Source: https://mark-conlon.blogspot.com/2020/02/what-really-happened-to-united-93.html
By Mark Conlon
Introduction:
In
this analysis I explore conflicting official data evidence in relation to the alleged crash of "United Airlines "Flight 93" on 9/11. The evidence and data information I present in this analysis is
available in the public domain, and can be found from official sources. I will present my hypothesis which has been carefully deducted from the official evidence and data, along with circumstantial evidence, which I have gathered over the last 5 years of my independent analysis, which has led me to reach my conclusion.
The
‘official’ narrative of United Airlines ‘Flight 93’ (UAL 93)
United
Airlines ‘Flight 93’ (UAL 93) was a domestic scheduled passenger flight which
was allegedly hijacked by four Al-Qaeda terrorists. It allegedly crashed into a
field in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, during an attempt by the passengers and
crew to regain control. The hijackers stormed the aircraft's cockpit 46 minutes
after take-off. The pilot and first officer took measures, by de-activating the
autopilot to hinder the hijackers. Ziad Jarrah, who had allegedly trained as a
pilot took control of the aircraft and diverted it back toward the east coast,
in the direction of Washington, D.C. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi bin
al-Shibh, considered principal instigators of the attacks had claimed that the
intended target was the Capitol Building. All 44 people on-board were killed,
including the four alleged hijackers. No one on the ground was injured. The
aircraft involved was a Boeing 757–222, registration number: N591UA was flying
United Airlines' daily scheduled morning flight from Newark International
Airport in New Jersey to San Francisco International Airport in California. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Airlines_Flight_93
Discrepancies
with the official data evidence of UAL 93's take-off time
UAL
93 was delayed for 41 minutes on the runway in Newark, and finally took-off at
8:42 a.m. according to the official narrative. Yet in the Bureau of
Transportation Statistics (BTS) database it reveals a discrepancy regarding the
"wheels-off time" of 8:28 a.m. (This is the moment when the plane lifts-off from
the runway). UAL 93's official wheels-off time is 8:42 a.m. Additionally, according to the Aircraft Communications Addressing and
Reporting System (ACARS) data, the wheels-off time is also 8:28 a.m. A similar
discrepancy was found in the case of United Airlines ‘Flight 175’, which had
the official wheels-off time of 8:14 a.m., but according to ACARS data, the
wheels-off time was at 8:23 a.m.
The
Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) is a device
used to send messages to and from an aircraft. Very similar to text messages
and email we use today, Air Traffic Control, the airline itself, and other
airplanes can communicate with each other via this "texting" system.
ACARS was developed in 1978 and is still used today. Similar to cell phone
networks, the ACARS network has remote ground stations installed around the
world to route messages from ATC and the airline, to the aircraft depending on
its location and vice versa. https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Aircraft_Communications,_Addressing_and_ReportingSystem
To
understand further how the information was being generated, the wheels-off time
is triggered automatically by a mechanical sensor switcher when the airplane
loses contact with the ground during take-off. The data is then sent
automatically to the airline via the ACARS, and then the airline forwards the
data to the BTS on a regular basis. Ostensibly, no human intervention is
involved, thus no human failure is possible. An obvious question to ask is: how
can two pieces of "official" data of the take-off time be in conflict with the offical narrative? The
answer is they cannot. A question that has to be asked is, does this suggest or
indicate the possibility that a duplicate airplane took-off for this
discrepancy to happen? Evidence suggesting this possibility exists with the
account of Anthony F. Mazza with UAL 93 at Newark Airport on 9/11.
The
strange encounter that Anthony F. Mazza had with UAL 93 at Newark Airport on
9/11
On
the morning of 9/11, Anthony F. Mazza was working at Newark Airport as a
fuelling technician. One of the planes he provided with fuel was United
Airlines 'Flight 93'. In the cockpit of the plane he met a person who was
apparently neither Leroy Homer, Jr, the co-pilot, nor Jason Dahl, the pilot. On
Oct. 19, 2001, Anthony F. Mazza was interviewed by the FBI. Here's the FBI
report: Anthony
F. Mazza, Mazza worked as a fueler for Ogden Aviation Services at Newark
International Airport since 1973. Mazza fuelled United Airlines ‘Flight 93’ on
September 11, 2001 prior to its departure and crash in western Pennsylvania.
