, is held out in several of the late publications against the new Constitution.   

● 1790년대의 연방주의자와 반연방주의자 사이의 갈등은 미국 역사에 커다란 충격과 영향을 끼쳤다. 

알렉산더 해밀턴이 이끄는 연방주의자들은 항구들의 도시적인 상인들의 이득관계들urban mercantile interests(항구 도시 부유한 상인층의 이익)을 대변했다. 반면에 토머스 제퍼슨이 이끄는 반연방주의자들은 시골과 남부 지역의 이익을 대변했다. 이들 사이의 논쟁은 주로 중앙 정부와 지방 정부의 권한에 대한 것이었는데, 연방주의자들은 중앙 정부의 권한을 강화하자고 주장했고 반연방주의자들은 스테이트(주) 정부의 라이트들(권리)을 주장했다. 

해밀턴은 상업과 공업에 힘을 기울이는 강력한 중앙 정부를 추구했다. 그는 공적인 생활에 효율성과 질서 그리고 조직이라는 개념을 도입했다.  

그의 이러한 조치들은 연방 정부에 대한 확고한 믿음을 심어주는 동시에 국가가 필요로 하는 세입을 확보하게 함으로써 상업과 공업에 자양분이 되었으며, 또 사업가들이 연방 정부 뒤에 확고하게 자리를 잡으며 동조 집단을 형성하게 하였다. 

제퍼슨은 탈중앙화한 농업 공화국을 주창하였다. 그 역시 외교 관계에 있어서 강력한 중앙 정부가 얼마나 중요한지 알고 있었지만 그밖의 다른 측면에 관해서는 중앙 정부가 비대하지길 원하지 않았다.  

해밀턴은 무정부 상태를 두려워했고, 그런 점에서 효율과 질서를 중요하게 여겼다. 반면에 제퍼슨은 폭군정부tyranny(독재)를 두려워하며 자유를 중요하게 여겼다. 

통일된 스테이트들The United States(합중국)에는 둘 다 필요했다. 이 두 사람이 동시에 존재함으로써 둘의 철학을 섞을 수 있었다는 점이 나라country(합중국)에게는 행운이었다. (이상 주한 미대사관[미국 역사의 어떤 윤곽선AN OUTLINE OF AMERICAN HISTORY] 가운데 4장 8절, ’해밀턴 vs 제퍼슨‘ 요약임)   

● 연방주의자 논집(The Federalist Papers)은 미국 헌법을 지지하는 85개 논문을 말한다. 이 논집은 헌법 작성자의 생각과 철학을 엿볼 수 있는 귀중한 자료로 여겨진다. 1787년 10월부터 1788년 8월까지 <인디펜던트 저널>을 비롯한 뉴욕 시의 신문에 연속으로 게재되었다. 이것에 다른 8편의 추가하여 편집하여 1788년 8월 발표한 85편의 글 모음집을 《연방주의자 논집》(The Federalist; or, The New Constitution)으로 2권의 책으로 J & A 맥린에 의해 간행되었다. 이 연작의 올바른 제목은 《더 페더럴리스트》(The Federalist)이며 《더 페더럴리스트 논문》(The Federalist Papers)이라는 제목은 20세기 이후에 사용되게 된 것이다.  

《더 페더럴리스트》는 헌법에서 제안된 정부 구조에 대한 철학이나 동기를 명확하고, 설득력있는 문장으로 쓰고 있기 때문에, 현재도 미국 헌법 해석의 기본 문서가 되고 있다. 논문의 필자들은 헌법 비준에 찬성표를 던지게 할 수 있는 영향력을 가질 것과 미래의 헌법 해석을 만드는 것 모두를 원했다.

역사학자 리처드 B. 모리스에 따르면 “이것은 비교할 수 없는 헌법 설명이며, 이후 미국인 작가에 의한 어떤 작품 보다 심도깊은 정치학의 고전이다”라고 평하고 있다.  이 논문은 알렉산더 해밀턴, 제임스 매디슨, 존 제이가 헌법 지지를 이끌어 내기 위해 썼으며, 출판 당시에는 푸블리우스(Publius)라는 필명이 사용되었다.

