Some community members have been working on creating new EOS constitutions. You can find a list of them here.
Initially, I was a supporter of the v2 constitution proposed by Dan Larimer, but having given it more thought, I’m not convince that BPs should be involved in or be responsible for the enforcement or execution of dispute resolution decisions. This is a specialized task, which should be carried out by people who have the required training and expertise for it. It’s not a job for Block Producers.
Because of this, I’m drawn to the proposed User Agreement written by EOS New York.
https://medium.com/eos-new-york/eos-platform-user-agreement-v2-0-c0cc2496e650
EOS New York has decided to rename their version of the constitution to that of a ‘User Agreement’ because the word constitution has different meanings to different cultures and some of those meanings have a negative connotation attached to them.
Out of all of the constitutions created thus far, I like EOS New York’s the most, but in no way will I be proposing it, or voting for it via the referendum under its current guise.
I will explain why not in a moment, but first, I would like to thank EOS New York for the incredible work they have done putting this User Agreement together. Even though I will spend much of this article pulling their regproducer agreement apart, the work they have put into creating this User Agreement, regarb and regforum has been excellent and I cannot stress this enough. My critique against their regproducer agreement is so extensive because that is the only thing I can find wrong with their attempt at an EOS constitution. The rest of it is brilliant and it allows for any additions to be made, both now or in the future.
When I spoke with Kevin Rose (Co-Founder, Head of Community EOS New York) and raised with him the concerns I had regarding the Regproducer element of their drafted User Agreement, he was very gracious and stated;
“The purpose of the proposal was to be an open source template. To this end it was written with the most lean, basic, but complete framework for governance that we could create. EOS New York isn’t going to propose it. You are free to take it and alter it how you see fit.”
I have linked to the full version of EOS New York’s draft of their User Agreement above, but in order to allow this article to flow without you having to click away to a different page, I will also put it below:
All records and actions on The EOS blockchain chain_id are recorded forever. Due to the distributed nature of blockchain, the EOS blockchain chain_id is not subject to any particular jurisdiction. The EOS blockchainchain_id is to be governed by and construed under the rules contained herein, the EUA. However, Users are expected to adhere to the laws of their local jurisdiction.
regproducer agree to, and are bound by, the regproducer Ricardian Contract.regarb agree to, and are bound by, the regarb Ricardian Contract.regforum agree to, and are bound by, the regforum Ricardian Contract.All Users consent to these terms, definitions, and standards. chain_id string is included in the signature of every valid transaction signifying consent.
The EUA & governing documents are to be modified only by User Referendum.
User Referendums must be submitted on-chain either in full text or as a hash of the referendum text. A User Referendum is considered approved for execution once at least 15% of issued tokens have registered a vote for the associated referendum, ‘affirmative’ tokens exceed the number of ‘negative’ staked tokens by a difference of no less than 10% of total percentage of registered votes (i.e. 55% yes, 45% no) EOS. This threshold must be met and remain above the minimum requirements for a period of at least 30 consecutive days within a 120-day period. Should a User Referendum not be approved for execution within the 120-day period, it is considered expired and must be resubmitted if another vote is desired. The 120-day period starts when the transaction which includes the referendum question is appended to the blockchain. EOS tokens issued during the 120-period are counted toward the total issued amount calculation.
The native unit of value on EOS chain_id shall be the EOS token as defined and created by the eosio.token smart contract.
Block Producers will maintain the active blockchain codebase. Further, they shall participate in the testing, review, and implementation to all modifications of existing features, all optimizations, and all upgrades: present and future. Any attempt to alter the EUA or any governing document, as well as any action that may alter the current state of any tokens considered network funds, is prohibited without prior authorization obtained through a User Referendum conducted in accordance with Article VI. All other stipulations, requirements, demands, and standards for all Block Producers shall be delineated in the regproducer agreement.
Altering the state of any tokens contained within network fund accounts requires User Referendum. Altering any pre-existing code that directly or indirectly governs the allocation, fulfillment, or distribution of any network funds requires User Referendum.