Mazza stated that everything seemed normal on the flight including the amount
of fuel that was pumped into Flight 93's tank. Mazza stated that prior to the
passengers boarding Flight 93, he had completed fuelling the plane and
proceeded to the cockpit to inform the co-pilot of the completed task. This has
been the standard operating procedure for United flights out of Newark for many
years. Mazza entered the cockpit where he handed the fuelling sheet to a young
Caucasian male, well groomed, brown hair and a white shirt, who was sitting in
the co-pilot's seat. The male responded to Mazza by saying thank you and taking
the paper from him. Mazza then departed Flight 93 prior to the passengers
boarding. Mazza stated that this was approximately 30 minutes prior to the
scheduled departure time. Mazza was interviewed by FAA employee John Patani
shortly after the crash in western Pennsylvania. Mazza stated that he reported
that there was nothing unusual on the day of the flight and that the plane had
been fuelled without incident. http://911woodybox.blogspot.com/2009/09/who-was-male-in-flight-93s-co-pilot.html
On
Friday, October 12, 2001 Mazza saw a memorial for the crew of Flight 93 and saw
pictures of the co-pilot of Flight 93. The picture was the actual co-pilot of
Flight 93, who was Leroy Homer. Mazza stated that he was certain that the
co-pilot he spoke with was not Mr. Homer. http://www.911myths.com/images/e/ed/Team7_Box12_LeroyHomer.pdf
Who
was the "male" in the co-pilot's seat, if it wasn't neither Leroy
Homer nor Jason Dahl, the pilot? After seeing the memorial, Mazza
obviously took the initiative to contact the FBI. Had he identified Dahl -
whose picture he certainly saw, too - as the "male", he would not
have felt compelled to call the FBI? When interviewing Mazza, the FBI surely
asked him about this possibility and probably showed photos of Dahl again. In
any case, the absence of Dahl in the report makes it clear that he was not the
"male" either, and Dahl was 43 years old, not really a young man like
the "male" as described by Mazza.
Jere
Longman describes the United Airlines routine pre-flight procedures.
Before
the passengers board a plane, it has to be checked, of course. Basically the
captain looks after the cockpit instruments along a pre-flight checklist while
the first officer checks the plane outside (tires etc.).
The
fact that Mazza met neither Dahl nor Homer is even more compelling than the
presence of the "male". Again, is this further evidence indicating
that duplicate airplanes were involved on 9/11? As I mentioned earlier, it is
now known that according to United Airlines ACARS messages, UAL 93 took-off at
8:28 a.m. in stark contradiction to the "official" take-off time of
8:42 a.m.
Did
passengers board a duplicate UAL 93?
In
the official narrative the passengers of UAL 93 boarded the airplane from
boarding Gate 17 of Terminal A at Newark Liberty International Airport on 9/11,
however there appears to be an account of passengers boarding UAL 93 from the
tarmac. This eyewitness account comes from the New York Giants football player
Triton Clayton White.
"We
had played a Monday night game in Denver, and flew back home the next
morning," White said. "We landed in Newark, N.J., about 6:45 in the
morning. We usually get off the plane on the tarmac and board a bus to get to
our cars. I noticed another plane sitting next to ours because the people were
walking to the plane across the tarmac instead of through the jet way. Two
weeks later, as we’re taking another plane to a game, one of the stewardesses
informed us the plane that had been boarding next to us was Flight 93 that
crashed in Pennsylvania on 9/11. That was a very eerie feeling."
Is
it possible Triton Clayton White seen something he was not supposed to? Is it
possible the planners of 9/11 did not take into account the possibility of
charter flights off-loading on the same tarmac, where a second group of
passengers boarded a duplicate UAL 93? Did Triton Clayton White witness the
duplicate UAL 93 being boarded on the Tarmac at Newark Airport, which is
another separate boarding onto a different airplane, which could explain the
discrepancies in the official data between the BTS and ACARS data take-off
times? There is no reference in any official information or data of a second
boarding of passengers onto UAL 93.
Aircraft
Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) discrepancies
Earlier
on in this analysis I highlighted a discrepancy regarding UAL 93’s official
wheels-off time at 8:42 a.m. which is in conflict with the official ACARS data,
which indicates UAL 93’s wheels-off time was at 8:28 a.m. not 8:42 a.m. as
listed in the BTS data-base. UAL
93 (N591UA), definitely took off from Newark Airport (EWR), and the strongest
confirmation of this is in this document here: [doc: UASSI1-00000398] https://www.scribd.com/document/16345059/T7-B18-UAL-Jumpseat-Fdr-Entire-Contents-UA-175-and-UA-93-Emails-and-Documents-562
During
my analysis, which is based on the official FBI documents issued on 11/09/2001,
it raised the question, was United Airlines (UAL) and the FAA tracing two
different UAL 93 flights, because of further ACARS messages sent to UAL 93
after UAL 93 allegedly crashed at 10:03 a.m. UAL are in direct physical contact
with its own airplanes, and in the UAL ACARS logs it shows that till 10:10 a.m.
