What if we structured the proposal system a bit differently

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Oh my poor forgotten community.

Well it's been a while since I've posted here in Hive Think Tank, but it's also been a while since I've had a Hive idea. Mostly I'm still concerned with UX upgrades, and since honestly it feels like Condenser is frozen in its tracks, if I have an idea I just talk straight to the PeakD peeps.

Anyway, if you're new to Hive Think Tank, I made this Community back in the day as a place to brainstorm ideas for the improvement of Hive. Things don't need to be fleshed out or technically feasible. Just a place to bounce ideas around. Which brings me to this idea.

What if we structured the proposal system a bit differently

In its current iteration I think it's insanely hard to get a proposal funded. Especially if you aren't really well known on Hive. I don't think this is because of a lack of interesting things we could fund, but more that the design is a bit clunky and requires too much cooperation and attention. It's like the whole community needs to be on board to fund something and I think that's not the most effective way for us to get valuable work done and maximize our resources.

So I had the thought what if the proposal system worked a bit more like upvotes. There is of course a pool, where inflation goes that is for proposals. What if instead of us voting on proposals in the current design, we each had a stake weighted allocation of the proposal pool that we could distribute or un-distribute.

For example, based on her stake, user X generates 1 SBD of proposal funds that they have to distribute to proposals per day. She also, based on that stake can un-vote 1 SBD per day. She can also vote on proposals with a percentage, so 50% to one and 50% to another.

This way she or a group of users can fund proposals on their own. If they use this to farm, it can be un-voted by other users.

Abuse Vectors

Off the top of my head, keep in mind this isn't super well thought out, I'm just spitballing...

  • Toxic whale A has a huge stake and votes for their own proposal or for the proposal of an alt that adds no value.

    (Solution: This is a complicated one, easy thing is, have good distribution, but that's not really sufficient because humans gonna human. Maybe a certain amount of stake unvoting a proposal automatically kills it. Like there is a return proposal now, there is a kill threshold or something along those lines)

  • Toxic user or users spam thousands of proposals to make un-voters fatigued with unvoting all their fraud proposals.

    (Solution: It's still costs money to create a proposal. Maybe more than the current price?)

  • Proposal gets funded, does what it says for a while then tapers off or stops meeting expectations, but people are still voting for it because of different variables. Dormant accounts, laziness, not paying attention etc.
    (Solution: I think the kill threshold would work here too. As long as there is a group of users that remain vigilant that there isn't money going to useless things, and these users collectively have enough to trigger the kill threshold or somewhere around it with a bit of lobbying could trigger it, I think it could work)

Hmm, I can't think of anything else. Maybe you can. Let me know in the comments what you think or poke a giant hole in it if you can think of one.

What if we structured the proposal system a bit differently | Ecency