EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY:
HOW HAS THE COURT ADDRESSED LAWS REQUIRING SEPARATION OF THE RACES?
In Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 2 (1883) the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the Civil Rights Act of 1875 that prohibited discrimination by places of public accommodation such as inns, theaters, and places of public amusement.
The court stated that statutes requiring separation of the races are a third type of racial classification that exists on the face of the law.
The Supreme Court broadly held that the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to government action, not to private conduct, and that therefore Congress acting Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment can regulate only government actions.
In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the Supreme Court ruled and upheld laws requiring segregation of the races.
Moreover, the court discussed relations based on classifications based on race the object of the Fourteenth Amendment was to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law. But in the nature of things, it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. The argument assumes that social prejudices may be overcome by legislation.
In addition, the legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts, or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation. In specific the civil and political rights of both races be equal, one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically.
Furthermore, if one race is inferior to the other socially, the constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane.
Justice Harlan dissenting
The justice contended that everyone knows that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white person.
The court discussed whether all citizens are equal before the law separate but equal.
The court opinioned, the judgment this day rendered will, in time prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott case. The arbitrary separation of citizens based on race, while they are on a public highway, is a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality before the law established by the constitution. It cannot be justified upon any legal grounds. We boast of the freedom enjoyed by our people above all other peoples. But, it is difficult to reconcile that boast with a state of the law which, practically, puts the brand of servitude and degradation upon a large class of our fellow-citizens, our equals before the law. The thin disguise of “equal” accommodations for passengers in railroad coaches will not mislead anyone, nor atone for the wrong this day done. For the reason stated, I am constrained to withhold my assent from the opinion and judgment of the majority.
In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the court stated whether separate but equal was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.
In addition, they have been denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race.
The court discussed that no moral reasoning in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.
Moreover, social science was doubtful in that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in the life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it is a right that must be made available to all on equal terms.
In Brown v. Board of Education (1954), segregation in the education of minors or the Negro race, through their legal representatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to the public schools of their community on a non-segregated basis.
In addition, the segregation of children in public schools solely based on race, even though the physical facilities and other “tangible” factors may be equal; deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities?
Moreover, the separation of children from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.
The court concluded that in the field of public education of the doctrine of “separate but equal” has no place.
The court ruled that separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.
Furthermore, the judicial discussion follows in appraising Brown it is important to consider the Court’s emphasis on the harms of segregation in education, rather than providing an overall constitutional judgment about the impermissibility of government-mandated segregation. The Court supported its claim that separate can never be equal in education with citations to social science studies. This has been enormously controversial. Some argue that the Court erred by relying on social science studies to support its conclusion rather than expressing a moral judgment that segregation was wrong. Indeed, Professor Mark Yudof argued that “[v]irtually everyone who has examined the question now agrees that the Court erred” in relying upon the social science data. The concern is that the studies were “methodologically unsound” and that reliance on them made the decision vulnerable if future research came to differing conclusions.
Moreover, others argued that Chief Justice Warren took the approach needed to secure a unanimous ruling from the Court, widely perceived as essential in light of the intense opposition to the decision. By focusing on the inherent inequality of racially segregated schools, and by supporting this claim with citations to social science research, Warren was able to secure a unanimous ruling.
In Johnson v. California, 543 US 499 (2005), the California Department of Corrections (CDC) has an unwritten policy of racially segregating prisoners in double cells in reception centers for up to sixty days each time they enter a new correctional facility.
The court held that “all racial classifications [imposed by government]…must be analyzed be a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), under strict scrutiny, the government has the burden of proving that racial classifications “are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.”
In Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) a plurality opinion applied strict scrutiny to all racial classifications to “smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring that [government] is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.”
The court discussed the CDC claims that its policy should be exempt from our categorical rule because it is “neutral”-that is, it “neither benefits nor burdens one group or individual more than any other group or individual.”
Under strict scrutiny should not apply because all prisoners are equally segregated. The court stated the CDC’s argument ignores our repeated command that “racial classifications receive close scrutiny even when they may be said to burden or benefit the races equally.” Because the CDC’s policy is an express racial classification, it is “immediately suspect.”
The court held that the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to apply strict scrutiny to the CDC’s policy and to require the CDC to demonstrate that its policy is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
In specific, in the prison context, when the government’s power is at its apex, we think that searching judicial review of racial classifications is necessary to guard against invidious discrimination.
In McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), the court granted the California Department of Corrections (CDC) an exemption from the rule that strict scrutiny applies to all racial classifications would undermine our “unceasing efforts to eradicate racial prejudice from our criminal justice system.”
In addition, the CDC argues that “[d]eference to the particular expertise of prison officials in the difficult task of managing daily prison operations” requires a more relaxed standard of review from its segregation policy.
The court refused deferment to state officials’ judgments on race in other areas where those officials traditionally exercise substantial discretion.
Furthermore, the court stated that strict scrutiny does not preclude the ability of prison officials to address the compelling interest in prison safety.
Moreover, prison administrators, however, will have to demonstrate that any race-based policies are narrowly tailored to that end.
The court stated the fact that strict scrutiny applies “says nothing about the ultimate validity of any particular law; that determination is the job of the court applying strict scrutiny.”
On Remand, the court discussed the CDC will have the burden of demonstrating that its policy is narrowly tailored with regard to new inmates as well as transferees.
The court held that strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review and remand the case to allow the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, or the District Court, to apply it in the first instance.
In Justice Stevens dissenting, in my judgment a state policy of segregating prisoners by race during the first 60 days of their incarceration, as well as 60 days after their transfer from one facility to another, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Moreover, the California Department of Corrections (CDC) has had an ample opportunity to justify its policy during the course of this litigation, but has utterly failed to do so whether judged under strict scrutiny or the more deferential standard set out in Turner v. Safley 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
In Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia dissenting that this Court has no less categorically stated that “the [relaxed] standard of review we adopted in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) applies to all circumstances in which the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights,” Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). The constitution has always demanded less within the prison walls. Time and again, even when faced with constitutional rights no less “fundamental” than the right to be free from state-sponsored racial discrimination, we have deferred to the reasonable judgments of officials experienced in running this Nation’s prisons. In specific, the court viewed that in context and light of the four factors enunciated in Turner. The court held that California’s policy is constitutional because the CDC’s policy is reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical interest; alternative means of exercising the restricted right remain open to inmates; racially integrating double cells might negatively impact prison inmates, staff, and administrators; and there are no obvious, easy alternatives to the CDC’s policy.