ACARS messages UAL dispatchers sent to UAL 93 (N591UA), were physically
received by the airplane, and also show that the Radio Ground Stations (RGS)
who were also in contact with UAL 93 (N591UA) were Toledo, Fort Wayne and
Champaign, IL.
The
official data indicates that UAL and FAA were tracking two different airplanes,
flying at different times and in different locations, and both were officially
identified as UAL 93? Central to my analysis is the evidence that there was a
UAL 93 still receiving ACARS transmissions as late as 10:10 a.m. seven
minutes after UAL 93 had “allegedly” crashed in Shanksville, PA according to
the official narrative crash time at 10:03 a.m. the messages activated the
printer in the aircraft and, in one case, even an audible signal. According to
messages #18 and #19, they were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the Radio
Ground Stations near Champaign, IL (CMI) as designated in the line "AN
N591UA/GL CMI". Both messages were sent to the printer and Message #19
also activated an audible signal in the aircraft. http://www.911myths.com/images/1/1c/Team7_Box11_FBI302s_ACARS.pdf
These
were apparently the last messages received by UAL 93. Here's what happened to
the later messages:
Messages
#20 to #24 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD. However, all of the messages
were rejected indicating the aircraft did not receive them. These references
also identify that an ACARS message had been received by its sender, either
ground communications or the airplane. In the final moments, at 10:12 a.m. EST,
of UAL 93's flight, ACARS messages were being sent from ground communications
but were not being received. This was causing the ACARS messages to be
rejected. Knerr advised that UAL 93's low altitude may have caused this dilemma
or the fact that UAL 93 had already crashed at the time messages were sent. The
last message to UAL 93 which has two time stamps is #707, sent at 10:10 a.m.
and affirmed at 10:11 a.m. [FD-302 of Michael J. Winter 28-01-2002, Pg 3, PDF].
Knerr
has carefully chosen 10:12 a.m. as the point when UAL 93 ceased to receive
messages. Not 10:10 a.m. or 10:11 a.m. but 10:12 a.m. So all messages before -
like message #707 - have been received by UAL 93. Did Knerr make a mistake? Knerr
was also sitting there with two FBI agents and the print-out of the ACARS
messages, having the 10:10 a.m. and the 10:11 a.m. were clearly before their
eyes. And what he says is in perfect accordance to Winter's statement: #707 in
the ACARS file corresponds to message #19 as described by Winter. All following
messages (#20 to 24) were not received by the aircraft and therefore rejected.
Below is what a rejected ACARS message looks like:
CHIAO
CHI68R
CHIAOUA
111420/ROB
CMD
AN
N591UA/GL DEC
QUCHIAOUA 2
DDLXCXA
UA93
EWRSFO
There’s
no content, on the second time stamp and no affirmation. Knerr's statement,
Winter's statement and the ACARS file are consistent. Are there any doubts that
N591UA received and acknowledged a message at 10:11 a.m. eight minutes after
the alleged crash at 10:03 a.m. in Shanksville, PA? This evidence proves beyond
any doubt UAL 93 was still airborne after and did not crash at 10:03 a.m.
UAL
93's transponder still on after the alleged crash
A
transponder is a device that sends a plane’s identifying information, speed,
and altitude to controllers’ radar screens. UAL 93’s transponder, which was
switched off after UAL 93 was hijacked, is turned back on just before the
plane crashes, thereby revealing the plane’s altitude to air traffic
controllers at the FAA’s Cleveland Center. https://www.scribd.com/document/14094225/T7-B17-FBI-302s-of-Interest-Flight-93-Fdr-Entire-Contents
UAL 93’s transponder is reactivated at 10:02 a.m. and 50 seconds, and then stays on
for “approximately 20 seconds, according to information from the flight data to
the FBI later today by Rick Kettell, the manager of the Cleveland Center”.
After the transponder is turned back on, Flight 93’s radar track is observed by
Cleveland Center controllers Linda Justice and Stacey Taylor. The information
from the transponder shows them that UAL 93 is at an altitude of 8,200 ft. https://www.scribd.com/document/14094225/T7-B17-FBI-302s-of-Interest-Flight-93-Fdr-Entire-Contents
The
9/11 Commission gives an exact time of 11 seconds after 10:03 a.m. that UAL 93
crashed. It will claim this "time is supported by evidence from the
staff’s radar analysis, the flight data recorder, NTSB (National Transportation
Safety Board) analysis, and infrared satellite data". It does note
that "the precise crash time has been the subject of some dispute."
A
dispute relating to seismic recordings shows a disturbance at 10:06 a.m. and
not 10:03 a.m. which the 9/11 Commission claimed the airplane crashed. Again,
the official seismic evidence reveals a discrepancy in the official timeline narrative.
