"China is not a superpower, nor will she ever seek to be one. If one day China should change her color and turn into a superpower, if she too should play the tyrant in the world, and everywhere subject others to her bullying, aggression and exploitation, the people of the world should identify her as social-imperialism, expose it, oppose it and work together with the Chinese people to overthrow it."
-Deng Xiaoping, Chinese Statesman
When China first began striding onto the world stage less than a decade ago, her underlying self-portrayal was as a "liberator" from "U.S. Imperialism." This portrayal {coupled with some self-flattery about being destined to become "First Among Nations" after having been long held down by the West, who according to China had been united in a kind of scheming jealous fear of China's supposed "superiority" for centuries and worked tirelessly to "contain China (Sun et al. 91, 109)"} has been the rhetorical framework in which China has cast itself (at least in internal dialogues) since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, so it was no surprise to find that this was their banner as they marched outward. It has been the underlying assumption pervading internal propaganda from day one. It appears as far back as Beijing Foreign Language Press's Selected Quotations from Mao Zedong that uses the phrase "U.S. Imperialism" more than 172 times in its nearly 600 pages, to as recently as 2014 in Sun Hongnian's absolutely laughable "biography" of the 14th Dalai Lama, wherein the PLA's entrance into Tibet in 1951 is referred to as "Peaceful Liberation from foreign Imperialists" who allegedly wished to "divide China (Sun et al.)” more than 20 times.
Their repetitive chorus has never changed: the "Evil Western Imperialists" were to be viewed as this evil oppressive force under which the world labored, and here came the "Celestial Empire" to save the day. The basic presumption was "the world is bitter and jealous of the U.S, so if China uses a silver-tongue and speaks enough of 'mutual benefit' while simultaneously portraying the U.S. as self-serving and weak, (Zhao, China Daily), countries will prostrate themselves at the feet of 'China the Great' who will then enjoy her 'rightful great rejuvenation (Jennings, Forbes),' which they have been unjustly denied by a shadowy coalition of bitter and scheming foreign nations, jealous of 'the Central Nation.'"
And frankly, this was working, at least for a while. Then, around 2009, China's "Charm Offensive" started to lose its charm and just become offensive (Newsham, National Interest), and the country became rather overt in their narrative that they are somehow entitled to world leadership and no one has the right to oppose them in it (Jennings, Forbes), even going so far as to calmly suggest the "Belt and Road" disputes should be settled by newly established Chinese-ruled International Courts, unabashedly subject to the rule of the Chinese Communist Party but whose rulings would be considered internationally binding.
Yeah, you read that right. Can you imagine the outcry from China if any other country (say, the U.S.) suggested "we will create a division of our government, absent any international oversight, to settle disputes between other countries and us, and we will fund these courts, whose judges we will appoint, but their rulings will have the weight of international law?" And yet, China simply cannot fathom why the "lesser nations" have not lined up to debase themselves before China. As James Jay Carafano put it, "From a Chinese perspective, all these initiatives might make sense: they are reconstructing a world that looks like the Middle Kingdom. The rest of the world, however, would probably prefer to live in the 21st century (Carafano, National Interest)."
And it didn't take long for the world to show that. China cannot yet even fully be said to have pulled alongside the U.S. as a superpower, and already the "liberator" facade is beginning to show cracks, as I showed in my previous article and the one before it. As China attempts to muscle her way into world leadership, her aggression and arrogance are earning her a lot of enemies (Marino, Reuters), from small nations surrounding her (who she thinks she can push around and no one will speak up because China quite mistakenly estimates that these small nations are not significant enough in the eyes of major powers to risk a confrontation with China) to major players with military capabilities China's PLA is not ready to confront. In short, things are happening exactly as Deng Xiaoping predicted, give or take the "working together with the Chinese People" part (no one outside of China seems to care about ousting the CCP from China anymore; so long as they oust the CCP from countries other than China). As dissatisfied as some countries are with the U.S's partially self-appointed role as "First Among Equals (and perhaps it is time to step back and reconsider our relations with some countries)," nation after nation is standing up to state categorically that they have found China's outright exploitation to be worse. While there is a common view among the ill-informed that China is some sort of unstoppable force, that there is no point opposing her and that anyone wishing to survive must yield to her without question (I'm looking right at you, Duterte), in this three-part article I'm going to shed some light on just how perilous China's present situation really is, and how completely outmatched, outmaneuvered and utterly out-of-her depth she truly is.