연방주의자 논문 제10호(매디슨)는 정당의 폐해를 지적하는 것으로 유명하며 연방주의자 논문 제84호(해밀턴)는 수정 헌법을 반대한 것으로 알려져 있다. 연방주의자 논문 제51호(매디슨)는 연방주의 철학을 가장 잘 드러낸 논문으로 알려져 있다.

논문 게재 당시 저자는 비밀로 취급 되었으나, 알아챈 비평가는 그것이 알렉산더 해밀턴, 제임스 매디슨, 존 제이의 3명의 가능성이 강하다고 추측했다. 1804년에 해밀턴이 죽은 후 그가 다 쓴 논문 목록이 공개되었다. 이에 따르면 논문의 3분의 2 가량은 해밀턴이 썼으며, 매디슨의 작품으로 볼 수 있던 것까지 포함했다(제49 - 제58, 제62 및 제63 각 편). 1944년에 더글러스 어 데어가 실시한 학술 연구에서 아래와 같이 저자를 가정했다. 이것은 1964년에 실시된 문장의 컴퓨터 분석에서도 증명되었다.
 

알렉산더 해밀턴(총 51편, 1, 6 - 9, 11~ 13, 15~17, 21~36, 59~61, 65~85)
제임스 매디슨(총 29편, 10, 14, 37~58, 62~63)
존 제이(총 5편 2~5, 64)
 

제18편에서 20편은 매디슨과 해밀턴의 작품이었다.

● 영어낱말들을 한글화함에 있어서, 페더레이션fedeation은 “연방”으로, 콘-페더레이션은 “공동연방”으로, 유니언은 일단은 “통일체”로 했음. “유니티, 유나이티드, 유니피케이션 등등”을 어떻게 한글화해야 할런지가 숙제임. 여기서는 일단 연방주의자들의 주장이 13개 스테이트들이 서너개의 공동연방으로 쪼개져선 안되고, "13개 스테이트들을 통일시키는 하나의 정부를 컨스티튜트한다"는 1787년 <공동연방의회Congress of the Confederation>에서의 컨스티튜션을 따르자는 주장이므로, 이러한 의도를 반영해서, 유니언을 "통일체"라고 한글화했습니다.   

● 첫 번째 페이퍼에서, 해밀턴은 <13개 스테이트들이 너무 광범위하므로, 하나로 통일하는 것은 무리이고, 몇 개의 분리된 컨페더러시 곧 공동연방들로 나누자는 이들, 곧 반-연방주의자들>을 마냥 비판하지 않네요. ’다 이해하고, 당신들도 선하고, 지혜롭고, 훌륭하다. 그러나 반-연방주의는 나쁘다“라는 논조입니다.

해밀턴은 줄곧 새로운 헌법으로 통일된 정치체를 ”통일체“라고 부르고 있다는 점도 기억해얄 듯 합니다. 이 첫번째 페이퍼는 이어질 84개 페이퍼들의 위한 ”일반적인 소개”라는 제목이 붙어 있습니다. 그처럼, 해밀턴은 왜 분리된 공동연방들(반-연방주의자들의 장부통치 설계)보다 통일체(연방주의자들의 그것)가 더 효용있는지를 차차 써나가겠다고 합니다.   이미, 미대사관이 제공한 [미국역사의 윤곽선] 그리고 [미국의 독립의 선포], [버지니아의 라이트들의 선포], [라이트들의 명세서] 등을 읽었으므로, 또다시 이들 85편을 모두다 볼 필요는 없으며, 대충 읽다가 중요하다고 여겨지는 10호, 51호, 84호를 중심으로 살피겠습니다.



FEDERALIST No. 2   Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence   
For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, October 31, 1787   JAY  

To the People of the State of New York:   

WHEN the people of America reflect that they are now called upon to decide a question, which, in its consequences, must prove one of the most important that ever engaged their attention, the propriety of their taking a very comprehensive, as well as a very serious, view of it, will be evident.   

