Here nothing can be rendered distinct [simply] by [giving it] a name, for the entire

concept has not even been thought of until now, let alone designated linguistically. In order for it to have

a name, however, we wish to designate what is conceived in this manner “the absolute tendency

[ Tendenz] toward the absolute”; or “absolute indeterminability through anything outside itself”; or “the tendency to determine itself absolutely, without any external impetus.” It is not only a mere force[ Kraft]

or a facultyor power[], for the latter is nothing

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actual but only what we think of as preceding actuality, in order to be able to integrate the latter into a

seriesof our acts of thinking. In this case, however, what we have to think is supposed to be something

actual, something that constitutes the essence of the I. But the concept of a power is contained within

this [actual essence of the I] as well. With respect to and in relation to the actual manifestation, which is

possible only under the condition that some object is given, it is the power to manifest itself in this

manner [IV, 29]. Nor is what we have to think in this case a drive[Trieb], which is what one might call the ground of the elasticity in the steel spring that served as our example; for a drive operates necessarily

and in a materially determined manner, so long as the conditions of its efficacy are present. As of yet we

know nothing of the sort about the I, and we must not forestall our future investigation through some

hasty determination.

Result. THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTER OF THE I, THROUGH WHICH IT DISTINGUISHES ITSELF FROM

EVERYTHING OUTSIDE OF IT, CONSISTS IN A TENDENCY TO SELF-ACTIVITY FOR SELF-ACTIVITY’S

SAKE; AND THIS TENDENCY IS WHAT IS THOUGHT WHEN THE I IS THOUGHT OF IN AND FOR ITSELF,

WITHOUT ANY RELATION TO SOMETHING OUTSIDE IT.

Remark. One must not forget that the I is here being considered only as an object, and not as an I assuch. Under the latter presupposition, the proposition just put forward would be utterly false.

§2

We have just shown what the I isin and for itself; or, to put it more carefully, how the I, when thought

of only as an object, must necessarily be thought.

But the Iis something only insofar as and only to extent that it posits (intuits and thinks) itself as this something; and it is nothing that it does not posit itself to be – a proposition that can be presupposed to

be known and demonstrated in the foundational portion of the entire Wissenschaftslehre.8

Let us now add a few words to elucidate this proposition. The difference between a thing and the I (a

rational being), which is entirely opposed to the former, is precisely this: a thing is merely supposed to

be,

8 See, e.g., SK, p. 241 ( SWI: 274; GAI/2: 406–407) and FTP, pp. 112 ff. ( GAIV/3: 345ff.).

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without itself having the least knowledge of its own being. In the I, however, being and consciousness

are supposed to coincide; no being of the I is supposed to occur without the latter’s self-consciousness,

and vice versa, the I possesses no consciousness of itself without a being of that of which it is conscious

[IV, 30]. All being is related to some consciousness, and even the existence of a thingcannot be thought

without thinking in addition of some intellect that has knowledge of this existence. The only difference

is that [in the latter case] this knowledge is not located in the existing thing itself, but in an intellect

outside of it. Knowledge of the being of the I, however, is located in that very substance that also is; and only insofar as this immediate connection between consciousness and being is posited can one say, “the

I is this or that.”

Applied to our present case, this means that just as certainly as what was previously established is

essential to the I, then the I must have knowledge of this. Hence there is certainly some consciousness of

the absolute tendency described above.

It might be important not simply to have some general knowledge of this point but to describe this

specific consciousness itself in more detail. Let us proceed to this task.

Problem

TO BECOME CONSCIOUS IN A DETERMINATE MANNER OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF ONE’S ORIGINAL

BEING.

For elucidation

One is obviously conscious of what one is talking about, and the situation will be no different in the case

of philosophizing. Thus in the previous section we were surely conscious of something.

Poetry 0117