Like everyone in the Hive ecosystem, we're watching the Hive Engine situation closely.
The Hive Engine breach is a sobering reminder of how much is at stake in this space. Our thoughts are with Aggroed, the Hive Engine team, and everyone who lost funds. This kind of attack hurts the whole Hive ecosystem and is happening at the worst possible time.
In the new era of AI-assisted development, seeing a significantly increased rate of hacks in crypto, security has never been more important and never more complex. The attack surface grows faster than any single team can cover alone.
That's why it's genuinely heartening to see community members stepping up to do independent security research and help projects identify vulnerabilities before attackers do. That kind of work matters more than most people realize.
On our end, we've spent hundreds of hours on security research, bug hunting, and vulnerability elimination across the Magi codebase. It's not glamorous work, but it's the foundation everything else stands on.
For those asking about Magi's exposure: we've reviewed the attack vectors involved in the Hive Engine breach and can confirm Magi is not vulnerable to a private key compromise of this kind. Our architecture uses threshold signature scheme (TSS), which distributes signing across multiple independent nodes, there is no single key to steal. With the coming Incentive Pendulum we are also launching overcollateralization as a core safety mechanism that beyond TSS assures added economic security.
That said, honesty is paramount: no system is ever fully safe. TSS protects against key compromise, but code bugs are always a risk in any complex system. The only real answer is that security work never stops.
We want to be clear about this not to create distance from the situation, but because people have legitimate questions about bridge security right now and they deserve honest answers.
We'll keep building carefully. And we hope the Hive Engine team recovers what they can.
This ecosystem is stronger when we look out for each other.
