protocols should be changed the moment they don't personally like the results
I am not unilaterally asking for anything. I made a proposal and put out publicly. Yes, people will want change when they disagree, that is the nature of governance. Whether it takes place or not is another story but yes people will want change.
It perfectly allows for a complete cessation of all DHF spending
But I still think the current rule exposes a flaw. This is not only about whether DHF spending should continue. This is about whether the DHF becomes a governance backdoor around hbd_print_rate.
HP taking 13 weeks to fully unstake exists as a protection around governance power. Stake is not supposed to be able to instantly enter, capture influence, extract value, and leave.
The DHF has no such protections.
If hbd_print_rate is reduced or goes to zero, normal HBD printing is suppressed for a reason but DHF proposals receivers can still receive full HBD from the treasury if enough stake supports them. To me, that looks like a consensus-level backdoor: stake can still open a path to HBD issuance/distribution while the protocol is suppressing HBD elsewhere.
That will scare outsiders. It certainly scares me.
the rights they paid for
Have a consensus level backdoor.
They paid for stake-weighted influence. I understand that.
But I do not think stake-weighted influence should include an unlimited right to route full DHF payouts through a path that ignores the same HBD stress signal applied elsewhere.
This proposal keeps their power, from electing witnesses to curating content and still funding DHF proposals, it just removes the backdoor.
Users are disenfranchised now. I hope my proposal can gauge the levels.
This isn't about 1st and 2nd class citizens
It is in so that there is a threshold for people to be allowed to print HBD while hbd_print_rate is set to zero.
Ordinary users do not get to bypass hbd_print_rate.
Expecting users to buy up and team up is not a fix for a design flaw.
Anyone can buy more stake if they want more influence
That is another discussion. On the general principle, I agree. This is DPoS, and stake-weighted influence is part of the design. But no amount of stake undoes a governance inconsistency that looks like a backdoor.
It is not reasonable to tell investors and users that the answer to an economic vulnerability is to buy more HIVE so they can vote harder to contain it.
It is insanity to expect investors and users to buy to gatekeep a vulnerability that should not exist. Buy Hive, stake into HP, upvote proposals, fund with HBD while hbd_print_rate is zero for a reason.
The message you are sending is:
"Buy HIVE, stake into HP, and maybe you can help gatekeep this path.", a path that looks like a backdoor!
That is the flaw I am trying to fix.
But the question remains: if hbd_print_rate says HBD printing should be suppressed, why should DHF proposal payouts continue at 100%? How is it not a backdoor?
The way you phrased
largest holders are disenfranchised of the rights they paid for
Sounds a lot like, I am not saying it is because all the witnesses I met and talked to are good people but it sound to a casual like me:
"Strong people have a right others do not. They do not want their backdoor closed"
More than anything I am a casual and that is how it sounds to me. I am afraid it sounds like that to others too. Want to rephrase that?
RE: I opened a protocol PR: scale DHF payouts when HBD printing is suppressed