Here is, what Hegel had said about Sokrates (from the above given source - I just translated parts of the text):

The Greeks, for whom the side of the contingency of consciousness as a being was also a knowledge of it as an oracle, had in it this individuality as a general knowledge that everyone could ask for advice.

With Socrates, however, where this external law had entered into consciousness as with us, but not yet completely, it was still the existing voice, not the voice of individuality as such, the decision that everyone has conscience in the sense of common people, but imagination, like Jupiter or Apollo, etc.; and therefore it had both the appearance of peculiarity as a particularity, not a general individuality, and this his judges, however fair, could not bear, whether they believed it or not.

The court is the general legal conscience and does not have to recognise the particular conscience of the accused.
Nor did Socrates wish to humble himself before the people, to ask for remission of the punishment; Socrates was thus condemned to death and the sentence carried out on him because he did not recognise the majesty of the people, not as a punishment for the offences of which he was found guilty.

It is precisely from those who rise up among the people that they must see this recognition;

(What is truly divine belongs to everyone; talent, genius are individual, peculiar, but they only have truth in their works insofar as they happen to be common).

Socrates has violated the spirit, the moral life of his people, and this violation is punished.

... this is the revolution that the oracle is replaced by man's own self-consciousness, by the general consciousness of everyone's thinking.

But Socrates is also the hero who has for himself the right, the absolute right of the spirit that is certain of itself, of the consciousness that is decisive in itself.

Now that, as indicated, this new principle has come into collision with the spirit of its people, with the existing attitude, this reaction has had to take place.

But only the individual is destroyed in the punishment, not the principle; the spirit of the Athenian people has not been restored from the violation, from the cancellation of the same.

The incorrect form of individuality is stripped away, and in a violent way, as punishment.

The true way of this principle is the general way in which it appeared afterwards; the injustice that was thus present was that the principle appeared only as the property of an individual.

The truth of the principle is to appear as the figure of the world spirit, as a general one.

It is not his world that can grasp Socrates in this way, but posterity, in so far as it stands above both.

On the one hand, by their repentance the Athenians recognise the individual greatness of the man; but on the other hand (and this is the closer sense) they also recognise that this principle in Socrates, which is pernicious and hostile to them - the introduction of new gods and disrespect for parents - has itself already entered their own minds, that they themselves are already in this dichotomy, that in Socrates they have only condemned their own.

They regretted the just condemnation of Socrates; it seems to lie in the fact that they themselves wished it had not happened.

A great man wants to be guilty, assumes the great collision; so Christ: his individuality has been shattered, surrendered, but his cause has remained, brought forth precisely through him.