Any on-chain provision included in any on-chain transaction, smart contract, or Ricardian Contract, involving any type of EOS based property that results in controversy between parties to such a provision, or the refusal by any party to such a provision to perform the whole or any part thereof, or any controversy arising out of any other type of on-chain agreement between parties, shall be settled by arbitration. If such a provision names or appoints an arbitrator or arbitrators registered through regforum Ricardian Contract or regarb Ricardian Contract, such method shall be followed. The application of either party to the controversy to the duly named regforum or regarb in such an on-chain provision is valid and enforceable, and regforum or regarb will act to resolve the controversy with full binding force and effect. Where agreed upon, users will submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of an on-chain transaction, smart contract, or Ricardian contract and will be administered by an arbitrator or arbitrators registered through regforum Ricardian Contract or regarb Ricardian Contract. The enforcement of any valid arbitral award relies solely on the parties to the dispute to execute.
Any current or future User is free to create an EOS Account. Block Producers may never affect an EOS User Account(s) unless the account owner has explicitly requested it, prescribed the exact actions to be taken, and have proven their ownership of the account. Block Producers may charge a fee for this actions taken, which is to be deposited into eosio.vpay account and distributed as eosio.vpay tokens are.
No User shall have a fiduciary purpose to support the value of the EOS token. No User can authorize anyone to hold assets, borrow, speak, contract on behalf of other EOS Users or the blockchain chain_ID collectively. This blockchain shall have no owners, managers, or fiduciaries.
All items pertaining to personal account security, including but not limited to the safekeeping of private keys, is solely the responsibility of the User to secure. No Block Producer is liable for any EOS Account protection.
Inflation is set at 1% per annum which is to be allocated to Block Producers for services provided to the EOS Blockchain chain_id.
The EUA grants freedom of contract based on agreement and free choice.
Regproducer AgreementThe current regproducer agreement is a good first attempt but it can be vastly simplified. The reality is that only items required of this agreement are consistent block production and the ability for BPs to self-enforce and remove bad actors.
The intent of the regproducer action is to register an account as a BP candidate.
I, producer, agree that I may be removed by 15/21 Block Producers for any reason deemed appropriate at any time.
I, producer, acknowledge and agree that my producer account is exempt from Article X of the EUA and submit that 15/21 Block Producers may effect my account if deemed necessary.
The regarb agreement serves to create a database of professionals who offer their services for on-chain dispute resolution. Inspiration for this language comes directly from American Bar Association Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes.
I, arbitrator, hereby nominate myself for consideration as a valid arbitrator for dispute resolution services deriving from on-chain disputes.
If arbitrator is unable to perform obligations under this contract I will resign my position replacing my account permissions with a null key.
I, arbitrator hereby agree to only use arbitrator_key to sign messages if accompanied by the cryptographic hash of the set of rules for dispute resolution used to resolve the dispute and to communicate on-chain directly with regforum for which I am associated.
I, arbitrator agree to maintain the following information on chain_id which can be accessed by any EOS member;
(1) Location
(2) Fee Schedule (If independent)
(3) Area(s) of Expertise
(4) Language(s)
(5) EOS Account Name
I, arbitrator agree that I can serve impartially;
(1) that I can serve independently from the parties, potential witnesses, and the other arbitrators;
(2) that I am competent to serve; and
(3) that I can be available to commence the arbitration in accordance with the requirements of the proceeding and thereafter to devote the time and attention to its completion that the parties are reasonably entitled to expect.
I arbitrator will avoid entering into any business, professional, or personal relationship, or acquire any financial or personal interest, which is likely to affect impartiality or which might reasonably create the appearance of partiality.
For a reasonable period of time after the decision of a case, I arbitrator will avoid entering into any such relationship, or acquire any such interest, in circumstances which might reasonably create the appearance that I have been influenced in the arbitration by the anticipation or expectation of the relationship or interest.
I, arbitrator will conduct myself in a way that is fair to all parties and will not be swayed by outside pressure, public clamor, and fear of criticism or self-interest. I will avoid conduct and statements that give the appearance of partiality toward or against any party.
arbitrator authority is derived from any on-chain provision included in any on-chain transaction, smart contract, or Ricardian Contract explicitly appointing arbitrator in the case of any controversy resulting from such an on-chain provision.
I, arbitrator, will neither exceed that authority nor do less than is required to exercise that authority completely. Where the agreement of the parties sets forth procedures of a specific on-chain forum to be followed in conducting the arbitration or refers to rules to be followed, it is the obligation of arbitrator to comply with such procedures or rules.
arbitrator has no ethical obligation to comply with any agreement, procedures or rules that are unlawful in any relevant jurisdiction.
