HOW HAS THE COURT ADDRESSED RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS TO BENEFIT MINORITIES AND TO ENHANCE DIVERSITY?
The court held that colleges and universities may use race as one factor, among many, in admissions decisions; but it is not permissible to add a significant number of points to the applications of minority students.
In Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), the court emphasizes “Diversity” Points on Law School Applications. The court discussed whether the use of race as a factor in student admissions by the University of Michigan Law School (Law School) is unlawful.
The court announced the principle of student body diversity as a compelling state interest; Justice Powell invoked our cases recognizing a constitutional dimension, grounded in the First Amendment, of education autonomy. The court concluded that the law school’s proper institutional mission and that “good faith” on the part of a university is “presumed” absent “a showing to the contrary.”
In addition, the court stated race is not the sole factor.
The court held the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School’s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the education benefits that flow from a diverse student body.
Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer concurring
Justice Scalia discussed the “Critical Mass” Justification.
Justice Thomas, with Justice Scalia concurring on part dissenting on part states that unlike the majority, they seek to define with precision the interest being asserted by the law school before determining whether that interest is so compelling as to justify racial discrimination.
Justice Kennedy dissenting the court’s refusal to apply meaningful strict scrutiny will lead to serious consequences. By deferring to the law school’s choice of minority admissions programs, the courts will lose the talents and resources of the faculties and administrators in devising new and fairer ways to ensure individual consideration.
Furthermore, the court states the constant and rigorous judicial review forces the law school faculties to undertake their responsibilities as state employees in this most sensitive of areas with utmost fidelity to the mandate of the Constitution. Moreover, deference is an antithetical to strict scrutiny, not consistent with it.
In Gratz V. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), the court discussed unrepresented groups and the allocation of diversity points on university applications.
The court considered several race acceptance factors.
The court questioned whether “the University of Michigan’s use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violate[s] the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In addition, the court states that the automatic distribution of twenty points is that the University would never consider student A’s individual background, experiences, and characteristics to assess his individual “potential contribution to diversity.”
In consequence, the court stated that every applicant like student A would simply be admitted.
Moreover, the court reasoned that because the University’s use of race in its current freshman admissions policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve respondents’ asserted compelling interest in diversity, the admissions policy violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court held that the admissions policy also violates Title VI and 42 U.S.C. sec. 1981.
The court explained that the provision was “meant, by it broad terms, to proscribe discrimination in the making or enforcement of contracts against, or in favor of, any race.”
Furthermore, the court explained that a contract for educational services is a “contract” for purposes of Section 1981.
In addition, purposeful discrimination that violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment will also violate Sec. 1981, footnoted by the court.
Justice O’ Connor, and Justice Breyer concurring
Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Souter dissenting
The court stated our jurisprudence ranks race a “suspect” category, “not because [race] is inevitably an impermissible classification, but because it is one which usually, to our national shame, has been drawn for the purpose of maintaining racial inequality.”
HOW HAS THE COURT ADDRESSED GENDER CLASSIFICATIONS?
The courts discussed examining gender discrimination under the Constitution.
The court addressed the gender classifications benefiting women.
The court discussed the level of scrutiny to prove gender discrimination.
Under Intermediate scrutiny, the appropriate test for the evaluation of gender classifications is challenged pursuant to the equal protection clause.
The court reasoned that sex, like race and national origin is an immutable characteristic. In addition, the court advocated strict scrutiny because of the need for a strong presumption against laws that discriminate against people based on traits that were not chosen and cannot be changed. Gender, like race, is an immediately visible characteristic. Moreover, women and racial minorities, tend to be significantly underrepresented in the political process.
Some courts arguing for intermediate rather than strict scrutiny for gender classifications make several arguments. In part, the argument is historical: the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment meant to outlaw only racial discrimination.
In addition, the biological differences between men and women make it more likely that gender classifications will be justified and thus less than strict scrutiny is appropriate to increase the chances that desirable laws will be upheld.
Moreover, the court stated that women are a political majority who are not isolated from men and thus cannot be considered a discrete and insular minority.