Nothing is more certain than the 불가결한indispensable(절대적으로) 필연necessity(필요) of government, and it is equally undeniable, that whenever and however it is 제도화된instituted(설립되었는), the 인민people(국민) must 양도해야cede to it some of their natural rights in order to vest it with 요청되는requisite(필수불가결한) powers. It is well worthy of consideration therefore, whether it would conduce more to the interest of the 인민people(시민) of America that they should, to all general purposes, be 하나의 국민one nation(단일국가), under one 연방적인 정부통치federal government(중앙정부), or that they should divide themselves into separate 공동연방정부들confederacies(동맹), and give to the head of each the same kind of powers which they are advised to place in 하나의 국민적인 정부통치one national government(단일정부).   

● <분리된 공동연방정부들로 쪼개질 것인가, 아니면 하나의 통일체의 정부통치 아래 하나의 국민이 될 것인가, 이것이 문제이다>라고 제이는 연방주의자들과 반-연방주의자들 사이의 잇슈를 잘 요약하고 있습니다.   

It has until lately been a received and uncontradicted opinion that the prosperity of the people of America depended on their continuing firmly united, and the wishes, prayers, and efforts of our best and wisest citizens have been constantly directed to that object. But politicians now appear, who insist that this opinion is erroneous, and that instead of looking for safety and happiness in 통일체union(통합), we ought to seek it in a 분할division(분리된) of the States into 구별된distinct(명백히) 공동연방정부들confederacies(독립국) or 주권들sovereignties(주권국). However extraordinary this new doctrine may appear, it nevertheless has its advocates; and certain characters who were much opposed to it formerly, are at present of the number. Whatever may be the arguments or inducements which have wrought this change in the sentiments and declarations of these gentlemen, it certainly would not be wise in the people at large to adopt these new political 교의tenets(신조creed) without being fully convinced that they are founded in truth and sound policy.   

● 한번 더 부연설명하고 있네요. <각 스테이트들이 구별된 공동연방정부들과 주권들로 분할되어야 한다>는 것이 반-연방주의자들의 교의인데, 많은 인민들이 이를(진실과 건강한 정책에 근본기초되었는지 여부를) 따져보지도 않고 채택하려고 한다는 것을 제이는 걱정합니다.   

It has often given me pleasure to observe that independent America was not composed of detached and distant territories, but that one connected, fertile, wide-spreading country was the portion of our western sons of liberty. 섭리Providence(신) has in a 개별적인particular(특별한) 태도manner(방법) blessed it with a variety of soils and productions, and watered it with innumerable streams, for the delight and accommodation of its inhabitants. A succession of navigable waters forms a kind of chain round its borders, as if to bind it together; while the most noble rivers in the world, running at convenient distances, present them with highways for the easy communication of friendly aids, and the mutual transportation and exchange of their various commodities.   

With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice that Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to 하나의 통일된 인민one united people(하나로 통합된 국민)--a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established 일반적인general(모두를 위한) liberty and independence.   

This country and this people seem to have been made for each other, and it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance so proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other by the strongest ties, should never be split into a number of 불가-사회적이고, 시샘하고, 딴세계인 주권들unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties(경계하며 무관한 개별국들).   

● 제이는 독립전쟁 끝에 탄생한 아메리카를 한껏 자랑스러워 합니다. 이러한 “하나의 통일된 인민”이 “불가-사회적이고, 시샘하고, 딴세계인 주권들”로 쪼개지는 것을 두려워합니다.   

Similar sentiments have hitherto prevailed among all orders and denominations of men among us. To all 일반적인 목적들general purposes(공동의 목적) we have uniformly been one people each 개체적인 시민individual citizen(개인) everywhere enjoying the same 국민적인 라이트들national rights(국가의 권리), 특권들privileges(혜택), and protection. As a 국민nation(국가) we have made peace and war; as a nation we have vanquished our common enemies; as a nation we have formed alliances, and made treaties, and entered into various 협약들compacts(계약) and 협의들conventions with foreign states.   

A strong 감각sense(믿음) of the value and blessings of 통일체union(단결) induced the people, at a very early period, to institute a 연방적인 정부통치federal government(연맹정부) to preserve and perpetuate it. They formed it almost as soon as they had a political existence; nay, at a time when their habitations were in flames, when many of their citizens were bleeding, and when the progress of hostility and desolation left little room for those calm and mature inquiries and reflections which must ever precede the formation of a wise and well-balanced government for a free people. It is not to be wondered at, that a government 제도화된instituted(설립된) in times so inauspicious, should on experiment be found greatly deficient and inadequate to the purpose it was intended to answer.   