I, arbitrator will conduct the arbitration process so as to advance the fair and efficient resolution of the matters submitted for decision. I will make all reasonable efforts to prevent delaying tactics, harassment of parties or other participants, or other abuse or disruption of the arbitration process.
The ethical obligations of arbitrator begin upon application of parties to a dispute to resolve said dispute and continue throughout all stages of the proceeding. In addition, as set forth in this contract, certain ethical obligations begin as soon as a person is requested to serve as an arbitrator and certain ethical obligations continue after the decision in the proceeding has been given to the parties.
Once I, arbitrator have accepted an agreement to arbitrate a dispute, I will not withdraw or abandon the position unless compelled to do so by unanticipated circumstances that would render it impossible or impracticable to continue. For where I am to be compensated for my services, I may withdraw if the parties fail or refuse to provide for payment of the compensation as agreed.
If I, arbitrator, withdraw prior to the completion of the arbitration, whether upon my initiative or upon the request of one or more of the parties, I will take reasonable steps to protect the interests of the parties in the arbitration, including return of evidentiary materials and protection of confidentiality.
Where I, arbitrator, are contracted directly by parties to a dispute I will communicate any award resulting from such a dispute on-chain to the debtor and creditor to such an award.
The Regforum agreement serves to create a database of arbitration forums willing and able to do business on EOS chain_id.
forum will provide effective, efficient, and economical methods of dispute resolution.
forum will administer arbitration cases but not determine the merits of a case.
forum will neither write arbitrator awards nor review the merits of their reasoning.
forum will provide a method of judicial oversight for arbitrator impartiality.forum will maintain a website which will include therein a fee schedule, online case access, and an up to date set(s) of rules for dispute resolution under which forum will administer.
forum agrees to maintain the following information on chain_id which can be accessed by any User;
forum will be responsible for the communication to clients regarding arbitrator awards.
ECAF was conceived as an arbitration forum, yet it oversteps the remit for what arbitration is and as yet, ECAF has not declared or clearly defined a scope for its organisation. ECAF has also proved that it takes an incredibly long time to reach conclusions and issue orders. Whilst this is good for arbitration (we want to make sure they take adequate time to access each case), it is not a good process for carrying out actions that need to happen quickly (such as removing bad actors from the system). Block Producers are probably in a better positioned and better equipped to assess and make decisions that require swift implementation.
EOS New York’s user agreement strips ECAF from the role of sole arbitrator and constitutional dispute judge and instead replaces them with a free market arbitration system (which ECAF can still be a part of). It also proposes Block Producers self-police.
I believe giving Block Producers self-policing powers without any framework or code of conduct (like regarb has), would be a recipe for disaster.
Self-policing systems without codes of conduct or moral frameworks don’t work and quickly become self-serving and corrupt. Look at what happened when the banks were allowed to self-regulate the sub-prime mortgage market without any code of conduct in place. Any sense of what’s good or bad for the wider community/economy goes out of the window and self-serving greed takes over. This is an unfortunate human condition that we cannot solve with blockchain or wishful free-market thinking. There needs to be a rule set in which we all agree to abide by and enforcement measures for those who wish to cheat.
Even though ECAF has largely been seen as a negative for EOS, their supporters say they need to remain in place in order to ensure all users (including block producers) adhere to the rules of the EOS constitution and make DPoS work better by balancing out the power structure.
If ECAF were to reduce and define their scope as an independent body that only policed and enforced against non-compliant block producers (i.e. became a completely different organisation), then I would be willing to take a look at that as a viable role for them.
Until such a time, the User Agreement EOS New York have come up, together with an amended regproducer agreement, appears to be a sensible way forward — at least over the short-term.
It doesn’t provide any framework or guidelines for how we (the community) wish Block Producers to behave as custodians of the network or how we wish them to enact their powers and in what circumstances.
Compare that to regarb which is both explicit and extensive as to what is required of arbiters who wish to operate on the EOS network.
Some say voting is the only mechanism required in order for the community to determine good Block Producers from bad, but I somewhat disagree with that. Voting allows one to exercise ones’ choice of candidate; it doesn’t put any kind of framework in place for how that candidate is expected to behave once they have attained a position of responsibility.
Corruption is an accepted business practice in some parts of the world, but not others. As a community, we need to at least agree on a few rights and wrongs in order for us to all get along — Agreements, whether stated or implied, are how cultures and civilizations cooperate and function.