The courts debated over whether strict or intermediate scrutiny should be used for gender classifications and was complicated by the affirmative action debate. Many of those who previously favored strict scrutiny for gender classifications now are concerned that such review would make it much more difficult for the government to engage in affirmative action to benefit women.
Generally, the court stated that intermediate scrutiny is successful in challenging invidious discrimination against women there is concern that the primary effect of strict scrutiny might be to limit programs that help women.
In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the Supreme Court for the first time invalidated a gender classification, but the Court professed to apply only rational basis review.
The court stated “[a] classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.”
The Supreme Court expressed that the issue was whether gender had a rational relationship to the ability to administer the estate.
The court stated that “[t]o give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and whatever may be said as to the positive values of avoiding intra-family controversy, the choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex.”
The court purported to be using just the rational basis test and did not express the view that gender was a suspect classification, its reasoning was not characteristic of rational basis review. If the law had said, when there are two people in a category that are equally qualified, one will be chosen by random selection, that surely would have been permissible under rational basis review.
Therefore, the use of gender had to have been regarded by the Court as worse than random selection and inappropriate ground to use to simplify administration.
The court implicitly had to regard gender as an impermissible basis for government decisions.
In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), the question before us concerns the right of a female member of the uniformed services to claim her spouse as a “dependent” for the purposes of obtaining increased quarters allowances and medical and dental benefits on an equal footing with male member. Under these statutes, a service man may claim his wife as a dependent without regard to whether she is in fact dependent upon him for any part of her support. A service woman, on the other hand may not claim her husband as a dependent under this programs unless he is in fact dependent upon her for over one-half of his support.
Thus, the difference in treatment constitutes an unconstitutional discrimination against service women in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Here, the court denied the appellant’s application because she failed to demonstrate that her husband was dependent on her for more than one half of his support.
The appellants reasoned that classifications based upon sex, like-classifications based upon race, alienage, and nation origin, are inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny.
The court ruled to find at least implicit support for such an approach in our unanimous decision only last term in Reed v. Reed 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
Moreover, since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate “the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility…”
The court differentiates sex from such non-suspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.
As a result, the statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously regarding the entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members.
Moreover, with these considerations in mind, we can only conclude that classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. The court applied the analysis mandated by that stricter standard of review, it is clear that the statutory scheme now before us is constitutionally invalid.
The court determined the sole basis of the classification established in the challenged statutes is the sex of the individuals involved.
Moreover, the government concedes that the differential treatment accorded men and women under these statutes serves no purpose other than mere “administrative convenience.”
Furthermore, the government offers no concrete evidence, however, tending to support its view that such differential treatment in fact saves the government any money.
In addition, the court ruled to satisfy the demands of strict judicial scrutiny, the government must demonstrate that it is actually cheaper to grant increased benefits, to all male members respectively, than it is to determine which of the male members are in fact entitled to such benefits. Furthermore, the court ruled to grant increased benefits only to those members whose wives actually meet the dependency requirement.
The court clearly stated our prior decisions make that, although efficacious administration of governmental programs is not without some importance, “the constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.”
In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the court expressed that when we enter the realm of “strict judicial scrutiny,” there can be no doubt that “administrative convenience” is not a shibboleth.
The court held by according differential treatment to male and female members of the uniformed services for the sole purpose of achieving administrative convenience, the challenged statutes violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment insofar as they require a female member to prove the dependency of her husband.
Justice Powell noted that he could not join the opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan.
In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the court ruled that to withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.
The court emphasizes that the appellees’ statistics cannot support the conclusion that the gender-based distinction closely serves to achieve that objective. Therefore, under Reed, the distinction cannot survive an equal protection challenge.
Moreover, the court stated that while such a disparity is not trivial in a statistical sense, it hardly can form the basis for employment of a gender line as classifying device.
In addition, the court held that the gender-based differential contained in [Oklahoma law] constitutes a denial of the equal protection of the laws to males aged eighteen to twenty.
Justice Rehnquist dissenting that the decision was objectionable on two grounds.
The court stated that without citation to any source, as being that “classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”
The court ruled that the statute challenged here need pass only the “rational basis” equal protection analysis and I believe that it is constitutional under that analysis.