This intelligent people perceived and regretted these defects. Still continuing no less attached to union than enamored of liberty, they observed the danger which immediately threatened the former and more remotely the latter; and being persuaded that ample security for both could only be found in a national government more wisely framed, they as with one voice, convened the late convention at Philadelphia, to take that important subject under consideration.   

This convention composed of men who possessed the 자긍심confidence(신임) of the people, and many of whom had become highly distinguished by their patriotism, virtue and wisdom, in times which tried the minds and hearts of men, undertook the arduous task. In the mild season of peace, with minds unoccupied by other subjects, they passed many months in cool, uninterrupted, and daily consultation; and finally, without having been awed by power, or influenced by any 정념들passions(권력) except love for their country, they presented and recommended to the people the plan produced by their joint and very unanimous councils.   

Admit, for so is the fact, that this plan is only RECOMMENDED, not 부과되지imposed(강요되지), yet let it be remembered that it is neither recommended to BLIND approbation, nor to BLIND reprobation; but to that sedate and candid consideration which the magnitude and importance of the subject demand, and which it certainly ought to receive. But this (as was remarked in the foregoing number of this paper) is more to be wished than expected, that it may be so considered and examined. Experience on a former occasion teaches us not to be too sanguine in such hopes. It is not yet forgotten that well-grounded apprehensions of imminent danger induced the people of America to form the memorable 의회Congress(연맹의회) of 1774. That body recommended 일정한 척도들certain measures(특정방침) to their 컨스티튜션하는이들constituents(국민), and the event proved their wisdom; yet it is fresh in our memories how soon the press began to teem with pamphlets and weekly papers against those very measures. Not only many of the officers of government, who obeyed the dictates of 인격적인 이득관계personal interest(개인적인 이익), but others, from a mistaken estimate of consequences, or the undue influence of former attachments, or whose ambition aimed at objects which did not correspond with the 공적인 선public good(대중의 이익), were indefatigable in their efforts to persuade the people to reject the advice of that patriotic Congress. Many, indeed, were deceived and deluded, but the great majority of the people 추론이성했다reasoned(현명하게) and decided 재판스럽게judiciously(심사숙고하여); and happy they are in reflecting that they did so.   

They considered that the Congress was composed of many wise and experienced men. That, being convened from different parts of the country, they brought with them and communicated to each other a variety of useful information. That, in the course of the time they passed together in inquiring into and discussing the true 이득관계interests(관심사) of their country, they must have acquired very accurate knowledge on that head. That they were 개인적으로individually 이득관계하고interested(주력하고) in the public liberty and prosperity, and therefore that it was not less their inclination than their duty to recommend only such measures as, after the most 성숙한mature(신중한) 심사숙고deliberation(검토), they really thought prudent and advisable.   

These and similar considerations then induced the people to rely greatly on the judgment and 정합성integrity(존엄성) of the Congress; and they took their advice, notwithstanding the various arts and endeavors used to deter them from it. But if the people at large had reason to confide in the men of that Congress, few of whom had been fully tried or generally known, still greater reason have they now to respect the judgment and advice of the convention, for it is well known that some of the most distinguished members of that Congress, who have been since tried and justly approved for patriotism and 할힘들abilities(능력), and who have grown old in acquiring political information, were also members of this convention, and carried into it their accumulated knowledge and experience.   

It is worthy of remark that not only the first, but every succeeding Congress, as well as the late convention, have invariably joined with the people in thinking that the prosperity of America depended on its 통일체Union(연맹). To preserve and perpetuate it was the great object of the people in forming that convention, and it is also the great object of the plan which the 협의convention(회의) has advised them to adopt. With what propriety, therefore, or for what good purposes, are attempts at this particular period made by some men to depreciate the importance of the 통일체Union(연맹)? Or why is it suggested that three or four 공동연방정부들confederacies(독립적인 동맹체제) would be better than one? I am persuaded in my own mind that the people have always thought right on this subject, and that their universal and uniform attachment to the cause of the 통일체Union(연맹) rests on great and weighty reasons, which I shall endeavor to develop and explain in some ensuing papers. They who promote the idea of substituting a number of 구별된distinct(여러) 공동연방정부들confederacies(개별 동맹국) in the room of the plan of the convention, seem clearly to foresee that the rejection of it would put the continuance of the Union in the utmost jeopardy. That certainly would be the case, and I sincerely wish that it may be as clearly foreseen by every good citizen, that whenever the dissolution of the Union arrives, America will have reason to exclaim, in the words of the poet: "FAREWELL! A LONG FAREWELL TO ALL MY GREATNESS."   

