Note: Seeking curation rewards is not worth a minnows time.
Curation incentives can turn steemit into an interesting game for the dolphins and whales. The trick is to choose content that will get the most rShares (stake weighted votes) after your own vote. The higher the post rewards become after your own vote, the higher your curation reward will be. It's kinda like picking a horse in the bookies...
I once worked in a bookmakers where I sold bets on horses, dogs and football for 10 hours a day. It was a fun job and the punters were fun to be around. I noticed there were 2 kinds of gamblers: the ones who played euro after euro on horses at 100/1 odds, and the ones who played €50 on a horse at 2/1. The horse at 2/1 wins more often, but costs the gambler more if they lose the bet. The horse at 100/1 has lower risk of loss from the bet, since to win €100 you only need to bet €1 and so the punters really don't realise the gradual losses especially if they eventually get a win.
If you think of every steemit account or author like a racehorse, there are some accounts that have greater odds at winning the race than others. Some horses are just famous for their speed. Some are just becoming recognised and realised for their potential. Then you have the underdogs. An underdog is a competitor who has very little chance of winning. It is human nature to root for the underdog. We all hope and want to believe that if we put in the effort there is a chance we could succeed.
According to SteemWhales.com the author on steemit with the most followers is . However, I used steemdb.com to figure out who has the biggest followers following them. View the table below for the Top 25.
Currently 75% of a posts rewards goes to the author and 25% goes to the curator, no matter how high or low their chances of "winning" are.
What if the curation rewards percentage for posts by the authors listed above were lower than the curation rewards percentage for posts by the "underdogs" or authors who are not being "followed" by whales?
There's a high likelihood that after being brought to the attention of the whole community by the upvotes, would have immediately gained a huge following of users that combine to make a large stakeholder. If the combined power of all of his followers were over 100 GV then the % of curation rewards for this authors next post could be as low as 5%.
This drastically lowers the incentive to upvote this user based solely on the expectation that they will win since the % of the rewards would be lower. However, knowing just how popular this author is is still incentive enough for many users to upvote the content.
I can see two counteracting ways that this system could be gamed.
Since a whale could intentionally lower the curation reward % an author this checks and balances the system so that stake has another power in determining what incentives there are to reward content. Since curators would prefer to keep the curation % higher, they are only likely to lower them if they believe they are seen too often on the trending page. This would never completely remove curation rewards, and if voters were unaffected by the decreased incentives the author would be very pleased to receive a higher % of author rewards. But there would be added incentive for curators to seek out new authors who are seeking recognition.