The impulse leads to reciprocalactivity, to mutualinfluence, mutualgiving and receiving, mutualsuffering and doing, not to mere causality not to mere activity, of which others are but the passive objects. The impulse requires us to discover free reasonable beingsaround us, and to enter into Society with them; it does not demand subordinationas in the material world, but co-ordination. If we do not allow freedom to the reasonable beings whom we seek around us, we take into account merely their theoretical use, not their free practical rationality; we do not enter into Society with them, but we rulethem as useful animals, and so place our social impulse in opposition to itself. But what do I say? we place our social impulse in opposition to itself? No: rather we do not possess this higher impulse at all; humanity is not yet so far cultivated within us; we ourselves still stand on the lowest grade of imperfect humanity, or slavery. We ourselves have not yet attained to a consciousness of our freedom and self-activity, for then we should necessarily desire to see around us similar, that is, free beings. We are slaves ourselves; and look around us but for slaves. Rousseau says “A man often considers himself the lord of others, who is yet more a slave than they.” He might with still greater justice have said “He who considers himself the lord of others is himself a slave.” Even should he not bear the outward badge of servitude, yet he has most surely the soul of a slave, and will basely cringe before the first stronger man who subdues him. He only is free, who would make all around him free likewise; and does really make them free, by a certain influence the sources of which are hitherto undiscovered. In his presence we breathe more freely; we feel that nothing has power to oppress, hinder, or confine us; we feel an unwonted desire to be and to do all things which self-respect does not forbid.

Man may use irrational things as means for the accomplishment of his purposes, but not rational beings; he may not even use these as means for attaining the end of their own being; he may not act upon them as upon dead matter or upon the beasts, so as to prosecute his designs with them without taking their freedom into account; he may not make any reasonable being either virtuous, or wise, or happy, against his own will. Laying aside the fact that such an attempt would be utterly fruitless, that no being canbecome virtuous, or .wise, or happy, but by his own labour and effort; laying aside the fact that man cannot do this, yet even if he could, or believed he could, he must not even desire to do it; for it is unjust, and by so doing he would be placed in opposition to himself.

The social impulse is also positivelydefined by the law of perfect internal harmony, and thus we arrive at the peculiar vocation of man in Society. All the individuals who compose the human race differ from each other; there is only one thing in which they entirely agree; that is, their ultimate end—perfection. Perfection has but one form; it is equal to itself: could all men become perfect, could they attain their highest and ultimate end, they would all be equal to each other, they would be only one, one single subject. But in Society each strives to make others perfect, at least according to his own standard of perfection; to raise them to the ideal of humanity which he has formed. Thus, the last, highest end of Society is perfect unity and unanimity of all its possible members. But since the attainment of this end supposes the attainment of the destination of each individual man, the attainment of absolute perfection; so it is quite as impossible as the latter, it is unattainable, unless man were to lay aside his humanity and become God. Perfect unity with all the individuals of his race is thus indeed the ultimate end, but not the vocation, of man in Society.

But to approach nearer this end, constantly to approach nearer it, this he can and ought to do. This approximation towards perfect unity and unanimity with all men may be called co-operation. Thus co-operation, growing ever firmer at its centre and ever wider in its circumference, is the true vocation of man in Society: but such a co-operationis only possible by means of progressive improvement, for it is only in relation to their ultimate destination that men are one, or can become one. We may therefore say that mutual improvement,—improvement of ourselves by the freely admitted action of others upon us, and improvement of others by our reaction upon them as upon free beings,—is our vocation in Society.

And in order to fulfil this vocation, and fulfil it always more and more thoroughly, we need a qualification which can only be acquired and improved by culture; and indeed a qualification of a double nature: an ability to give, or to act upon others as upon free beings; and an openness to receive, or to derive the greatest advantage from the action of others upon us. Of both we shall speak particularly in the proper place. We must . especially strive to acquire the latter, when we possess the former in a high degree; otherwise we cease to advance, and consequently retrograde. Seldom is any man so perfect that he may not be much improved through the agency of anyother man, in some perhaps apparently unimportant or neglected point of culture.

I know few more sublime conceptions, than the idea of this universal inter-action of the whole human race on itself; this ceaseless life and activity; this eager emulation to give and to receive,’ the noblest strife in which man can take a part; this general indentation of countless wheels into each other, whose common motive-power is freedom; and the beautiful harmony which is the result of all. “Whoever thou art,” may each of us say “whoever thou art, if thou bear the form of man, thou too art a member of this great commonwealth; through what countless media soever our mutual influence may be transmitted, still by that title I act upon thee, and thou on me; no one who bears the stamp of Reason on his front, however rudely impressed, exists in vain for me. But I know thee not, thou knowest not me! Oh! so surely as we have a common calling to be good, ever to become better,—so surely—though millions of ages may first pass away—(what is time!)—so surely shall a period at last arrive when I may receive thee, too, into my sphere of action, when I may do good to thee, and receive good from thee in return; when my heart may be united to thine also, by the fairest possible bond, a free and generous interchange of mutual influence for good.

motivation