PUBLIUS   

● 제이는 1774년 필라델피아에서 열렸던 대륙의회Continental로부터 시작해서, "13개 스테이트들을 하나의 정부로 통일시켜 컨스티튜트한다"는 1787년 9월 17일 <공동연방의회Congress of the Confederation>에서의 컨스티튜션 통과, 그리고 순조롭게 이어진 1788년 6월까지 9개 스테이트들의 비준RATIFICATION의 역사적인 진행과정들을 제이는 읽는이들에게 되살려줍니다.

9개 스테이트들이 비준을 마쳤으므로, 사실상 통일 아메리카 정부통치는 컨스티튜트된 셈이지만, 가장 큰 스테이트인 버지니아와 뉴욕이 비준을 거부하고, 반-연방주의자들의 주장에 날로 거세어지는 상황이 된 것이지요. 제이는 이러한 상황 안에서, 집중적으로 연방주의자들이 주장하는 아메리카 <통일체의 가치와 중요성>을 반-연방주의자들이 주장하는 <구별된 공동연방정부들로 나라를 쪼개자는 구상>과 대비시킵니다.    



FEDERALIST No. 3   The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)   

For the Independent Journal. Saturday, November 3, 1787   JAY   

To the People of the State of New York:   

IT IS not a new observation that the people of any country (if, like the Americans, intelligent and wellinformed) seldom adopt and steadily persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their interests. That consideration naturally tends to create great respect for the high opinion which the people of America have so long and uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing firmly 통일된united(단결) under 하나의 연방정부통치one federal government(단일정부), vested with sufficient powers for all general and 국민적인national(국가적인) purposes.   

The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons which appear to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become convinced that they are cogent and conclusive.   

Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their 안전SAFETY(안보) seems to be the first. The SAFETY of the people doubtless has relation to a great variety of circumstances and considerations, and consequently affords great latitude to those who wish to define it precisely and comprehensively.   

At present I mean only to consider it as it respects 안전보장security(안보) for the preservation of peace and 평온함tranquillity, as well as against dangers from FOREIGN ARMS AND INFLUENCE, as from dangers of the LIKE KIND arising from domestic causes. As the former of these comes first in order, it is proper it should be the first discussed. Let us therefore proceed to examine whether the people are not right in their opinion that a cordial 통일체Union(연맹), under an efficient 국민적인 정부통치national government(중앙정부), affords them the best security that can be devised against HOSTILITIES from abroad.   

The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the world will always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of the causes, whether REAL or PRETENDED, which PROVOKE or INVITE them. If this remark be just, it becomes useful to inquire whether so many JUST causes of war are likely to be given by 통일된 아메리카UNITED AMERICA(연맹을 이룬 미국) as by 통일없는 아메리카DISUNITED America(분열된 미국); for if it should turn out that 통일된 아메리카UNITED AMERICA(연맹을 이룬 미국) will probably give the fewest, then it will follow that in this respect the 통일체Union(연맹) tends most to preserve the people in a state of peace with other nations.   

The JUST causes of war, for the most part, arise either from violation of 조약들treaties or from direct violence. America has already formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations, and all of them, except Prussia, are maritime, and therefore able to annoy and injure us. She has also extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain, and Britain, and, with respect to the two latter, has, in addition, the circumstance of neighborhood to attend to.   

It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe 국민들의 법률들the laws of nations(국제법) towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by 하나의 국민적인 정부통치one national government(단일중앙정부) than it could be either by thirteen 분리된 스테이트들separate States(개별 주) or by three or four 구별된 공동연방정부들distinct confederacies(독립된 동맹체제).   

