There was a Norwegian article on computer security, from the point of view of the biggest bank in Norway (DNB). I do see some common misconceptions, both in the article and in the comments field.
The title says that cryptolocker viruses are the worst, and there is a claim in the article that given enough resources on the attacker side, it's possible to break into any computer system. Both claims are wrong - I would even call it dangerous thinking.
A month ago there was an attack on the Parliament, the attackers could take out emails and other data from the Exchange servers used by all the parliament members. The party responsible for the security claimed it was "impossible" to protect against the attack. Now I believe that's also wrong - even dangerous thinking.
A physical door with a lock can never be 100% secure, an attacker with enough tools and time will always manage to break into a building. I think many people consider IT-systems to be something of the same, but it isn't. An IT-system is either secure or vulnerable, it's actually quite binary. If the IT-system is secure, then it's impossible to break in. If the IT-system is vulnerable and connected to the internet, then it's almost a certainity that someone will break in, sooner or later.
Admittedly, in practice it may not be that binary. A DDoS attack may take down even the most secure system. Vulnerabilities may lurk around for years without being known. It may be impossible to prove that a complex computer system is secure. There exists vulnerabilities that are both hard to exploit and hard to fix (like row hammer). For a sufficiently big and complex IT-system the probability that there exists some unknown vulnerability may grow close to one. Users, developers and system administrators may be tricked (or even paid) into giving access to the system. If tricking or paying doesn't work, there is always the "5 USD wrench attack" (but that's a physical attack - it's required with a local attacker that can be found and put into jail by the police).
Despite all that, I still strongly believe that if a computer system is broken into, it's something wrong with said computer system, it's important to learn a lesson from it and ensure it won't happen again.
The Norwegian mentality is that if a crime happens, the guilt is always on the criminal and never on the victim (this is particularly important in the context of rape victims) - and hence I was castigated in the comments section of the said article for "blaming the victim". One of the analogies given was blaming a burglary victim for not being at home and protecting the house. Bad analogy, blaming the victim for not locking the door is more like it. Burglary is still a criminal offence, but at least the insurance company may end up blaming the victim if the door wasn't locked.
If there is an outage due to a crypto locker situation, the typical Norwegian reaction would be to be upset with the attacker. Typical mentality is to never pay up for getting access to the files again (even if the alternative is weeks or months of outage - Norwegian article), as it will only fund more criminality. That was my gut reaction also first time I learned about the concept - but giving it a second thought, I think it's misguided.
The important lesson when being hit by a crypto locker virus is that the system is (or was) vulnerable. It doesn't help raising a clenched fist and being angry. The alternative to being hit by a crypto locker now would be to be hit a bit later, or possibly by some different kind of attack. From that point of view, the best thing that can happen is that the system is "only" struck by some harmless crypto locker virus. It's even a luxury being able to pay for a "quick fix" for restoring it (though, one is in very dangerous terrain if one pays for a "quick fix" without addressing the root security problem).
The worst? Possibly having attackers covertly accessing systems for months or years, while copying sensitive data from the system, utilizing the foothold gained to get access to "deeper" systems, etc. Even worse, consider an attacker that would be subtly falsifying data, payment records, etc without anyone noticing it. Breaking into a banking system and stealing money from some few customer accounts, perhaps the bank wouldn't understand the problem even if those customers would be complaining. And of course, bigger heists happen too.
I'm not saying that the owner of an insecure IT-system is "guilty". Clearly, from a juridical point of view, the attacker is doing a crime, and the owner of the attacked systems is innocent. This is not a juridical or moral thing, this is a purely practical thing - blaming the offender doesn't work. For a "clean" cyber attack, it is almost never possible to catch the criminal, it's impossible to eliminate bad actors on the Internet, but it's very possible to work on improved computer security.
The real victim may not even be the owner of the system, it may be the end user who trusted said system with money or private data. I think it's quite dangerous if the owner of the system will just shrug of an attack with "it wasn't our fault, it was the fault of the attacker".
I would use the word "careless" - I believe the very most of such attacks stems down to a careless (or clueless) attitude towards computer security, eventually a lack of time and energy spent on securing systems ... but sometimes, simply bad luck (as with my corona infection). For all I know, sooner or later some of my own equipment will be struck by some crypto locker.