In Part 1 I'm going to introduce the lengthy list of smaller nations who have felt China's aggression and are uniting to push back, even if that means militarily. In Part 2 I'll introduce the so-called "Quad-Alliance," the four major powers who have seen not only their allies but also themselves wronged by China's bullying and after exercising admirable patience waiting for China to grow up, are finally lending their considerable clout to the list mentioned in Part 1. Finally, Part 3 will shed some light on just how limited China's capabilities truly are. Mind you, I'm not comparing China to the U.S. here. I've already done that in an older article, and established that contrary to the hype, there's no comparison. No, instead I'm going to show that the PLA really doesn't even have the capabilities to take on the combined power of her nearby rivals. But first, let's meet who those rivals are, beginning with the ones China mistakenly thought the world would view as "expendable pawns."
Taiwan
One would be hard-pressed to think of any nation that stands more to lose from an ascendant China than Taiwan. Even that sentence would set off censors if you typed it into WeChat, because China is not the least bit shy about punishing anyone who dares refer to Taiwan as a nation, and that shows you what is at stake for Taiwan: their very existence. Beijing claims that the tiny island, the last holdout of the Pre-1949 Republic of China, is a "rebel province" and has never renounced the use of force to "reunify China." In fact, under Xi Jinpeng, the regime has been very open about their threats (Reuters UK), and Wang Hongguang, former commander of the PLA's Nanjing Theatre of Operations, ran a six page article for Huangqiu with a title that translates into something about "how to reunify by force," wherein he gleefully (if a bit unrealistically) puts the inherently barbaric and inhumanly tyrannical nature of the CCP on display by tauntingly bragging of bombing the island into utter subjugation, boasting primarily of the number of fatalities he hoped to inflict. If your Mandarin is a little rusty and your translator is no better, then skip over that sea of Hanzi cave-drawings and just look at what the PLA did when they "liberated" Tibet. Do you remember? Well, Taiwan does.
Fortunately, Taiwan is not as defenseless as General Wang likes to think (Cole, Michael J. National Interest). Simply put, the PLA would have to put its full resources into such an endeavor (something they can ill-afford to do with their military spread as thin as it is right now), as well as firing at nearby Japanese and U.S. assets at the outset. Needless to say this would invite a brutal counterattack from both of those countries, even if they weren't already committed to Taiwan's defense.
There is also the minor little detail that Taiwan now possesses missiles capable of hitting Beijing (Everington, Taiwan News). Even without nuclear capabilities, the possibility of missiles raining down on Tiananmen Square in a retaliatory strike is not something Beijing can afford.
Vietnam
In the United States there is a general view that China and Vietnam are the best of friends. This view likely stems from China's support of the NVA and Viet Cong during the Vietnam War. What's not so commonly known in the West is that there are centuries of enmity between the two, owing largely to the fact that several Chinese Dynasties exercised colonial control over Vietnam and many Chinese today (including Xi Jinping, by all accounts) still view Vietnam as exactly what it is described as in the WeChat post shown above: a "subsidiary" of China. Vietnam's "northern big brother" tried to demonstrate this in the 1970's. As soon as the NVA either "conquered South Vietnam" or "unified Vietnam," depending on whether your propaganda was written in the East or the West, the Chinese wasted no time in invading Vietnam (Pike, Global Security), which many Chinese believe is an "ancient and inalienable part of China," the same phrase they use for Tibet. Americans can soothe our egos with the knowledge that even though it took the Vietnamese 20 years to drive us out, the PLA invasion force was handed a humiliating defeat which "no amount of strategic propaganda can cover (Pike)" within a matter of months by the battle-scarred, war-weary, exhausted remnant of the Viet Cong left over after the war. At the war's end, disputes over China's illegal "Nine Dash Line," which includes Vietnam in the list of countries whose territory it violates, certainly did not improve relations any (Perlez, NY Times). Relations have deteriorated so far by now that Vietnam, in a move that can be viewed either as a repeat of history or an ironic reversal, has reached out to the United States for help against China's aggression. The United States has provided this help in the form of lifting an ages-old ban on arms sales to Vietnam and, of course, sending the supercarrier U.S.S. Carl Vinson to Vietnam (Asia times), after a quick stroll through the Scarborough Shoal (Endo, Nikkei). Rest assured, the message was not lost on China.
Thailand
"Hey dude, I need a favor. Um, could you cut yourself in half for me? Thanks." This is essentially the proposal China has been trying to make to Thailand since 1677 (Crispin, Asia times). And no, that's not a typo. China wants sea-access to the Indian Ocean without going through choke points in Malacca, and they feel that the narrow peninsular country's southern isthmus would give it to them. Thailand, for numerous reasons (not the least of them being a Jihadic insurgency in Thailand's southern regions who do not need the encouragement that a suddenly-existent water border would provide), has never been keen on the idea. However, Xi Jinping views it as an essential part of his "Maritime Silk Road" goal, and Xi has a history of not quite understanding when other countries, for some inexplicable reason, are a bit hesitant to sacrifice their core interests for China's benefit. Given Beijing's history of coercion of countries that don't go along with their initiatives, it's no surprise that Thailand has pursued closer military ties with the U.S. (Parameswaran, The Diplomat, b) as the latest step in a recent push by both coutnries to mend strained ties (Parameswaran, The Diplomat, a).