Because when once an efficient 국민적인 정부통치national government(중앙정부) is established, the best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also will generally be appointed to manage it; for, although town or country, or other contracted influence, may place men in State 하원들assemblies, or senates, or courts of justice, or executive departments, yet more general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the 국민적인 정부통치national government(중앙정부),--especially as it will have the widest field for choice, and never experience that want of proper persons which is not uncommon in some of the States. Hence, it will result that the administration, the political counsels, and the judicial decisions of the 국민적인 정부통치national government(중앙정부) will be more wise, systematical, and judicious than those of individual States, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations, as well as more SAFE with respect to us.   

Because, under the 국민적인 정부통치national government(단일정부), treaties and articles of treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense and executed in the same manner,--whereas, adjudications on the same points and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or four 공동연방정부들distinct confederacies(독립적 동맹체제), will not always accord or be consistent; and that, as well from the variety of independent courts and judges appointed by different and independent governments, as from the different local laws and 이득관계interests(이권) which may affect and influence them. The wisdom of the convention, in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by and responsible only to one 국민적인 정부통치national government(중앙정부), cannot be too much commended.   

Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the governing party in one or two States to swerve from good faith and justice; but those temptations, not reaching the other States, and consequently having little or no influence on the 국민적인 정부통치national government(중앙정부), the temptation will be fruitless, and good faith and justice be preserved. The case of the treaty of peace with Britain adds great weight to this reasoning.   

Because, even if the 통치하는 정당governing party(집권정당) in a State should be disposed to resist such temptations, yet as such temptations may, and commonly do, result from circumstances peculiar to the State, and may affect a great number of the inhabitants, the 통치하는 정당governing party(지배정당) may not always be able, if willing, to prevent the injustice meditated, or to punish the aggressors. But the 국민적인 정부통치national government(중앙정부), not being affected by those local circumstances, will neither be induced to commit the wrong themselves, nor want 권력power(세력) or inclination to prevent or punish its commission by others.   

So far, therefore, as either designed or accidental violations of treaties and the laws of nations afford JUST causes of war, they are less to be apprehended under 하나의 일반적인 정부통치one general government(단일정부) than under several lesser ones, and in that respect the former most favors the SAFETY of the people.   

As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and unlawful violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good 국민적인 정부통치national government(중앙정부) affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort than can be derived from any other quarter.   

Because such violences are more frequently caused by the 정념들passions(감정) and 이득관계interests(이권) of a part than of the whole; of one or two States than of the 통일체Union(연맹). Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of the present federal government, feeble as it is; but there are several instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper conduct of individual States, who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offenses, have given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants.   

The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering on some States and not on others, naturally confines the causes of quarrel more immediately to the borderers. The bordering States, if any, will be those who, under the impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick sense of apparent interest or injury, will be most likely, by direct violence, to excite war with these nations; and nothing can so effectually obviate that danger as a 국민적인 정부통치national government(중앙정부), whose wisdom and prudence will not be diminished by the passions which actuate the parties immediately interested.   

But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the 국민적인 정부통치national government(중앙정부), but it will also be more in their power to accommodate and settle them amicably. They will be more temperate and cool, and in that respect, as well as in others, will be more in capacity to act advisedly than the offending State. The pride of states, as well as of men, naturally disposes them to justify all their actions, and opposes their acknowledging, correcting, or repairing their errors and offenses. The 국민적인 정부통치national government(중앙정부), in such cases, will not be affected by this pride, but will proceed with moderation and candor to consider and decide on the means most proper to extricate them from the difficulties which threaten them.   

Besides, it is well known that acknowledgments, explanations, and compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a 강력한 통일된 국민strong united nation(강하고 통합된 국가), which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a State or 공동연방정부confederacy(동맹) of little consideration or power.   In the year 1685, the 스테이트state(공화국) of Genoa having offended Louis XIV., endeavored to appease him. He demanded that they should send their Doge, or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their senators, to FRANCE, to ask his pardon and receive his terms. They were obliged to submit to it for the sake of peace. Would he on any occasion either have demanded or have received the like humiliation from Spain, or Britain, or any other POWERFUL nation?   

