@blocktrades,

You keep saying stakeholders can stop DHF spending. As one of the largest stakeholders, would you personally support reducing or suspending DHF payouts when hbd_print_rate approaches zero? If not, then the issue isn't that stakeholders can stop it. The issue is that the dominant stakeholders don't want to.

Or better yet, don't answer that, instead let's just cut straight into the meat and potatoes.

Let us assume HBD debt stress becomes severe enough that hbd_print_rate reaches 0%.

At that point the protocol has determined that normal HBD creation should be suppressed.

My question is simple:

Why should DHF HBD payouts continue at 100% under the exact same conditions?

Note: I'm not asking who controls them.

Note: I'm not asking whether stakeholders can vote differently.

Note: I'm not asking whether stake-weighted governance is good or bad.

I'm only asking about the economic mechanism itself.

What is the economic rationale for having one HBD issuance path obey the debt-stress signal while another HBD issuance path ignores it?

What specific problem would be created by applying hbd_print_rate proportionally to the DHF payouts as well?