Singapore
When it comes to a clash between any Pacific power and China, whoever wins, Singapore loses, and Singapore has always been keenly aware of that. During periods of heightened tensions and saber-rattling between Washington and Beijing it has consistently been Singapore, who has strong economic interests in both countries, that has cried the loudest for a calm solution. However, when it comes to defense, Singapore's closest ally has always been the United States (Parameswaran, RSIS Publications). Recently, as China has begun flexing its muscles in the seas to her south, there have been signs that Singapore, who vividly remembers being overrun by the Japanese Empire in WW2, fears a repeat performance by China (Mahmud, Channel News Asia). This goes a long way toward explaining why Singapore and the U.S. just finished conducting their largest joint military exercise in a decade (Parameswaran, The Diplomat, c).
South Korea
South Korea has a long history of anti-Chinese sentiment, likely due to the fact that South Korea's violently hostile northern neighbor owes their entire existence to the PRC's 1950's campaign to "Liberate" the Korean Peninsula from "Western Imperialist puppets," which has always been China's term of endearment for the Republic of Korea (Sun et al. 61). Recent events such as China's boycott of Lotte Mart (a protest against South Korea granting the U.S. permission to put an interceptor system in South Korea to shield them from China's North Korean puppets), and Xi Jinping's repeated remarks about the Korean Peninsula being "former Chinese territories (Nakazawa, Nikkei)," a term far too reminiscent of the phrasing China uses to justify their disputed territorial claims elsewhere, have certainly not improved the Republic's attitude toward China. Indeed, many believe (including this author) that Xi Jinping tipped his hand about China's next Imperialistic adventure, and China's response (Corr, Forbes) has certainly done nothing to make that less apparent.
In recent months though, China's aggression has gone beyond words and boycotts, and entered the realm of open military action. With 300,000 troops being deployed to the Sino-Korean border (Lee, Chosunilbo), and Chinese warplanes making blatant incursions into both Japanese and South Korean airspace (Asia times, "Japan"), it's no surprise that South Korea is preparing for war, and it's safe to say they are preparing to fight not only the barking dog in Pyongyang, but the owner in Beijing who has failed to keep hold of the leash.
Indonesia
Indonesia has tried (and to a large extent managed) to stay out of the fighting between China and nearly every one of her neighbors. However, China's illegal claim over the West Philippine Sea extends far enough south that it overlaps with Indonesia's long-held sovereign territory. And of course, being China, they felt the need to make sure to pick a fight over it by sending fishing boats hundreds of miles from their coast and into Indonesian waters, spurring a backlash from Indonesia. This backlash started with the renaming of the disputed expanse of sea (Allard et al., Reuters). China, in typical Chinese fashion, insisted this was "meaningless," because of course any decree that did not come from the "Ruler of Tianxia" is invalid, or whatever excuse lurks in the mind of a Zhonghua Jingoist. Regardless of how "meaningless" Beijing thought the move was, Indonesia took it seriously enough that Indonesian and Chinese naval vessels have already traded shots over the issue (Cochrane, NY Times).
The Philippines
sigh...
Ah, the Philippines. Where do I even begin? This article has already gone on for about twice the length I intended so I won't go into the entire opera of China's bullying of the Philippines. I've already done one entry about it, as well as another criticizing how little the Philippine President is doing about it. At this point I'll just presume that anyone who has lived anywhere other than somewhereunderarockistan has heard about it. However, I would like to take just a moment to point out that even though Duterte seems content to sit by and let China despoil his country, it is apparent that some of his generals are aware of the dangers posed by China, which is why they are building up their manpower (Wakefield, Bulletin). Admittedly, an increase of 8,000 troops does not seem to Western eyes like a huge move for a country with a population of 100 million, but given the limited military budget of the AFP, it's indicative that someone somewhere in the chain of command, even if it's probably not the presidential palace, still hasn't been neutered by Xi Jinping.
The Quad Alliance
Of course, the sad reality is the nations listed here would not be able to do much against China, even combined. Someone would have to back them, someone powerful. They're the minnows of geopolitics, and aren't able to do much against a whale like China. Fortunately for them, an alliance is already in the works elsewhere to do exactly that, as I'll explain in my next entry: an alliance consisting of one barracuda, two sharks, and one leviathan China really is absolutely not prepared to cross swords with.
Works Cited
Books
Mao Zedong. "Selected Quotations." Foreign Language University Press. Beijing. 1972
ISBN 0-8351-2388-X
Sun Hongnian, Zhang Yongpan & Li Sheng. "The 14th Dalai Lama." China Intercontinental Press. Beijing. 2014
ISBN 978-7-5085-2642-3
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