PUBLIUS   

● 3편에서도 제이는 한결같습니다. 통일체가 되어야 강력한 외교정책을 펼수 있으며, 외국의 폭력으로부터 국민의 평화와 평온함을 안전보장할 수 있지만, 반-연방주의자들의 주장처럼 13개 스테이들로 또는 서너개의 공동연방정부들로 쪼개지면 외교적 분쟁일 일어날 때, 약한 처지가 되어서, 수치를 겪게 된다고 공포를 잔뜩 먹이네요.   



FEDERALIST No. 4   

* the safety of the people would be best secured by union against the danger   

* it may be to human nature, that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it   

* one good government is not, relative to the object in question, more competent than any other given number whatever   

* consolidate them into one corps, and thereby render them more efficient than if divided into thirteen or into three or four distinct independent companies.   

* when a people or family so divide, it never fails to be against themselves   

● 3장과 마찬지로 이어지는 글입니다. “하나의 인민 또는 가족이 분할되면, 그들은 반드시 서로 적이 된다”는 마지막 글귀가 아마도 당시 많은 미국사람들에게 먹혔을 듯 하네요.   



FEDERALIST No. 5   

* the union may be brought to a happy conclusion, being the only EFFECTUAL way to secure our present and future happiness, and disappoint the designs of our and your enemies, who will doubtless, on this occasion, USE THEIR UTMOST ENDEAVORS TO PREVENT OR DELAY THIS UNION.   

* the division of America into any given number of independent sovereignties would tend to secure us against the hostilities and improper interference of foreign nations   

● 5편에서 흥미로운 점은 제이가, 영국이 3 나라로 분할되어 서로 전쟁을 벌여온 역사를 본보기로 삼아서, 반-연방주의자들의 정부통치 설계 곧 ‘서너개의 분리된 공동연방정부를 수립한다’는 구상이 얼마나 불행한 것인가를 논증하는 부분입니다. 우리가 쪼개지면, 영국 역사 안에서처럼, 우리들 끼리 적이 되어 맨날 전쟁하게 된다구!!! 앞 편에서 “가족이 분리되면 서로 적이 된다”는 aA 가치감정에의 호소에 더해져서 아주 큰 설득력을 갖는다고 보입니다.   



FEDERALIST No. 6   Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States   

For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, November 14, 1787   HAMILTON
 

* The genius of republics (say they) is pacific; the spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of men, and to extinguish those inflammable humors which have so often kindled into wars. Commercial republics, like ours, will never be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other. They will be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of mutual amity and concord.  

* The wars of these two last-mentioned nations have in a great measure grown out of commercial considerations,--the desire of supplanting and the fear of being supplanted, either in particular branches of traffic or in the general advantages of trade and navigation, and sometimes even the more culpable desire of sharing in the commerce of other nations without their consent.   

● 해밀턴은 이 6편 안에서, 상당히 공격적이고 전복적인 주장을 합니다. 우리가 <시즌3 정치학>에서 공부해왔던 바에 따르자면, <공화국이 평화를 가져다준다>(몽테스키외, 페인이 대표적임)거나, <상업은 온화한 품위를 길러준다>(이것은 거의 모든 근대정치이론가들의 공통점임)고 주장하는데, 처음으로(내가 아는 한) 해밀턴은, 공화국이나 상업이 평화가 아니라 전쟁의 주범인 역사적 케이스들을 마구마구 인용하면서, <상업과 공화국이라고 해서 결코 평화를 보증해주지도 않고, 온화한 품위를 보장해주지 못한다>고 주장합니다.

다시말하자면, 13개 스테이트들이 모두 상업적이고 공화국들이니 전쟁을 안할거라는 것은 결코 추론이성이 아니라는 것입니다. 이게 이 6편의 메시지가 되겠습니다.   



FEDERALIST No. 7   The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States)   

For the Independent Journal. Thursday, November 15, 1787   HAMILTON   

* by the destructive contentions of the parts into which she was divided, would be likely to become a prey to the artifices and machinations of powers equally the enemies of them all. Divide et impera(1) must be the motto of every nation that either hates or fears us.   

● 7편도 6편의 연속입니다. 해밀턴은 4편 제이의 말을 그대로 다른 버전으로 표현합니다. 분리된 스테이트들 사이의 파괴적 투쟁은 아메리카를 외부의 적들 앞에 갖다바칠 것이다. “분할하여 지배하라!”   