The changes EOSNY makes in their User Agreement and regproducer agreement effectively installs BPs as governors of the EOS blockchain, without giving them a code of conduct in which to abide by (like it does to arbiters under regarb).
Without specifying exactly what is or isn’t acceptable behaviour as a Block Producer and instead replacing those specifics with non-specific sweeping (decision-making/political/enforcement) powers, would inevitably result in the network being corrupted and run by 15 colluding BPs over time (a cabal).
Without a framework or rules of conduct, self-interest and greed will become the driving forces behind block producer motives. When block producers are given free reign to make up the rules, they typically make those rules suit themselves rather than the network they’re supposed to serve. Look at how other DPoS blockchains without rule sets turn out (Lisk is a prime example).
Also, try if you can, to imagine voting for politicians in a country where there were no laws or codes of conduct and those same politicians were also the police and the justice system all rolled into one, giving themselves the mandate; ‘Any political opponent can be put in prison for any reason deemed appropriate at any time’.
Would you like to live in such a country?
No, me either.
Yet this is what EOS New York’s regproducer agreement advocates.
“I, producer, agree that I may be removed by 15/21 Block Producers for any reason deemed appropriate at any time.”
I’m not sure of the reason why EOS New York put such a non-specific statement into their version of regproducer, I suspect it may be so the good Block Producers can remove the bad ones as well as respond to novelty if/when it occurs.
We don’t know who the future BP power players will be. It’s a forever changing landscape and in a years’ time the entire list of top 21 Block Producers could have completely changed. EOS New York themselves may not be a top 21 Block Producer 12 months from now (although I hope they are). So whomever ends up being in the top 21, let’s at least give them a rule set and code of conduct to work off.
If vote buying and spinning up multiple nodes is allowed to continue (the EOSNY User Agreement or regproducer doesn’t state that this not allowed), then the aim of the game for BPs, will likely quickly turn into getting as many nodes into the top 21 positions as possible (in order to achieve more of the enforcement powers and set the rules against competing BPs). I think it encourages the wrong motivations.
Some block producers are clearly already breaking the rules of the current constitution by buying votes, but under EOSNY’s user agreement they wouldn’t be.
When I asked Kevin about this he replied;
Under the agreement vote buying, or any tactic, is “allowed” so long as it doesn’t upset 15 of the 21.
So, wrongdoing is decided by 15 block producers getting together and deciding they don’t like what another block producer is doing. This would be dangerous as it would allow BPs to remove competing BPs for any reason they deem appropriate, at any time, without justification. Again, I think it encourages the wrong motivations.
I think it would also be used as a method to remove BP competitors who have different ideas on how a BP should be run. Especially when there are no defined rules issued to Block Producers (by the community) as to what is deemed acceptable BP behaviour.
So instead, my suggestion would be; let the community decide what is acceptable in the first instance and then allow the BPs to enforce it.
BPs themselves wouldn’t know if buying votes is right or wrong as this new User Agreement + regproducer doesn’t mention anything about it being acceptable or not.
At best it leaves ambiguity and uncertainty.
BPs buying votes in order to stay in paid positions and running more than 1 Block Producer to maximize rewards earned would likely be chosen over the long-term health and development of the network in which they’re supposed to serve. This has proven to be the case on other DPoS blockchain networks that don't have rules or codes of conduct.
Good block producers also resort to buying votes because if they didn’t, they wouldn’t remain competitive or remain in business.
There are some proponents within the EOS community that say DPoS systems will always resort to vote buying and it can never be stopped so we shouldn’t even try to stop it and it will only go underground if we do. Instead we should embrace it. For those of you who agree with this statement, I encourage you to propose the inclusion of vote buying as a stated and acceptable practice into regproducer under an EOS User Agreement v4.0.
N.B. Without stating whether vote buying is an acceptable practice or not, we are no closer to reaching clarity or consensus on the matter. It is for this reason that I have included no vote buying in regproducer for the EOS User Agreement v3.0.
EOSNY’s version of regproducer doesn’t address vote buying at all, so as a fellow block producer I am left wondering is it acceptable, welcomed or plain wrong???
“I, producer, agree that I may be removed by 15/21 Block Producers for any reason deemed appropriate at any time.”
I feel this isn’t good enough for clarification purposes. The community should decide on whether vote buying is something they want BPs to offer and the governing BPs should then enforce the community’s wishes around it.
