Uhm, maybe you didn't notice the link, but I'm the one working from the data instead of looking for data to fit a narative.

I look at the on-chain data and listen what it tells me, construct a narative from that that makes sense. And what it tells me is that community participation in re-pegging has gone down significantly. The lower the APR the higher the incentive for HBD holders to make money from participating in algoritmic pegging compared to locking their holding in saving, the more centralized the chian becomes and the more vulnerable to (as you observed) the centralized stabilizer running out of pegging strength.

While the stabilizer excerts a constant upward pressure, the reacivity of the stabilizer in convert operation has been relatively low. If you had looked at the actual data, you would have spottet that in terms of actual reacivity, @mika has likely done more in reestablishing the peg than @hbdstabilizer has. That is one account. Imagine the reacivity if the rest of the community had the incentive to participate.

As for time, what would you say? 3.5 days? nah.

Depegs seem to be getting longer and we should find ways to decentralize re-pegging. The most logical way is to either take away the incentive to put large amounts of HBD in saving, or to auto drop saving withdrawel time to zero days in case of a depeg.

But the important part isn't that we disagree, as we obviously do, the important part is that you were misrepresenting the HBD pegging related arguments about the 20% APR. The (main) argument isn't about extra $HBD creating downward pressure, it's about locked-in-savings $HBD being unavailable for algoritmic re-pegging, and working as an anti-incentive to community participation.