You are right that he is not a virologist or immunologist, but how many of them would know the ins and outs of the legalities of bioweapons development? Probably not many, whereas he literally wrote the main law on the subject.
I think that lawyers are typically very poorly suited to the task of writing laws and they frequently write bad laws, especially when it comes to science. And especially when they introduce their own uninformed bias about the science into the process.
The link backs up my original "guess" that the thought process driving this entire argument is that we should entirely avoid precautionary research into pathogens and instead just wait for them to occur and kill us (or just hope they never occur). That's why I referred to an overly expansive definition of gain-of-function. I can understand the fear that drives this mindset, but I don't agree with it.
I'm not surprised that you agree with a lot of his conclusions. But I feel it is worth sharing those conclusions with others, so that they can see the mindset of the person in question, as many people will not agree with his conclusions. The reasoning is simple: it may not be unreasonable to believe in one "conspiracy theory" that you've researched well. But the more improbable events a person believes, and with less affirmative evidence, the less trustworthy that person's assessment should become.
RE: US Institute of Health Admits to Funding Gain of Function Research in Wuhan, China.