The seismic data was another piece of evidence which was inconvenient for the
9/11 Commission because of UAL 93's transponder still being recognised by Air
Traffic Control (ATC) as airborne after the alleged crash time of 10:03 a.m.
This has been explained due to 'Coast Mode' tracking, however, ATC did not
recognise any signs of CST (Coast Mode). Furthermore, confirmation that this
was not any type of "Coast Mode" is that ATC also recognised UAL 93
reporting an altitude. The only way ATC could observe a reported altitude is if
UAL 93 was squawking Mode C on the transponder, which means altitude reporting
capability. It would have been impossible for ATC to have observed UAL 93's
transponder and altitude after the reported impact time and southeast of the
crash site if UAL 93 did in fact crash in Shanksville, PA as the 9/11
Commission concluded.
Here's
the account of Mark Barnick, who was a supervisor at Cleveland Center. He
refers to 9:41 a.m. after UAL 93 had completed its U-Turn over Cleveland and
switched off the transponder for the first time:
UAL 93's transponder was then lost or shut off and the radar tag went into coast.
Other aircraft in the area verified that they had visual contact with UAL 93
and that it was still flying southeast bound. In order to follow the aircraft,
John Werth started a new flight following tag on UAL93's primary radar target.
No altitude information was available and all other controllers were advised to
keep all aircraft well away from the target of UAL 93. However,
according to National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Flight Path Study, UAL
93 allegedly impacted the ground at 10:03 a.m. The following transcript
excerpts are provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). It is a
conversation between Air Traffic Control System Command Center - East,
Management Officers (ntmo-e) and other various facilities. The conversation is
as follows in real time:
1405
(10:05 a.m.)
ntmo-e:
ok united ninety three we're now receiving a transponder on and he is at eighty
two hundred feet
doug:
now transponder and he's eighty two-hundred
ntmo-e:
southeast bound still
doug:
eighty two hundred feet and now getting a transponder on him
ntmo-e:
correct
doug:
ok buddy
14:06
(10:06 a.m.)
ntmo-e:
ok we've lost radar contact with united ninety three
UAL
93 switched on the transponder at 10:05 a.m. two minutes after the
"official" crash time, and the transponder indicated an altitude of
8200 ft. It was also heading southeast. One minute later, at 10:06 a.m. radar
contact with UAL 93 was lost, at the position 39 51 North, 78 46 West. This
point is 15 miles southeast of the "official" crash site in
Shanksville, PA.
This
proves UAL 93 was still airborne after the crash because of the latitude and
longitude positions reported by ATC (3951N - 7846W) where they reported UAL
93’s last known radar position. It is unclear if the position is reported as
Degrees, Minutes or Decimal, however, standard aviation terminology is in
Degrees, Minutes. With that said, both positions are well past the official UAL
93 crash site. So at 10:05 a.m. 2 minutes after the official crash time (10:03
a.m.) the NTSB report says UAL 93 had crashed in Shanksville, yet they had UAL
93 on radar which is absolute proof UAL 93's transponder was still
operational because ATC were still receiving altitude information at 10:05 a.m.
Air
Traffic Control's last known coordinate of UAL 93
At
14:10 UTC (10:10 EST) in the official ATC recordings, we hear two controllers
discussing the last known coordinates for UAL 93, where the controller gave UAL
93’s last known positioning location as 3951 (North) 07846 (West). Taken
from the “official” ATC transcript. See below:
14:10 (10:10 a.m.)
ntmo-e: I
don't know if he's landed ok; the last position of united I'm going to give
some coordinates united ninety three
doug: yes
ntmo-e: three
nine five one north zero seven eight four six west
doug: zero
seven eight four six
ntmo-e: west
doug: west
doug: all
right
ntmo-e: you
got the thirty nine fifty one north
doug:
ya thirty nine fifty one north zero seven eighty four six west
ntmo-e: that's
the last known position of united ninety three
Astonishingly,
the last known coordinates (3951N 07846W) given by the ATC locates
UAL 93, 15 miles past the crash site proving that UAL 93 was still
airborne after the alleged crash at 10:03 a.m. It was also reported at 14:00
UTC (10:00 EST) which was captured in the Air Traffic Control (ATC) recordings
and transcripts that UAL 93 was spotted by a VFR which reported that UAL 93 was
travelling at 8,000 feet and 11 miles south of Indian Head, PA, which is just
north of Cumberland, Maryland. Based on the ATC evidence, UAL 93 is now in two
different locations?
Evidence
UAL 93 was in two different locations after the alleged crash?
Strangely, the ACARS messages which indicate UAL 93 was near Champaign, IL after the
alleged crash in Shanksville is no where near to UAL 93’s last known coordinate, which was 15 miles
past the official crash site. Based on this official evidence and data
conflict, FAA and United Airlines had to be tracking two different airplanes
which were in two completely different locations.
