“Every skill and every inquiry, and similarly, every action and choice of action, is thought to have some good as its object. This is why the good has rightly been defined as the object of all endevour.”
This seems reasonable enough but it both tells us nothing of what the good is, merely it is what is wanted, or whether we ought to have it, merely that it is sought after. Deceitfulness is a skill after all, and some use it in an attempt to procure opiods. Most assume that deceitfulness is not a good quality to have (though some would say it is as long as it is being employed for an ethical cause) and that opiod use is not advisable outside of those in severe agony – and yet both fit the description given.
We must, then, distinguish between various motives and objects of those motives. This will allow us to have a clearer image of what is “the good” or what is truly sought after. However, this still tells us nothing of whether we ought to have said good. What is wanted above all else? There is no easy answer for there is no single all-defining motive of humanity. Schopenhauer lists three and they seem to be comprehensive. There is Egoism, desire for one’s own pleasure or satisfaction from desire; Compassion, desire for another’s pleasure or desire for another’s pain to be reduced, diminished or prevented; and Malice, desire for another to feel suffering of either the physical or psychological variety.
If the good is simply what a person wants then it is not a stable thing but contingent of the will of the person wanting it. What is good one day could be inversed the other. People, despite feeling vengeance for others and often being guided by self-interest, feel compelled by the idea that Compassion is the nobler of the three passions, and are attracted to it while being repulsed by Egoism and Malice. Schopenhauer was aware of this when he proclaimed it as the sole grounding of morality. This, says nothing of normativity but it does distinguish between moral and non-moral goods. This also can be seen in the two uses of good, one in the sense of a “good car” or “goods and services” that which is serviceable to some end, the other good referring instead to one’s motives, usually involving considering the welfare of others.
Because people naturally attach things out in the world to subjective states they often are confused and say that “X” is the good, what they want, when it is really “Y.” “X” is either then irrelevant to the good, sufficient but not necessary or even hazardous to it. Let’s assume that our hypothetical person is guided by Egoism – so his good is his pleasure. He desires alcohol, for he believes it will give him the pleasure he is after. Either he is wrong, and it will have no affect on him (he could be an alien who has seen people enjoy alcohol but is unaware it doesn’t have the affects on him that he desires), it will have the affect he desires, but he could potentially feel more joy watching the sun set or watch a film, or it could cause him pain which is what Egoism actively avoids. Obviously it could call him both pleasure and pain at different times in different quantities, so at various times all three of these things can take place. The point here is that what he wants is not alcohol, it is happiness or the subjective state that he believes alcohol will bring him. He truly only wants alcohol when he forsakes it for all other things, including happiness.
One could argue that the drink could give him pleasure but also the pain of disappointment or crushing the hope of being satisfied once he has his drink and yet remaining unsatisfied. This is why the Stoics mention expectations in relation to our attitude towards life events. There could be a movie in theaters that I normally would enjoy, but if I view it as something that will likely give me a profound sense of joy or realization in life then when this does not occur I will feel more disappointment then enjoyment. If our good is pleasure, it then seems reasonable to have low expectations and to take life as it comes as a guiding principle.
We have concluded that it is not any “thing” which is good but only states of being, for it is these states, whether pleasure for ourselves, pain for others, or pleasure for others, that we truly desire. Objects towards these ends could be described as “goods” but not “the good,” or the ultimate realization of our motives. If what is good is merely what we want then what is good is dependent upon these wants which despite appearing otherwise revolve around the subjective states of ourselves and other sentient beings.
We can use a combination of empiricism and sound reasoning to see if “X” will give us the subjective state we desire for ourselves or others, though he even this is based on probability and not certainty, but we cannot find in reason definitive claims that will sway us to another motive or that we should be swayed to one of the other two motives or a fourth not mentioned and, in theory, capable of describing but not realizing. For if I’m thinking about committing a murder, guided by Malice, and my hand is stayed by the thought of me being punished, it is not the law forbidding murder that instilled self-interest upon me. I already had the notion of spending decades incarcerated as repulsive and my mind simply went to a likely conclusion of my crime.
How different passions are related to the outside world causally, how to inspire Malice, Egoism or Compassion is a mysterious realm of inquiry that psychologists and aestheticians should dedicate themselves to. What is known however is we can create associations in the mind towards aversion the same way they are made towards things that are deemed pleasant. This was the task of the social engineers in Brave New World. It is not that they instilled the operative system of repulsion and attraction in the infants, they already, operating under Egoism, disliked what caused them pain and liked what caused them pleasure. They simply did what was under their control, namely inflict pain on them in association with books and flowers so they would associate these things as “ills” and associate them with feelings intrinsically unwanted by humans although they are ignorant of the reasons why.
This paper is in a sense a “middle-ground” examination in knowledge. It does nothing to establish definitive metaphysical or ethical knowledge, which could be seen as the basement-level supporting other questions in philosophy and life. It also does nothing to give us the details that the scientific method has given us. A comprehensive knowledge of the human body and various foods affects on it for example will give us information to either bolster or dismiss the claim that drinking alcohol will have “X” effect or giving someone cyanide will have the effect of “Y.” However, it not only tells us nothing of whether or not effect of “X” or “Y” should happen, it tells us nothing as to if we want these affects and therefore tells us nothing as to whether it is a good. For someone can say that eating broccoli is good for me, and if I value my own well-being and am reasonable I will most likely agree, but if I do not value my own existence, happiness, or health, what in the data of eating broccoli will convince me or should convince me to value these things? If I am on a vendetta for revenge or leading a revolt with the motive of liberating slaves purchasing guns and using them could be the realization of my good. That is why the questions of Aristotle are “middle-ground” philosophy.
