A question that is often asked nowadays is whether the use of increasingly complex machines leads to people becoming lazy. It is very rarely considered whether machines can display laziness themselves. The relevance of this question arises from the ongoing mechanization and digitization of the world and the currently praised and at the same time feared progress in artificial intelligence.
In the course of this consideration, topic-relevant terms are discussed using system-theoretical approaches. Building on this, an attempt is made to transfer the concept of laziness to machines and analyze essential prerequsisites. To this end, it is initially explained why laziness is accompanied by the setting of goals. Subsequently, it is shown why machines as representatives of technical systems do not meet these requirements by themselves. Finally, it is concluded that they are not able to be lazy according to the current state of the art. An outlook is given as to what developments would be necessary in order to be able to have machines show laziness as well.
To determine whether the concept of laziness can be applied to machines, it is necessary to define some terms. Lazing around is defined as doing nothing while neglecting what needs to be done. Laziness is therefore a characteristic that leads to a failure to achieve a desirable situation in the sense of a goal.
The concept of action is defined in the context of this consideration as the transformation of one situation into another, whereby the final situation is determined in advance by the initial situation and the maxim of the actor. Doing nothing should therefore be seen as a form of unsuccessful action with regard to the definition of laziness. Success does not occur because the action is not performed according to what needs to be done.
The broad definition of action was chosen to identify the term as a function of both human and technical systems. The action-executing instances are called action systems. Using this approach it is possible to instantiate any empirical actor. Empirical actors can therefore be people but also, for example, toothbrushes, coffee machines or cars.
Technical systems are generally described using functional, structural or hierarchical concepts. Applying the structural approach, subsystems are identified, which in turn perform sub-functions of the primary function. The sub-function of the goal setting and its structural counterpart, the goal setting system, is of particular importance here: Technical systems simply lack it. In the course of an action, any goals represent merely an embodiment of the objectives set by humans in the sense of socio-technical integration in their use. This means that man decides what the aim of the action is for the machine, which acts as a mere assistant in carrying out the action.
Lazing around as a form of unsuccessful acting requires on the one hand the setting of goals, i.e. the definition of what needs to be done, and on the other hand the realisation of said goals. Since technical subsystems cannot fulfil this sub-function alone, but needs man to do so, they are therefore not able to be lazy by themselves. Due to socio-technical integration, the human being is to be regarded as solely responsible for the success or failure of an action through his definition of the goal, the desired outcome.
But what if future machines will be equipped with highly developed forms of artificial intelligence with the ability to set completely autonomous goals? What if the machine goes beyond the current scope of the technical system? Does this mean that a new form of action system is being lifted out of the cradle, or are the old models simply no longer sufficient to accurately depict the rising technology levels?
Concepts that classically affect man alone or at least living beings might begin to crumble under the pressure of technology. They need to be rethought to keep up, but more importantly: We need to adapt our thinking for a new class of thinkers.