Moreover, the legislatures are not held to any rules of evidence such as those that may govern courts or other administrative bodies, and are entitled to draw factual conclusions because of the determination of probable cause, which an arrest by a police officer normally represents.
The court held under the rational-basis test for equal protection, it is neither irrational nor arbitrary to bar them from making purchases of 3.2% beer, which purchases in many cases, might be made by a young man who immediately returns to his vehicle with the beverage in his possession.
In U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), the court holds that the constitution’s equal protection guarantee precludes Virginia from reserving exclusively to men the unique educational opportunities Virginia Military Institute (VMI) affords.
The court examined the “exceedingly persuasive justification” for gender classifications.
First, does Virginia’s exclusion of women from the educational opportunities provided by VMI-extraordinary opportunities for military training and civilian leadership development-deny to women “capable of all of the individual activities required of VMI cadets,” the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment? Second, if VMI is a “unique” situation, as Virginia’s sole single-sex public institution of higher education-offends the constitution’s equal protection principle, what is the remedial requirement?
The court reasoned that parties who seek to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for that action.
But, such classifications may not be used, as they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.
The court stated that no “exceedingly persuasive justification” for excluding all women from the citizen-soldier training afforded by VMI.
Moreover, the court stated the remedy proffered by Virginia; the Mary Baldwin VWIL program does not cure the constitutional violation. In consequence, it does not provide equal opportunity.
The court ruled the precedent instructs that “benign” justifications proffered in defense of categorical exclusions are not accepted automatically, a tenable justification must describe actual state purposes, not rationalizations for actions in fact differently grounded.
The court stated the remedial decree must closely fit the constitutional violation; it must be shaped to place persons denied a constitutional opportunity or advantage in “the position they would have occupied in the absence of [discrimination].
Justice Scalia, Dissenting
Here, the court cited a progressive argument.
The court discussed “gender based developmental differences.”
Moreover, the court expressed proving the existence of a gender classification.
Furthermore, the court stated two major ways of proving a gender classification.
First, the gender classification can exist on the face of the law.
Second, if a law is facially gender neutral, providing a gender classification requires demonstrating that there is both a discriminatory impact to the law and a discriminatory purpose behind it.
The court discussed the proof of a discriminatory purpose.
Moreover, the court reasoned that nothing in the record demonstrates that this preference for veterans was originally devised or subsequently re-enacted because it would accomplish the collateral goal of keeping women in a stereotypic and predefined place in the Massachusetts civil service.”
The court discussed the issue of determining when discrimination exists.
In Geduldig v Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), the appellees brought the action to challenge the constitutionality of a provision of the California program that, in defining “disability,” excludes from coverage certain disabilities resulting from pregnancy.
The court ruled the unemployment Insurance Code excludes from coverage certain disabilities that are attributable to pregnancy.
Moreover, the court reasoned that there is nothing in the Constitution, however, that requires the State to subordinated or compromise its legitimate interests solely to create a more comprehensive social insurance program than it already has. The State has a legitimate interest in maintaining the self-supporting nature of its insurance program.
Furthermore, the court discussed there is no evidence in the record that the selection of the risks insured by the program worked to discriminate against any definable group or class in terms of the aggregate risk protection derived by that group or class from the program.
Congress effectively overruled Geduldig by statute when it enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which defined sex discrimination to include pregnancy discrimination and which prohibits discrimination on that basis.
HOW HAS THE COURT ADDRESSED GENDER CLASSIFICATIONS BENEFITING WOMEN?
The court held that role stereotypes generally will not be allowed.
Generally, the court held that benefiting women designed to remedy past discrimination and differences in opportunity are permitted.
HOW HAS THE COURT ADDRESSED GENDER CLASSIFICATIONS BASED ON ROLE STEREOTYPES?
In Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), the question presented is the constitutionality of Alabama alimony statutes which provide that husbands, but not wives, may be required to pay alimony upon divorce.
The issue being discussed is the statute violation of EPC- sexist alimony.