No Emergency Locator Transmitters
(ELT) when UAL 93 allegedly crashed in Shanksville
The
Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELTs) are emergency transmitters that are
carried aboard most general aviation aircraft in the U.S. In the event of an
aircraft accident, these devices are designed to transmit a distress signal on
121.5 and 243.0 MHz frequencies. ELTs are mounted aft in the airplane, and
designed to be triggered upon impact or may be manually activated using the
remote switch and control panel indicator in the cockpit. Activation of the ELT
triggers an audio alert, and 406-MHz ELTs transmit GPS position for search and
rescue. [Emergency Locator Transmitters – AOPA].
There
was no apparent ELT signal picked up in the area where UAL 93 allegedly crashed.
Major Allan Knox, who works at the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center, which
is the contact for credible ELT signals, will tell the 9/11 Commission that he:
“does not recall an ELT detection being
brought to his attention”. This indicates that UAL 93 did not crash in
Shanksville, PA, thus supporting the Air Traffic Control data evidence that UAL
93 continued on heading towards Washington.
UAL
93's new flight plan to Reagan National Airport, Washington
UAL
93 deviated off course, after completing its U-Turn over Cleveland, Ohio and
switched-off the transponder for the first time at approximately 9:40 a.m. UAL
93 filed two additional new flight plans. The first one was Hagerstown (HGR)
and a second one at 9:55 a.m. was to Regan National Airport (DCA).
Additionally,
in support of this evidence, Linda Justice can be heard during ATC
communication recordings saying “UAL 93 is flashing over Hagerstown”.
Hagerstown
locates UAL 93 approximately 69 miles past the official crash
site. Another piece of official evidence is in the ATC communication
transcripts locating UAL 93’s position west of Dulles International Airport,
Washington. See transcript page 30 below:
A
noticeable gap in primary radar happens right when UAL 93 switches from San
Francisco International Airport (SFO) to Reagan National Airport (DCA) between
9:52:03 a.m. and 9:53:21 a.m. No other flight had this issue on 9/11. A new
arrival time at DCA (Reagan National Airport, Washington with an estimated time
of arrival at 10:28 a.m. Who was updating this flight? Who authorised these
flight plan changes? The Primary Radar stopped pinging UAL 93, so how could ATC
update UAL93 flight plan (which is reflected on Flight Explorer) if every
single data point has been eliminated? It was reported in the news
media that the hijackers filed the new flight plan.
MSNBC News Dateline: reported that the hijacker’s filed the new flight plan
from on-board the airplane, with its new destination Reagan National Airport.
There
has been a concerted effort on behalf of the authorities to conceal this fact,
by saying “this was not result of communication with the pilot” See
below:
Yet
there’s a major contradiction in the Staff Report published 26th
August 2004, which references its source as the NTSB report, Flight 93 flight
data recorder. It states: The pilot
hijacker, presumably Jarrah dialled into the flight computer the navigational
code for Regan National Airport in order to fly the aircraft toward Washington
DC. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/9-11/staff-report-sept2005.pdf
See screen-shot below:
Additional
information comes from 'Flight Explorer' which supports that UAL 93 was heading
to Reagan National Airport, Washington, for a 10:28 a.m. landing. Firstly, some
additional background information about Flight Explore itself below.
Flight
Explorer - They correspond to real airliners with real people moving in
real time. Now, travellers, pilots, airline dispatchers and others can go to a
laptop or desktop computer and tell where an airliner is within seconds through
real-time tracking. This service, called Flight Explorer, differs from the
tracking that on-line travel services and airlines provide. Those tell you
where a flight should be, based on the timetable, or, when they do provide
tracking, update their information less frequently. Ask any flier, and they'll
tell you that timetables and schedules are, at best, a polite fiction. "It's
the reality that counts," says Berry Gamblin of Dimensions International,
an Alexandria, Va., firm that designed Flight Explorer (http://www.flightexplorer.com) and licenses the
software to companies. The company uses Federal Aviation Administration air
traffic control reports that are updated as frequently as every 10 seconds.
