I already told you that I liked the idea of being able to redirect a part of your inflation reward to another author as post reward. However, I have a few objections to your proposal. a) Governance I think

Gina code is finished and Gina will launch on friday on hive =)

I correct "everyone" to "the huge chunk of the stake". And definitely, hive needs a restructuring of the value proposition of this. Removing "curation" is from a game theory

I don't agree with the "free downvotes" part. You have to be able to direct values upwards as well as downwards. And you should not have to "lose out" on money by directing rewards

It would get a larger relative curation not a larger curation value. The 19$ bet could still get 5$ curation (around 25% of the bet) but the 1$ bet could get 50 cents (50%)

Can you please back your 45% claim up with proofs?

I think there are some ways to avoid this. To be honest I have not completely researched this and neither completely calculated it through because I want community input on these things first before I

If you rampantly over or under evaluate you will get less curation. That's the idea.

We could even expand this system and start a new round of bets every week. If a user thinks the post is worth more than it played out within a week he can bet higher and can get curation within a week

Similarly to the other users you think that reducing it to 16 will prevent someone from taking over all 20. However, it would be easy enough to distribute some of the tokens to a second account and then

We did it!

If every account on Steem only has 1 SP. Then 1t1v == 1a1v. This allows maximum flexibility to allocate stake to votes. This is the assumption I work with.

On purpose. 1t1v basically allows you to distribute your voting stake to as many accounts as you want without having to power it down. So basically 1t1v is like a 1a1v where every account has only 1 SP.

Ty, I corrected it

I like the idea in general, but it would then result in Peer to Peer vote buying to increase your own REP.

I understand this. However, designing a good REP system is difficult, designing one that cannot be games even more difficult and designing one that cannot be gamed and users don't sell their accounts with

With less democratic I meant "witnesses get more power the more reputation they have compared to the stakeholders without having any stake". I agree that new accounts becoming an administrator

As many others already pointed out, making an automatic assessment of reputation is extremely difficult. And that is not all, there is no guarantee that the account owner stays the same. Probably the easiest

I'm there already, sounds good then

(Talking about designing consensus, governance, etc)