Under the current constitution (v1), vote buying is not allowed, yet some block producers are ignoring this rule and are doing it anyway. As of now, the only way to prevent them from breaking the rules of the v1 constitution is to raise a case with ECAF and wait for them to rule. Such a process may take between 6 months to 2 years to conclude, and is therefore an unworkable solution.
Having BPs rule against other BPs will be much quicker and much more effective as an enforcement mechanism. However, we need to be very clear and careful with regards to when, how and under what circumstances this is done.
As a minimum requirement, surely there needs to at least be a code of conduct (within regproducer) that all Block Producers agree to adhere to?
That’s why I propose we give the Block Producers a framework (within regproducer) to only kick out non-compliant BPs instead of carte blanche powers to remove any BP for any reason deemed appropriate at any time.
15/21 BPs can then remove other non-compliant BPs only if they break the rules of the user agreement and/or the regproducer agreement and not for any other reason(s).
The responsibility therefore lies with the EOS community to state to Block Producers via referenda, how and in what circumstances we (the community), wish them to exert these enforcement powers.
All documents to remain as per EOS User Agreement v2.0 apart from regproducer
The intent of the regproducer action is to register an account as a BP candidate.
If I, producer, am selected to produce blocks by the eosio contract, I will sign blocks with {{producer_key}} and I hereby attest that I will keep this key secret and secure.
I, producer, hereby acknowledge that 2/3+ other elected producers may vote to disqualify {{producer}} in the event {{producer}} is unable to produce blocks or is unable to be reached, according to criteria agreed to among producers.
I, producer, hereby agree to align my self interests with the interests of the security and health of the EOS network.
I, producer, agree that double-signing for a timestamp or block number in concert with 2 or more other producers shall automatically be deemed malicious and subject to immediate disqualification from being a producer. An exception may be made if {{producer}} can demonstrate that the double-signing occurred due to a bug in the reference software; however the burden of proof is on {{producer}}.
I, producer, agree not to interfere with the producer election process. I agree to process all producer election transactions that occur in blocks I create, to sign all objectively valid blocks I create that contain election transactions, and to sign all pre-confirmations and confirmations necessary to facilitate transfer of control to the next set of producers as determined by the system contract.
The community agrees to allow {{producer}} to authenticate peers as necessary to prevent abuse and denial of service attacks; however, I, producer, agree not to discriminate against non-abusive peers.
I, producer, agree to process transactions on a FIFO best-effort basis and to honestly bill transactions for measured execution time.
I, producer, agree to consult the community via referenda, before agreeing to move, change or allocate any fund(s) held within any system account.
I, producer, agree not to manipulate the contents of blocks in order to derive profit from the order in which transactions are included in the hash of the block that is produced.
I, producer, hereby agree to disclose all ultimate beneficial owners and all direct shareholders who own a 10% or more interest in my block producer.
I, producer, hereby agree to own and operate or have a vested interest in; no more than 1 block producing node.
I, producer, agree to maintain a website which contains up-to-date information on the owners and investors of our block producing node.
I, producer, hereby agree to cooperate with other block producers to carry out our respective and mutual obligations under this agreement, including but not limited to maintaining network stability and a valid blockchain.
I, producer, hereby agree not to act in any way that purposefully makes another block producer miss blocks.
I, producer, agree to accurately set our node location such that other producer(s) can schedule with minimal latency between my previous and next peer.
I, producer, agree not to produce blocks before my scheduled time unless I have received all blocks produced by the prior producer.
I, producer, agree not to set the RAM supply to more RAM than my nodes contain and to resign if I am unable to provide the RAM approved by 2/3+ producers, as shown in the system parameters.
I, producer, agree to operate in a cooperative manner with other block producers in order to protect and prevent against any major hack of the EOS blockchain, providing it is within my power(s) to do so. I producer, also reserve the right, under exceptional circumstances, to temporarily suspend other requirements of this agreement in order to prevent such a hack from occurring.
I, producer, acknowledge and agree that my producer account is exempt from Article X of the EUA and submit that 15/21 Block Producers may effect my account and remove me as Block Producer if I brake any of the rules contained herein this regproducer agreement.
I, producer, agree to voluntarily unreg producer or have other block producers unreg me if I am unable to adhere or perform to the obligations set under this contract.
I, producer, agree not to remove any Block Producer unless there is evidence that explicitly shows that they have broken a clause contained within this agreement that was not due to a system bug.