First, this is a regressive dynamic that has been building for some time. What we're witnessing now is simply the most extreme point of that decline of external support. About three years ago, amid what was already the deepest economic crisis in three decades, I asked a highly experienced colleague whether Cuba still had any "friends" left. We now look back on that moment as some good old days, a feeling well captured by the expression "We were rich, but we did not know it". Since then, and even before, we've done nothing but collide with the grim reality that things will only get worse.
Without a doubt, I believe the primary cause is the intensification of an already aggressive U.S. policy. The first major turning point came during Trump's first administration, which triggered the oil embargo and dealt a heavy blow to tourism. The second is the current MAGA experience, with Trump back in the business of being a despicable ruler. This crazy Washington administration has blown up every bridge, every connection Cuba had with the outside world.
The oil problem started in 2019 with the designation of Cubametales, then Cuba's sole fuel importer. That forced the island to turn to the so-called dark fleet of tankers. Venezuelan crude began arriving in ever-diminishing volumes. There is the claim that Cuba was actually reselling most of the contracted inventory from Caracas on the Asian market. So far, the Cuban government has neither confirmed nor denied it. After Maduro's capture and invoking IEEPA, Trump threatened tariffs on any country supplying crude to Cuba—a sword of Damocles that has hung over Mexico and Russia even after the Supreme Court denied him the authority to use IEEPA for this and other punitive trade measures. Since January, only one Russian tanker has reached Cuba; Moscow once again left the island to fend for itself.
Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel, quite rightly, aimed an implicit rebuke—less at the international community at large than at those countries that, for historical reasons, should be doing more for Cuba: "Every time a part of the world remains silent in the face of aggression against Cuba, international law is weakened. Every time a government accepts the illegitimate sanctions of the United States, the principle of non-intervention is eroded," he said yesterday at a commemoration event.
As for tourism, Trump began in 2019 by designating a sweeping list of Cuban hotels, and has since gone as far as damaging Cuba's historic ties with European tour operators like Spain's Meliá by designating the Cuban Ministry of Tourism itself. Many operators that worked with the military conglomerate GAESA—a classic target of today's Secretary of State—had already fled in droves. The export of professional services is now on life support following last week's designation of the Medical Services Marketing Company.
So one thing I see clearly is that the U.S. has made it harder than ever for the international community to engage with Cuba. It's important to emphasize harder than ever, because some starters might think this history began last January. We're actually talking about the cumulative impact of the most comprehensive sanctions regime the U.S. applies anywhere in the world, now over 60 years old, albeit taken to its extreme.
But I think that while this explains a great deal—countries in general, and Cuba's closest "friends" in particular, don't want to compromise their interests with the global superpower—there's something else at play here. There is both a silent reprimand and an indirect pressure campaign against Cuba, and even an undeclared wish for the political regime to completely collapse. In other words, beyond cowardice or pragmatism, I hypothesize that many countries are not exactly sorry to see Cuba squeezed to the bone, and that Washington's dirty work might ultimately produce a big change in the status quo. I believe this is the key to understanding Cuba's loneliness—and, with it, our own—in the face of Trump and Rubio's ruthless and deceitful policy.