Other services available on the Internet update about every 3 minutes. FAA
flight data is collected from the nation's 20 major regional air route traffic
centers. [USA Today By David Field 06/08/99] Source: http://www.webcitation.org/6Vpc9jhqr
The Flight Explorer flight-paths were used by 11 news agencies on
9/11, and the FAA themselves regularly used Flight Explorer flightpath
recordings until 1999, at which point they began recording them internally. The
Flight Explorer flightpaths include all deviations from the planned flightpath,
confirming they are position based rather than predictive. The Flight Explorer
flightpaths produced by Flight Explorer themselves used their internal data,
negating all client refresh timing updates, and so incorporate all FAA supplied
positional data. Flight Explorer received regular requests from the FAA
themselves for flightpath traces, confirming the accuracy and validity of their
data. Source: https://web.archive.org/web/20190129055833/http://femr2.ucoz.com/forum/2-2-1
More
additional evidence shows that UAL 93 did receive a new flight plan on 9/11,
reported by both a male flight attendant and also a live news report at 5:00 p.m.
by CNN were using Flight Explorer to review the hijackings reported the new
flight plan to Reagan National Airport. Source:
More news media coverage in the links below, reporting the flight plan change to Reagan National Airport, Washington D.C.
There
can be no doubt that an airplane identifying itself as UAL 93 was heading
towards Reagan National Airport for an estimated time of arrival of 10:28 a.m.
Further supporting evidence comes from the Flight Aware screen-shots below
regarding UAL 93's landing at Reagan National Airport at 10:28 a.m. Source:
This
file below was provided to Brian Stark via [FOIA 2008-3195] is an Excel sheet recording
the DCA departures/arrivals for 9/11/2001: http://aal77.com/faa/FOIA%202008-3195%20(Stark).xls
DCA is Reagan National Airport. See screen-shot below:
So
either UAL 93 was edited out of
the BTS, or UAL 93 was edited into this
XL document. Also, wherever this document came from, that organisation needs to
be contacted as to why it says UAL 93 landed at DCA on 9/11.
Interestingly,
at 10:22 a.m. WCBC live news coverage reported (Michael Hershman – President of
international security and counter-terrorism) an unidentified airplane
approaching an airport in Northern Virginia, either Dulles Airport or Reagan
National Airport. This is around the precise time UAL 93 would have been heading to land at Reagan National Airport with an ETA at 10:28 a.m. Source [Note the video has since been set to private by YouTube channel. Please find the back-up copy below from my archives.
What
happened to the duplicate United Airlines 93?
The
official data evidence it indicates UAL 93 landed at Reagan National Airport at
10:28 a.m. However the official ACARS data evidence shows UAL 93 sill airborne
after the crash and near Champaign IL. To establish what possibly happened to
this duplicate UAL 93 airplane we must revisit the UAL 93 – Cleveland Hopkins
Airport mystery landing story.
On
the morning of 9/11 a Cincinnati television station ran a story saying 'Flight
93' landed at Cleveland International Airport instead of crashing in
Pennsylvania as claimed in the official government narrative. Reporters at WCPO
Channel 9 quoted then Cleveland Mayor Michael R. White as saying "a Boeing 767 out of Boston made an emergency
landing due to a bomb threat, the airplane landing safely, moved to a secure
location and evacuated”.
The
early morning report went on to say United Airlines verified the plane as
Flight 93, but was also deeply concerned about another jetliner in the
vicinity, Flight 175, flying from Boston to Los Angeles. Also included in the news
report was a comment from United CEO, James Goodwin, who said, "The
thoughts of everyone at United are with the passengers and crew of these
flights. Our prayers are also with everyone on the ground who may have been
involved. United Airlines is working with all the relevant authorities,
including the FBI, to obtain further information on these flights."
Former
Mayor White, as well as United and WCPO comments were suspiciously removed from
the television's website in June 2004 in and around the time of the 9/11
Commission Hearings. With the evidence of these statements in the public
domain, the obvious question still remains: If Flight 175 had crashed into the
South Tower and Flight 93 was downed over Pennsylvania like the government
asserted, why was Mayor White saying both planes were in or in the vicinity of
Cleveland?
In
the 2nd Edition of the 'Loose Change' and 'In Plane Site'
documentary films, they both promoted the idea that UAL 93 landed at Cleveland
Hopkins Airport at 10:45 a.m. I had been sceptical about this disclosure and
promotion of this story for several years, because of the overwhelming official
evidence and data I had obtained indicating that UAL 93 landed at Reagan Nation
Airport at 10:28 a.m. which was in the opposite direction and location to
Cleveland Hopkins Airport. However after studying all the official evidence
data, and in particular the official ACARS data, both in relation to UAL 93's
take off time discrepancies with the BTS and also later ACARS messages which located UAL 93 near Champaign, IL which is in direct conflict with Air Traffic Control's
last known coordinates of UAL 93 (15 miles past the official crash site in
Shanksville, PA) as shown earlier in this analysis. I now feel the UAL 93
landing at Cleveland Hopkins at 10:45 a.m. to be relevant and a possibility to
provide a plausible hypothesis for the conflicting official evidence data to
offer an explanation to what happened to the duplicate UAL 93 airplane flying near Champaign,
IL.