FEDERALIST No. 8   The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States   

From the New York Packet. Tuesday, November 20, 1787.   HAMILTON   

* If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated situation. Europe is at a great distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to continue too much disproportioned in strength to be able to give us any dangerous annoyance. 광범위한 군대Extensive military(대규모 군병력) establishments cannot, in this position, be necessary to our security. But if we should be disunited, and the integral parts should either remain separated, or, which is most probable, should be thrown together into two or three confederacies, we should be, in a short course of time, in the predicament of the continental powers of Europe--our liberties would be a prey to the means of defending ourselves against the ambition and jealousy of each other.   

● 8편에서 해밀턴은 연방주의자들의 주장처럼 아메리카가 통일체일 경우에는, 별도의 광범위한 군대가 필요없지만, 공동연방정부들로 쪼개질 경우에는 유럽의 대륙의 권력들의 공격으로 인해서, 제각각 군대를 갖추는 불필요한 비용을 쓰게 될 것이라고 하네요.   



FEDERALIST No. 9   The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection   

For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, November 21, 1787   HAMILTON   

* The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances and checks; the institution of courts composed of judges holding their offices during good behavior; the representation of the people in the legislature by deputies of their own election: these are wholly new discoveries, or have made their principal progress towards perfection in modern times.   

"It is very probable," (says he(몽테스키외 "Spirit of Laws," vol. i., book ix., chap. i.)
"that mankind would have been obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a single 인격person(사람), had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical government. I mean a 공동연방적인 공화국CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC(연맹공화국)."   
"This form of government is a convention by which several smaller 국가들STATES agree to become members of a larger ONE, which they intend to form. It is a kind of 어쎔블리assemblage(집합) of societies that 컨스티튜트하는constitute(구성하는) a new one, capable of increasing, by means of new 어쏘시에이션associations(연합), till they arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the 통일된 몸체united body(통일된 집합체)."   
"A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may support itself without any internal corruptions. The form of this society prevents all manner of inconveniences."   
"If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the 공동연방적인 스테이트들confederate states. Were he to have too great influence over one, this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that which would still remain free might oppose him with forces independent of those which he had usurped and overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation."   
"Should a popular insurrection happen in 공동연방적인 스테이트들의 하나one of the confederate states(연맹의 한 주) the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The state may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the 공동연방정부confederacy(연맹) may be dissolved, and the 공동연방들confederates(연맹구성원) preserve their sovereignty."   
"As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys the internal happiness of each; and with respect to its external situation, it is possessed, by means of the 어쏘시에이션association(연합), of all the advantages of large monarchies."   

* They have, at the same time, an intimate connection with the more immediate design of this paper; which is, to illustrate the tendency of the Union to repress domestic faction and insurrection.   

* The definition of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC seems simply to be "an assemblage of societies,"...    

* The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the State governments, makes them constituent parts of the national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the Senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive and very important portions of sovereign power. This fully corresponds, in every rational import of the terms, with the idea of a federal government.    

● 그당시 반-연방주의자들의 주장을 뒷받침하는 논거가 몽테스키외 [법률들의 영성]이었나 봅니다. “공화적인 어떤 정부통치를 위한 축소된 어떤 영토의 필연성the necessity of a contracted territory for a republican government”이란 그의 개념설계를 바탕으로 반-연방주의자들은 <아메리카 통일체 켄스티투션은, 몽테스키외에 따르자면, 공화적인 정부가 아니다>라고 했던 모양입니다.

이를 반증하는 것이 이번 9편입니다. 해밀턴은 ‘그래? 진짜로? 반-연방주의자들이 몽테스키외의 개념설계를 잘못 디컴인하고 있음을 논증해 주마!’라고 하면서, 실질적으로 몽테스키외 책 안에서, 공동연방적인 공화국 글토막들을 집중적으로 뽑아추려냅니다.

몽테스키외는 반-연방주의자들의 주장과 반대로써, 몽테스키외에 따라서라도, 통일체를 만들어야 하며, 그 통일체가 곧 몽테스키외가 말한, 공동연방적 공화국임을 해밀턴이 논증합니다.