The court stated a legislative purpose to provide help for needy spouses, using sex as a proxy for need. The other is a goal of compensating women for past discrimination during marriage, which left them unprepared to fend for themselves in the working world following divorce.
Moreover, the court discussed other stereotypes also have been rejected as a sufficient basis for gender classifications benefiting women. The court cited Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan whereas the court declared unconstitutional a state policy of operating a nursing school that excluded men.
In Mississippi University for women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), the court questioned whether a state statute that excludes males from enrolling in a state-supported professional nursing school violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court ruled the party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the burden of showing an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for the classification.
In addition, the court held the burden is met only by showing at least that the classification serves “important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed” are “substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.”
Moreover, the court held that in limited circumstances, a gender-based classification favoring one sex can be justified if it intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is disproportionately burdened.
The court stated “the mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme.”
The court reasoned that a state can evoke a compensatory purpose to justify an otherwise discriminatory classification only if members of the gender benefited by the classification actually suffer a disadvantage related to the classification. Thus the court questions the remedial impact because It fails the second part of the equal protection test. Justice Powell and Rehnquist dissenting no woman has complained based on stereotypes.
In Michael M. V. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981), the court discussed the issue of “statutory rape” related to gender classification.
The court held that such a statute is sufficiently related to the States objectives to pass constitutional muster.
The court reasoned that the legislature acting to protect minor females is hardly unreasonable to exclude them from punishment.
The court expressed Interest-Illegitimate teenage pregnancy.
Justice Brennan, White, and Marshall dissenting, expressed a fear that the court reaches the opposite result by placing too much emphasis on the desirability of achieving the state’s asserted statutory goal, the prevention of teenage pregnancy. Furthermore, the justices stated that it is not enough emphasis on the fundamental question of whether the sex-based discrimination in the California statute is substantially related to the achievement of that goal.
Furthermore, the court states the issue is one-sided and not enough to meet its burden of proof under Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
The court held the State has not produced evidence in this case showing deterrence in minor females from engaging in sexual intercourse.
In Rostker v. Goldberg, 452 U.S. 57 (1981), the court questioned whether the Military Selective Service Act violates the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in authorizing the President to require the registration of males and not females.
The court ruled that it arises over Congress’ authority over national defense
Moreover, the court stated that no one could deny that under the Craig v. Boren (1976) test, supra, the Government’s interest in raising and supporting armies is an “important governmental interest.”
The court reasoned that women are exempt from registration is not because military needs can be met by drafting men. Because of the combat restrictions on women, are simply not similarly for purposes of a draft or registration for a draft.
Congress’s decision to authorize the registration of only men therefore, does not violate the Due Process Clause. The exemption of women from registration is not only sufficiently but also closely related to Congress’s purpose in authorizing registration.
Justice White Dissenting
HOW HAS THE COURT ADDRESSED GENDER CLASSIFICATIONS BENEFITING WOMEN AS A REMEDY?
Gender classifications benefiting women will be allowed when they are designed to remedy past discrimination or differences in opportunity. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) is an example.
In Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977), the court ruled that the social security benefits when calculated differently allow higher benefits for women.
Moreover, the court stated the “classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives,” Craig v. Boren (1976).
Furthermore, the court held that an important governmental objective requires Intermediate scrutiny.
In Schlesinger v. Ballad, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), the court upheld a Navy regulation that required the discharge of male officers who had gone nine years without a promotion, but allowed women to remain 13 years without promotion.
The court held this was constitutional because men had more opportunities for promotion than women did.
Although intermediate scrutiny is the test for all gender-based classification, many of the same issues will arise as in the context of race-based affirmative action, including what interests justify affirmative action and what techniques are permissible.
HOW HAS THE COURT ADDRESSED CLASSIFICATIONS BENEFITING WOMEN BECAUSE OF BIOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN?
In Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Service ,533 U.S. 53 (2001), the court allows a difference in the Immigration & Naturalization Service (INS) rules favoring mothers over fathers because of the greater uncertainty as to the identity of the mother as compared to the father and the greater opportunity that mother have in establishing a relationship with their children.
The court reasoned that there is a biological difference between men and women and the child being a citizen with rights.