The
plausible reason why UAL 93 was located near Champaign, IL was because UAL
93 flew near Champaign, IL before turning back around and heading back towards Cleveland
Hopkins Airport to make its landing at 10:45 a.m. If this is so then this would
explain the statement made by Mayor White and United Airlines, thus why the
story was published by WCPO on their website.
The
ACARS messages #16 to #19, together with the time when they were received establishes
a rough flight path for the duplicate UAL 93:
9:22
a.m. PIT (Pittsburgh)
9:32
a.m. CAK (Canton/Akron)
9:35
a.m. CLE (Cleveland)
9:46
a.m. TOL (Toledo)
9:51
a.m. FWY (Fort Wayne, IN)
10:10
a.m. CMI (Champaign, IL)
If
we study the ACARS messages sent to UAL 93 which were received by the airplane from the Radio
Ground Station (RGS) in Cleveland message #10 at 9:35 a.m. and the last two ACARS messages #18
and #19 sent from RGS in near Champaign, IL which were received at 10:10 a.m.
this shows a 35 minute time-line between the two ACARS messages in which UAL 93
would have travelled from Cleveland to near Champaign, IL. If we use the last
known received Champaign, IL ACARS message #19, (time of 10:10 a.m.) it equates to 35
minutes for UAL 93 to have flown back to Cleveland Airport to make its 10:45 a.m.
landing precisely.
To
support this hypothesis is the testimony of Air Traffic Controller Stacy Taylor
who recalled UAL 93 changing altitude from 35,000 ft to 41,000 ft, and flying
past Cleveland Center and then turning back around and heading straight for
Cleveland Center with a rapid descent. Source:
UAL 93 circling over Chicago?
In
the memorandums from the 9/11 Commission online release, on page 5 of this
document: http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00762.pdf
it states: "Marr told Commission staff that his focus was on UAL 93, which was
circling over Chicago. Marr thought UAL 93 was waiting for word over what had
been happening across the country to begin its attack." Note: Marr is
not "connected" to ACARS, but speaks from radar data someone told
him.
ACARS messages get transmitted via VHF radio antennae on
the ground near the plane. For planes at cruising altitude, "near"
can be up to 200 miles away. The sender must include the ground station in the
message. After studying the ACARS Radio
Ground Stations (RGS) it becomes apparent some ACARS messages were run-by RGS’s
near Chicago, such as: Toledo, Fort Wayne and Champaign, IL.
Toledo
covers a 200 mile radius coverage which includes Fort Wayne
Chicago
covers a 200 mile radius coverage which includes Toledo, Fort Wayne and Champaign,
IL.
Champaign,
IL covers 200 mile radius coverage which also includes Fort Wayne and Chicago
The
VHF ACARS radio range fits perfectly with Marr’s account. The “circling over”
Chicago means that the airplane was near Chicago. But the data that Marr
mentions is not data from the ACARS, moreover information (incorrect or
correct) that comes from other sources: FAA or Radars and therefore does not
and could not refer to the RGS that manage the ACARS messages of the Airlines.
Chicago must undoubtedly have its own RGS, but as we
learned from the words of Knerr and Winter (in the UAR UA 93 ACARS Case Study).
Mr.
Winter explains the Aircraft Communication and Reporting System (ACARS) uses radio
ground stations (RGS) at various locations throughout the United States for
communication. The messages from the aircraft utilize the RGS in a downlink
operating system. A central router determines the strongest signal received
from the aircraft and routes the signal/message to UAL flight dispatch. Source:
http://www.911myths.com/images/1/1c/Team7_Box11_FBI302s_ACARS.pdf
Some research “debunkers” believe that the ACARS ground
station is usually determined from flight plans, not from live information
about the plane's actual location, but as Mr. Winter explains, this theory is incorrect.
Furthermore, UAL 93’s acknowledgement that it received the ACARS
messages (18 and 19) sent from the RGS in Champaign, IL is absolute proof
that UAL 93 was near Champaign, IL.
CNBC
News Reported UAL 93 Originated in Chicago and headed to Cleveland
CNBC reported information from WPIX at 11:10 a.m. that “the
plane that crashed in Pennsylvania originated in Chicago, it was heading to
Cleveland and there was 90 people onboard.
Does the CNBC news report corroborate further support for
Marr’s account regarding UAL 93 “circling
over” Chicago. Does this provide proof that UAL 93 was indeed heading back
to Cleveland to make the 10:45 a.m. landing? Although this report states UAL 93
originated in Chicago, and was heading to Cleveland, the evidence is clear that
both UAL 93’s took off from Newark International Airport, not Chicago. Was this
a mistake in the reporting because UAL 93 was near to Chicago as suggested by
Marr? Was this misinterpreted that UAL 93 originated in Chicago because UAL 93 was flying
to Cleveland? The report suggests that it was indeed UAL 93. Is this a coincidence that the
report correlates with the ACARS messages data regarding the Radio Ground Stations
which located contact with UAL 93 near to Chicago?
