You may perhaps feel that I am lamenting too much about my problems and worries. The question is how to tackle them. Needless to say, the causes for refugee outflows are by nature political. Many of today’s ugly group conflicts, while ignited by political oppression in the absence of democratic governance, are the product of deeper social inequality and injustice. If the sense of injustice is generated or manipulated along ethnic or other communal lines, then disputes may be further aggravated. Hegemonic political power confrontations, as we see them in Rwanda and Burundi, reflect therefore the lack of a complex mixture of political and socio-economic rights of people. The argument in some quarters that economic development, or vast post-war reconstruction, would eliminate the refugee problem, is clearly too simplistic. Not all poor countries produce refugees. I wish to underline this, because a proper understanding of these causal relationships is essential in advancing prevention and solution-oriented strategies.
Both the prevention and solution of contemporary refugee problems requires the settlement of political conflicts. The need for military interventions in the course of conflict resolution depends on the intensity with which obstructive forces must be overcome and political or humanitarian objectives must be pursued. I am talking here about military intervention by UN peace keeping forces or by a coalition of several states in the context of today’s internal conflicts as compared to the all-out international wars we have seen in the past. For humanitarian actors, cooperation with the military even in this limited mission has always posed uncertainties. Would military protection of the provision of assistance compromise the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian action? Can military action remain neutral when wars intensify?
During the turbulent years of conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNHCR’s initial hesitation to receive military protection of its convoys gradually changed, as it could no longer carry out its mission without the cooperation of UNPROFOR. It was indeed thanks to UNPROFOR’s military support that UNHCR and its partners could sustain one of the largest and most complex relief operations in history. While human suffering and perhaps even a spreading of the conflict were contained, we also witnessed painfully the impossibility of an overcharged peace keeping mission where there was no peace to keep and when the protection of “safe areas” began to undermine the neutrality of its mission.
When NATO came in and force was used against the Bosnian Serbs, our relationship with the military became delicate in terms of our humanitarian neutrality and impartiality. Our task became almost impossible by the summer of 1995. Enforcement is indeed a critical issue. It may complicate the arduous efforts of conflict mediators preferring to operate in a “neutral” environment, and it may lead to retaliations against humanitarian staff and the blocking of life saving access to populations of the opposing side. On the other hand, strict neutrality and ineffective protection could not lead to political settlement. Nor could humanitarian responses ensure the security of people. The relief operation became an excuse to avoid resolute military and political action.
With intensifying military action, Sarajevo in August 1995 demonstrated that a people and their city can be saved when the major powers agree to act. Determined political leadership both in Europe and across the Atlantic stepped in, out of compassion but perhaps even more out of a shared political interest in halting tensions in the Atlantic alliance. The combination of enforcement action and leadership also delivered the push necessary to arrive at the breakthrough in Dayton in November 1995. Dayton put us all back on the peace track. Military intervention four years earlier, in Vukovar, might well have done the same. Yes, I am a bit bitter as so many others, having lived through the devastation of ethnic cleansing and now being charged to help reverse it by organizing the return of 2.1 million refugees and internally displaced to their homes. Could the international community have prevented the débâcle had it taken more resolute action earlier? Or was it inevitable for humanitarian and political efforts to run their course?
Post-Dayton Bosnia is a vivid example of the symbiotic relationship between political, military and humanitarian action to solve refugee problems and establish durable peace and security. With 250,000 people having returned - and far more expected to follow them in the coming months, we are making progress. In addition to the occupation and destruction of houses, political obstruction, most notably on the Bosnian Serb and Croat side, remains however the biggest stumbling block for inter-ethnic returns and hence for the re-integration of Bosnia. Bosnia shows that there can be no lasting military peace without civilian peace. We are extremely worried that the future of the Dayton accord is at stake. Regarding refugees, Dayton leaves open the choice between return to one’s place of origin and relocation, thus giving room for policies of ethno-political inclusion as well as exclusion. The Dayton formula was probably the only one possible through political negotiations, but it does not indicate a real compromise about the multi - or mono-ethnic make-up of society and leaves humanitarian actors like my Office to grapple with essentially political issues. The pressure in some European countries to repatriate refugees regardless of their place of origin or where they can re-establish themselves, does not help and may lead to a dangerous “pressure cooker” effect in Bosnia. As far as UNHCR is concerned, we are committed to make inter-ethnic returns possible, but we need the close security involvement of NATO forces, targeted progress in reconstruction and concerted political backing.
In terms of our close collaboration with the political and military actors, Rwanda and Zaire have been rather painful. In fact such a relationship has not materialized, except for the military assistance during the initial outflow of 1.1 million Rwandan refugees to Zaire in the summer of 1994 during and after the genocide in their country. Without the military airlift capacity and emergency assistance, my Office could not have coped with the disastrous situation in Goma when thousands of people died. However, the military assistance quickly pulled out, amidst speculation about the possible revival of armed conflict between the ousted Hutu and new Tutsi leadership. There was no intention among major powers to use their military or to engage in intensive efforts to solve the complex political and ethnic problems in the region.
