A 5ct post at this point requires the strength of about ten dozen brand new accounts, so it is already a full orders of magnitude above a post that gets up votes from a dozen of brand new accounts and two orders of magnitude above a new account giving an up vote on a comment on a post of his. I think it is important to keep the impact on the influence on new accounts, and the impact on small account vesting Vs dust level, in mind when looking at these curves.
But my main point, let's stick to the 5ct example. A 5ct post at this point in time could be a single post with votes from four 100% votes on it from four different 1MV accounts. These could be four out of a hundred 1MVEST accounts belonging to the same person created because 1000 votes by 100 accounts on 250 posts are less likely to be flagged as 20 up votes on 20 posts by two 50 MVEST accounts.
The same though is equally true with respect to 100 10MVEST accounts Vs two 500MVEST accounts or 100 100MVEST Vs two 5GVEST accounts. Consolidating vesting in less accounts prevents obfuscation of behaviour at all levels equally, and as the scale runs from a comment up voted at dust level by a single brand new 30KVEST account up to posts up voted by a multiple whale and bid not accounts, it would see logical the same insentive we need to create to keep our 100MVEST stake holder from breaking up his stake in an attempt to keep his (automated) false curation at least partially under the flagging radar, should apply equally at all sizes of total stake.
The goal of the n x S^Log(n) curve is to penalize the 5ct1000 Vs $2.50 * 20 scenario in the same way the EIP curve does, but without a disproportionate hit on the part of the economy between dust level and 5ct posts, and with an equal penalty for for example the 50ct1000 Vs $25.- * 20 scenario.
Hope I'm making sense with all of this.
RE: A serious attempt at repairing the STEEM Economic Improvement Proposal (eip) for HF21