The UAL 93 confusion with Delta 1989
Theory
Many
people say UAL 93 was confused with Delta 1989. The Associated Press and two
Ohio newspapers report a landing at 10:45 a.m. However, Delta Airlines registered
its landing time at 10:10 a.m. Cleveland firefighters also can confirm that the
landing took place before 10:30 a.m. Because Delta Airlines did not lose track
of its airplane. The 10:10 a.m. plane was surely Delta 1989. So the 10:45 a.m.
plane is by definition – United Airlines 93. To further support this evidence,
a report by USA Today said: "Flight Quarantined" - On a remote
taxiway at Hopkins International Airport in Cleveland – Delta Flight 1989 is
quarantined. Since early reports that a bomb, then hijackers, might be aboard,
Delta CEO Leo Mullin, 58, had nervously tracked the flight from the company’s
headquarters in Atlanta. Every five minutes, a new report came in. None seemed
clear. Still, the flight landed uneventfully in Cleveland at 10:10 a.m. [USA
Today, 8/12/02].
Summary
& Conclusion:
As
I have outlined using the official evidence, data along with some mainstream media sources, there are major
discrepancies regarding UAL 93's official wheels-off time at 8:42 a.m., which is
in direct conflict with the official BTS data, which indicates UAL 93’s
wheels-off time was at 8:28 a.m., not 8:42 a.m. We also have official ACARS
data suggesting that UAL 93 was near Champaign, IL, after UAL 93 had allegedly
crashed at 10:03 a.m., and also Air Traffic Control (ATC) communications revealing
that UAL 93’s last known coordinate was 3951N 07846W, locating UAL 93
fifteen miles past the official crash site after the alleged crash, which was
obtained via transponder data which was active at 10:05 a.m., two minutes after
the official crash time at 10:03 a.m. Champaign, IL, is nowhere near UAL 93’s last
known coordinate (15 miles past the official crash site).
Based
on this official evidence and data conflicts, FAA and United Airlines had to be
tracking two different airplanes. This is supported by Anthony F. Mazza’s
account, the fueler for Ogden Aviation Services at Newark International Airport
who encountered a different pilot on UAL 93, who was not Leroy Homer, Jr nor
Jason Dahl, who were officially named as the two pilots of UAL 93. Moreover,
the official narrative states the passengers of UAL 93 boarded the airplane
from boarding Gate 17 of Terminal A at Newark Liberty International Airport on
9/11, however passengers were observed boarding UAL 93 from the tarmac, which
could suggest those passengers were boarding a different UAL 93 airplane,
especially taking into account Anthony F. Mazza's account seeing a different co-pilot
of UAL 93.
Additionally,
the evidence also indicates UAL 93 filed two additional new flight plans. The
first one was Hagerstown (HGR) and the second one was Reagan National Airport
(DCA). Corroborating evidence demonstrates that UAL 93 was heading towards
Washington, DC, to make a landing at Reagan National Airport. The official ACARS
and ATC data shows UAL 93 still airborne after the “alleged” crash time. It has been
suggested that the airplanes were inserted blips, however due to the ACARS
messages being received by the airplane near Champaign, IL, this proves it was
not an inserted radar blip. Moreover, it is questionable whether or not the airplane located via ATC
coordinates an was an inserted radar blip because a VFR had a visual sighting on UAL 93, which
was travelling at 8,000 feet, and 11 miles south of Indian Head, PA, which is
just north of Cumberland, Maryland, thus demonstrating a airplane was
observed by the VFR, thus proving two different UAL 93's were in the air.
The
evidence presented here in this analysis demonstrates that an airplane
identifying itself as UAL 93 landed at Reagan National Airport at
10:28 a.m., while a duplicate airplane was identified as UAL
93 was near Champaign, IL, which possibly landed at Cleveland Hopkins Airport
at 10:45 a.m., which was reported on the morning of 9/11, by Cleveland
Mayor, Michael R. White. It was also reported via a Cincinnati television
station, saying “Flight 93 had landed at
Cleveland International Airport”. Although was later retracted by Liz Forman. In
conclusion, the “official” telemetry data itself strongly indicates that duplicate planes identifying as United Airlines "Flight 93" were in the air on 9/11, and did not crash at the named crash site in Shanksville, PA at 10:03 a.m.
Archived URL: https://mark-conlon.blogspot.com/2020/02/what-really-happened-to-united-93.html
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